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Some scholars who have studied the Iranian Oil Nationalization Crisis o f 1949- 
1953 have lamented the outcome and consequences of this crisis. During this 
period, some analysts assert that the U.S. government should have followed a 
different course of action. They claim that, despite British objections, Iran’s 
Musaddiq government should have been supported in order to hasten a new oil 
agreement and attain a more democratic regime for Iran. This part o f the 
revisionist school also claims that Western ignorance and prejudice was a key 
sculptor of the outcome of the crisis, and a direct contributor to the subsequent 30 
years of authoritarian rule under Mohammad Reza Shah.
However, this study will examine other, more pertinent causes of the courses and 
consequences of the crisis. It is true that Western officials, particularly British, 
frequently exhibited ignorance and lack of cultural sensitivity before, during, and 
after the crisis. Yet these cultural causes were not the preeminent factors that 
shaped the outcome. Rather, there were other, more significant sculptors of the 
crisis’ outcome.
First, the internal political situation inside Iran, coupled with Musaddiq’s 
intransigence, combined to create a recalcitrant Iranian stance during oil 
negotiations. Second, the British government and public were resistant to an oil 
settlement that deprived Britain of its historic economic interests in Iran. Third, 
the effects of Cold War dynamics were strong. The American government 
opposed Musaddiq and oil nationalization not due to bigotry, but due to their 
assessment that continued instability in Iran could hasten a Communist takeover 
in Tehran. Fourth, British prejudice and Iranian suspicion helped shape their 
intransigent postures. Fifth, Musaddiq would have fallen from power even 
without Anglo-American intervention, for opposition to his government was 
strong by 1953.
In essence, there were several factors that shaped the crisis. Though ignorance 
and prejudice were two o f these factors, they were by no means the most 
influential. This study will analyze other, more powerful factors that affected 
American-Iranian relations during this period.
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PARTI: NARRATIVE 
1. A Diplomacy off Priority
As frequently occurs in the conduct of foreign relations, we tend to see the 
full scope of our mistakes, misunderstandings, and miscalculations after the 
negative consequences of our actions are revealed. In the case of American- 
Iranian relations, the Revolution of 1979-1980 indeed has been viewed as a direct, 
negative consequence o f misdirected U.S. foreign policy. For 30 years previous 
to the ascension of Iran’s religious right, the American government gave 
economic, military and political support to the increasingly authoritarian 
Mohammad Reza Shah. This policy was adopted due to die Shah’s virulent anti­
communism, and to die perceived lack of any viable pro-Western political 
alternative. Yet it was a policy fated for failure. The Shah’s violent suppression 
o f political dissent and lack of substantively successful economic and political 
reforms throughout the 1970s, effectively galvanized otherwise-antithetical forces 
within Iran against his rule. These forces eventually caused his fall.
In the past 20 years, several histories have sought to reevaluate American- 
Iranian diplomatic relations using the clarity provided by the Iranian Revolution. 
This revolution was a severe shock to the Carter Administration, as well as to the 
American public. The deposing of a loyal monarch-ally, the seizing of American 
hostages, the burning of American flags, and infuriated students chanting of 
“Death to America!” were a bewildering spectacle to a constituency that was
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mainly ignorant of the culture and politics of the Near East. It was this maelstrom 
that prompted the self-evident question, “What went wrong in U.S.-Iranian 
relations?” The authors of such histories have reminded us that in the first half of 
the 20th century, the United States actually enjoyed the favor of the majority of 
Iranians. They have searched for mistakes, misunderstandings and 
miscalculations in policy during the reign of that staunch U.S. ally, Mohammad 
Reza Shah.
The Revisionist School
In these evaluations of American-Iranian diplomacy, the Oil 
Nationalization Crisis o f 1949-1953 is often cited as the critical turning point in 
relations between the two countries. This is a correct assessment. Previous to this 
time, the U.S. enjoyed the favor of the Iranian majority due mainly to America’s 
lack of geopolitical interest and subsequent interference in Iranian affairs. 
Traditionally, it had been the British who had protected Western interests. The 
United States thus was content to remain an aloof neutral in the region, supplying 
Iran with only small-scale technical, economic, and military assistance programs 
in the 1920s and 1930s. America’s military presence during the Second World 
War, though substantial in comparison to previous interventions, was nonetheless 
limited. The U.S. Army stationed some 30,000 personnel in Iran, and this only to 
lend technical assistance for the shipment o f lend-lease materiel to Soviet Russia. 
Therefore, given the previous warmth of U.S.-Iranian relations, revisionists claim 
that misguided American demeanor and actions during the Oil Nationalization
2
Crisis embittered anti-Shah factions in Iran, and sowing the seeds for revolution 
three decades later. These revisionists, if that is a just label, claim that the U.S. 
Department of State, during the pivotal year 1953, should have supported 
nationalist Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq as a more favorable 
alternative to the pro-western, authoritarian monarch Reza Shah. Further, this line 
of argument contends the following:
1. Musaddiq and other champions of oil nationalization had 
legitimate grievances regarding past and extant agreements vis-a- 
vis the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).
2. American diplomats exhibited little knowledge of Iran’s 
complex social, political, and economic landscape. Their 
understanding of Iran was limited mainly to the Shah’s inner 
circle. Little was known about the sufferings, aspirations, and 
needs of Iran’s poor majority.
3. Further, British and American ignorance and cultural bias, 
combined with Musaddiq’s own eccentricities, led to strong 
personal prejudices against the Iranian prime minister. These 
biases prevented them from seeing Musaddiq’s favorable qualities, 
such as his goals o f land reform and the installation of a 
consitutional monarchy, based on the British model, that would 
limit the Shah’s powers.
4. The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations should have been 
more forceful in replacing Britain as guardian of Western interests
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in Iran. This criticism holds that the Americans were slow to act, 
and so squandered valuable time and opportunities to solve the 
British-Iranian impasse.
5. American officials overestimated the severity o f the Soviet 
threat, mistakenly believing that Musaddiq’s premiership could be 
hijacked by the leftist Tudeh Party. By the summer o f 1953, 
American officials were eager to embrace Reza Shah as the only 
viable pro-western alternative to Musaddiq. Yet the State 
Department consistently overlooked Musaddiq’s qualities, and 
instead supported Reza Shah, a virulently anti-Communist leader.
6. The U.S. government should have exchanged short-term for 
long-term goals. The Soviet-American rivalry served as an 
influence on U.S. policy, one that was not commensurate with the 
realities o f Soviet intentions and actions. Rather, the long-term 
economic, political, and social welfare of the Iranian people should 
have been of paramount importance, and led to an embrace of 
Musaddiq’s regime.1
Before addressing the inaccurate assertions listed above, it is important, in 
the interests of fairness, to first concede to the revisionist school their accurate 
assertions. These analysts have contributed greatly to the field of American- 
Iranian relations. They have been willing to reevaluate the conduct o f U.S.
1 See James F. Goode, The United States ami Iran, 1946-51: The Diplomacy o f Neglect (London: 
MacMillan, 1989), and The United States and Iran: In the Shadow o f Musaddiq (New York: St.
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foreign policy in the entire Near East, not just in Iran, and in doing so are seeking 
to chart a more productive American diplomacy, one loss inclined toward cultural 
prejudice, ignorance, and ethnocentrism. Therefore, the revisionist school is 
correct on the first three points listed above. First, the Iranian government, in its 
oil agreements with AIOC, had historically received treatment and profits 
incongruous with the resources being provided to Britain. Second, the majority of 
American officials in Washington and Teheran had scant knowledge of Iran. 
Third, British and American cultural and personal prejudices clouded their 
assessments of Musaddiq, leading directly to their covert support of the Shah 
during the 1953 coup.
However, contentions four to six are not entirely accurate. These points 
will be addressed in the order they appear above. Regarding point four, criticism 
has been levied against American officials and diplomats for what has been 
viewed as a lethargic response to the crisis. This requires a more adequate 
interpretation. U.S. involvement in Iran was minimal in the late 19th century, and 
of a predominantly private nature. American missionaries and soeial-aid workers 
came to Iran during this period, so diplomatic relations were established with the 
purpose of representing and protecting U.S. citizens in Iran. In the first half o f the 
20th century, as previously mentioned, U.S. involvement expanded to include 
economic, military, and public works programs sponsored by the government. 
Yet these programs were small in relation to the aid provided for other countries. 
Until the Second World War the United States was a secondary player, for she 
maintained no significant economic or military interests in Iran. Thus, the State
Martin’s Press, 1997) for good examples of the revisionist interpretation.
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Department was content to allow Great Britain a free hand in the country.
Anyone, then, who criticizes die U.S. government for not getting involved earlier
in the Oil Nationalization Crisis o f 1949-1953 is missing the mark. The British
had been active in Iran for approximately 150 years. It was understandable, then,
that the Americans would be hesitant to intervene directly during the early months
o f the crisis. Further, contrary to revisionist thought, the United States
government was not entirely without interest or expertise in Iran. Given Iran’s
geopolitical, strategic, and resource value, Washington was eager to prevent the
Soviets from attaining dominion over the country, and so devoted more attention
to Iran in the postwar years. Iran was not being neglected. Rather, in the years
immediately following the war, the United States government was undergoing a
baptism by fire with regard to Iranian diplomacy.
Regarding points five and six, it has been said that American officials
overestimated both the strength of the leftist faction within Iran, and the
seriousness of the Soviet threat. Historian James F. Goode has been acutely
critical o f the U.S. government on this point, asserting that the Truman and
Eisenhower Administrations were irrationally obsessed with the Soviet Union’s
intentions and actions:
In the early years of the cold war, the government of the United 
States found its time almost consumed with concerns about the 
Soviet Union... such proved to be the case notably in relations with 
Iran, where there was some Russian activity but not nearly as much 
as Washington officialdom espied.2
Goode contends that the American government carried “a misguided policy bom
2 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. viii.
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of ignorance and anticommunist ideology,” and that this mindset caused the State
Department to oppose Prime Minister Musaddiq out of an unjustified fear that his
nationalist movement would be co-opted by pro-Soviet elements within Iran.
Further, Goode believes that the U.S. should have possessed more foresight, and
supported Musaddiq during the Oil Nationalization Crisis, as he would have been
a more favorable long-term ruler than the oppressive Shah. “Assuming that
stability would satisfy the Iranian people,” Goode continues, “Americans
augmented royal power and as the years passed abetted the Pahlavi dictatorship,
making straight the way for the explosion to come.”3 In short, Goode labels
American policy in Iran in the years previous to the May, 1951 nationalization of
AIOC as a “diplomacy of neglect”:
Until the early 1950s, Britain was the principal western power at 
Tehran. During those early postwar years then, as the Cold War 
intensified, the Truman Administration neglected Iran, partly 
because it assumed that the British, with their long experience in 
the Middle East, would maintain the Western position, while 
Washington concentrated on Europe and East Asia. It assumed too 
much. Matters degenerated into die oil crisis of 1951, forcing the 
United States to adopt a more active policy.4
In stating that American policy with regard to Iran constituted a 
“diplomacy of neglect,” Goode has overplayed his hand. He is correct in 
asserting that U.S. support of the Pahlavi regime during and after the Musaddiq 
period contributed directly to the fiery Revolution of 1979-80. Yet even an 
American embrace of Musaddiq’s nationalist movement would not have altered 
Iran’s course. And we must remember that Goode wrote his two major works on
3 Goode, The Diplomacy o f Neglect, p. viii.
4 Ibid., p. viii, pp. 35-36, pp. 42-43.
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the subject after Iran’s Revolution. Remember also that these two works were
published immediately before and after the close o f the Cold War, in 1989 and
1997, respectively. Goode is writing with the added luxury of hindsight. Though
Goode’s suggestion of an alternative course for U.S. policy in Iran during the Oil
Nationalization Crisis is commendable, he has under-emphasized the influence
that the Soviet-American rivalry had upon the course o f U.S. diplomacy. The
bane of revisionism is its disproportionate reliance upon the assessment of the
consequences o f a course o f action, consequences often only visible in the
present. Historian John Lewis Gaddis recently touched on this inclination when
he penned an article on the Cold War in U.S. News & World Report. Gaddis
reminds us that what we see now with great clarity and wistful second-guessing,
was not what we saw then:
Our view of the past is so much clearer than our vision of the 
future that we tend to forget that the past once had a future, and 
that it was just as opaque to those who lived through it as our own 
future is for us today.5
The revisionist school often overlooks the uncertainties that the actors 
faced during the crisis. One easily criticizes the seeming slow American response; 
the strong influence of anticommunist ideology; the support given to a monarch 
who proved to be an enemy of democracy, rather than a defender of it,
A Diplomacy o f Priority & The Forces of History
Yet we cannot forget that U.S. officials in Washington and Tehran made 
decisions based upon their perceptions of Soviet intrigue. Of all the factors that
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affected its outcome, the crisis was undoubtedly shaped most by the budding Cold 
War and its accompanying American fears, some real, some imagined of 
Communist machinations in Iran. There were other significant influences, of 
course, such as the internal factionalism that eroded Musaddiq’s power base, or 
the intransigence of the British and Iranian governments during oil negotiations. 
However, it was Musaddiq’s perceived susceptibility to Communist subversion 
that led the Eisenhower Administration to oppose actively the prime minister’s 
government, and to help supplant it with a pro-Western regime more conducive to 
an oil agreement. More than any other factor, the competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union proved to be most critical to the outcome of 
Musaddiq’s drive for oil nationalization. Likewise, the positions of the British 
and Iranian governments were etched by enormous historical, domestic, political, 
and economic forces that pushed their subjects into intransigent stances during the 
crisis. Further, given the myriad of trouble spots in the years after the close o f the 
war, U.S. diplomats were forced to prioritize their foreign policy goals. Events in 
Europe mid Asia, as Goode attests, took precedence over the row in Iran, even 
after Musaddiq’s nationalization of oil in mid-1951. Unfortunately, Goode does 
not take this observation to its most logical conclusion, that Iran, though of some 
importance to American officials, was outranked in priority by several other 
issues and trouble-spots.
To summarize, the following are key rebuttals to this revisionist school, 
assertions that will provide a more accurate interpretation of the Oil 
Nationalization Crisis o f 1949-1953. First, Musaddiq and other champions of oil
5 John Lewis Gaddis, “Face-Off,” U.S. News & World Report (October 18, 1999), p. 39.
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nationalization had legitimate grievances regarding past and extant agreements 
vis-a-vis the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Great Britain’s sharp tool in its 
influence over the Iranian government Second, although many American 
officials exhibited little knowledge o f Iran’s complex social, political, and 
economic landscape, the direct impact this ignorance had upon the outcome of the 
crisis is less than some revisionist analysts would have us believe. There were 
other, more significant factors that led to Iran’s nationalization of AIOC in 1951, 
and the subsequent fell of Musaddiq in August, 1953. These factors will be 
discussed below. Third, although many British and American officials held 
prejudices against Musaddiq, these biases were not the central factor in their 
eventual opposition to him in mid-1953. Given the recent replacement of several 
world governments by leftists, the Americans were most concerned about 
Musaddiq’s ambiguous treatment of the Tudeh party. Thus, the effects of Cold 
War dynamics caused American opposition to Musaddiq as the crisis reached a 
boiling point. And even had Musaddiq’s cultural, character, and political nuances 
been better understood, it is unlikely that the overall outcome of the crisis would 
have been altered. Fourth, British prestige and power was on the decline after 
1945. However, we should not assume that Britain was forced to play the part of 
hapless sidekick to the United States. On the contrary, a crucible of American 
containment doctrine was the country’s need for allies in the fight against Soviet 
expansionism. While London no longer maintained a global empire, she was still 
a much-needed NATO ally, and the United States could not afford a permanent 
estrangement. Thus, Washington opted to tread lightly in the early stages of the
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crisis, for while the United States desired to gain influence in Iran, this desire was 
carefully balanced with the need for continued good relations with London. The 
Americans were not slow to act, but cautious. Fifth, the American government 
did not overestimate the Soviet threat. Though some diplomats sounded the alarm 
and warned of a probable Soviet invasion, they were later shouted down by the 
CIA. During the final months of Musaddiq’s premiership, the Central 
Intelligence Agency reached the conclusion that a Soviet invasion of Iran, though 
possible, was unlikely, and that the real Communist threat came from internal 
subversion. This interpretation of Iran’s tumultuous political scene was a fateful 
sculptor of Eisenhower’s decision to proceed with an Anglo-American covert 
operation to topple Musaddiq. Sixth, this type of revisionism has asserted that the 
U.S. government should have thrown its support to Musaddiq rather than Reza 
Shah. This contention is made, however, using the clarity that the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution provided. Cold war dynamics were too strong to have allowed this to 
happen. This is not to say that Musaddiq was not a qualified and able leader. In 
fact, Mohammad Musaddiq was a man of vision, integrity, perseverance, and 
sacrifice. Unfortunately, the forces o f history were conspiring against him. With 
immense courage he faced obstacles o f time and circumstance which were 
difficult to surmount, and for this he is to be admired. Seventh, another challenge 
that Musaddiq faced was the charged, fractious arena o f Iranian domestic politics. 
Even had the United States and Great Britain vigorously supported both 
Musaddiq’s premiership and his nationalization of AIOC, Musaddiq would have 
likely remained extremely vulnerable to the domestic political forces arrayed
l l
against him. Eighth, American diplomatic conduct toward Iran during the 
postwar period, though faulty, does not merit the “diplomacy of neglect” label 
sometimes affixed to it. Rather, it is more accurate to call it a diplomacy o f 
priority. The American government had a plethora of other hot-spots that had to 
be addressed during the height of the oil nationalization crisis in Iran. American 
officials were forced to prioritize their foreign policy goals. Though a key focus 
in the State Department’s recently-created Near Eastern and African Affairs 
Division, Iran was outranked by other, more pressing matters. This conduct, 
though repulsive given the vicious tyranny of Reza Shah that followed 
Musaddiq’s removal, is nonetheless an integral, if unfortunate, part o f every 
country’s foreign policy process. In international diplomacy, a short-term 
solution usually overshadows long-term vision.
Therefore, American conduct in Iran after 1945 does not constitute a 
“diplomacy of neglect,” but rather a very conscious diplomacy o f priority. U.S. 
policy-makers made decisions based on their unique circumstances, domestic 
pressures, interests, and perceptions. Simultaneously, these officials also reacted 
to the other actors involved: Iran, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. Each 
player in the tragedy was driven from behind by fierce internal pressures, as well 
as pressed from the front by equally intense external antagonisms. Given these 
innumerable responsibilities and the plethora of issues outside the Near East that 
Washington had to face, it was understandable that Iran became a lower priority 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Oil nationalization in Iran did not become 
a crisis due to American negligence, as the revisionist school claims. Rather, the
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oil crisis became a crisis because o f British and Iranian intransigence. U.S. 
officials made their foreign policy decisions te e d  on calculated assessments o f 
the global diplomatic, economic, political, and military picture. For the 
Americans, Iran was simply not on the short list o f priorities. While the U.S. 
government was extremely concerned about the ‘loss’ o f Iran and its resources to 
the Soviet bloc, events in Europe and Asia ranked higher on die priority list 
Even had Iran been placed a higher priority, it is doubtful that American 
intervention earlier in the crisis would have altered its outcome. In essence, then, 
American policy was a diplomacy o f priority.
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2.. Landscape
Before commencing this argument regarding the causes and consequences 
of Iran’s nationalization of oil in the summer of 1951, if is first necessary to 
provide a summary of the course of this crisis. First, a summation of AIOC’s 
birth and subsequent growth will be presented, for without an understanding of 
the troubled nature of British-Iranian relations, from which the AIOC cannot be 
separated, it is impossible to place the oil crisis in its proper historical context 
Next, a short narrative o f American involvement in Iran will be given. Discussion 
of British-Iranian relations in this chapter will be limited to the confrontations 
surrounding AIOC’s operations inside Iran, to political control o f the company, 
and to the disagreements regarding the proper allocation o f oil revenues. Other 
factors relevant to the Anglo-Iranian relationship will be examined in subsequent 
chapters.
Early American Involvement
Before official diplomatic relations were established between Iran and the 
United States in 1883, there had been a slight American presence in Iran for over 
50 years. The first documented American incursions in Iran came in 1830, when 
two missionaries, Harrison O.G. Dwight and Eli Smith, traveled through
N
northwest Iran. Without exception, America’s presence throughout the 19th 
century was confined to proselytism, aid, and education efforts such as these. The 
establishment of diplomatic relations in order to protect and represent American
citizens in Iran followed. Though limited in scope, these independent missions 
were viewed favorably by most Iranians, for much o f this early American 
presence centered upon the establishment of schools and health clinics for a 
people plagued by illiteracy and frequent poor living conditions. While most 
Shi’i Muslims reacted icily to the missionaries’ conversion attempts, they 
nonetheless appreciated the Christians’ humanitarian efforts. Thus, from roughly 
the 1860s to the 1940s, the U.S. enjoyed a mainly favorable image in Iran due in 
particular to these altruistic works, and to the absence of American political 
interference in its internal affairs. In fact, some historians, including James Bill 
and Barry Rubin, have lamented the downward spiral o f American-Iranian 
relations in the 20th century. One must remember, however, that during the 18th 
and 19th centuries it was these two juggernauts, and not incipient America, that 
vied for hegemony in Iran. The United States had no motive for such intrigue, as 
it held no vital strategic interests in die region, and was thus satisfied to allow 
Russia and Great Britain to wrangle for dominion over the ancient kingdom in 
their broader struggle for empire..
Oil and Anglo-Iranian Relations
Persia, as Iran was called until 1935, first granted an oil concession to the 
British Empire in 1901, when Australian William Knox D’Arcy received approval 
for the exploration of 480,000 square miles within Iran, excluding the five 
northern provinces. D’Arcy and his colleagues purchased the concession for 
£200,000, and were thus permitted to withdraw, transport, and process Persian
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oil.1 He subsequently attained the financial backing of Burmah Oil Company, 
formed the Persian Petroleum Syndicate in 1908, and discovered large oil deposits 
in the country the same year. In 1909 this syndicate was reorganized under the 
name Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), and drilling operations commenced 
shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. In 1914, that ever-persuasive 
First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston S. Churchill, convinced the Crown to 
purchase a 51% majority in APOC. Because the Royal Navy was converting 
from coal to oil-burning vessels, a reliable source of oil was required. In APOC, 
Churchill found this reliable source, sweetened the deal by his arrangement to 
purchase oil for the Royal Navy at a discount, and provided needed capital for an 
expansion of APOC operations.
In return, the Persian government received royalties at a fixed rate of 16%. 
Unfortunately, APOC profits proved insubstantial during the first decade of 
operation, netting the Persian government an average of only £250,000 annually 
between 1912 mid 1919.2 In 1920 production jumped to 1,385 long tons, 
providing the government with royalties o f £590,000.3 By 1926, the year after a 
young military officer named Reza Khan ascended to the Persian throne, oil 
revenues topped £1.4 million, despite a severe two-year decline in 1922-23. (See 
below, Table 2.1).
1 Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy o f Modem Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 
1926-79 (New York: New York University Press, 1981), p. 67.
2 Ibid
3 Ibid., p. 93. The author has noticed some discrepancies in these figures during the research 
stage. For figures regarding oil production and royalties, citations come from Homa Katouzian’s 
The Political Economy o f Modem Iran.
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table  2.1 -  Oil Revenues, Export Values, and Export Volume, 1919-19324
(A) (B) (C)
Year Oil Revenues Oil Export Volume
(£ million) (thousand long tons)
1919 0.47 1,106
1920 0.59 1,385
1921 0.59 1,743
1922 0.53 2,327
1923 0.41 2,959
1924 0.83 3,714
1925 1.05 4,334
1926 1.40 4,556
1927 0.50 4,832
1928 0.53 5,358
1929 1.44 5,461
1930 1.29 5,929
1931 0.31 5,750
1932 1.53 6,446
What is astonishing about the figures in column B is the degree of profit 
fluctuation for the Iranian government from year to year, despite the relatively 
consistent, if  gradual, growth in oil export volume (column C). If it is astonishing 
for us, it was a source o f great exasperation for Teheran, as fluctuations in the 
market price o f oil, bookkeeping mistakes, and creative accounting caused 
irregular variations in the revenues paid to Persia.5 Unfortunately, the 
government relied increasingly upon oil profits as a source of revenue, this during 
a period of decidedly undependable profits. It was this last variable, the very real 
possibility o f fraud, that most infuriated the government Yet because the 1919
4 Ibid., p.93, 117. For this data Katouzian has relied upon J. Bharier’s Economic Development in 
Iran 1900-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
5 Ibid., p. 94.
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oil agreement did not permit Teheran access to the books, the government had no 
evidence with which to prove the negligence or illegality o f APOC’s bookkeeping 
practices. Hence, the demand for access to the company’s ledgers soon became 
an integral demand during subsequent Anglo-Persian oil negotiations from the 
1920s onward.
Another irritant to Teheran was the company’s unreasonable refusal to
provide the government royalties on APOC operations outside the country,
despite the fact that Persian oil was being used in such enterprises, and at a
substantial profit to the company. It was inevitable, then, that the Iranians would
demand a more just oil agreement with APOC. In 1920 the British relented
slightly by way of the Armitage-Smith Agreement, by which APOC grudgingly
consented to pay royalties on the company’s non-Persian operations. However,
there was a significant divergence of opinion as to the fairness and permanence of
this 1920 compact, as Mary Ann Heiss observes:
This agreement met most of Persia’s demands, notably its call for 
the inclusion of the company’s non-Persian operations in the 
calculation of royalty payments. In British eyes the agreement 
constituted a permanent solution to Persia’s discontent with 
APOC. To the Persians, however, it was merely a stopgap until 
more advantageous terms could be arranged.6
Consequently, after he consummated his usurpation of the Qajar Dynasty in 1926, 
Reza Shah attempted to attain a better oil arrangement. He realized that Persia’s 
drive toward modernization required immense financial resources, and that the 
country’s oil profits were an important revenue source. In 1928 he commenced a 
new round of negotiations with the British, negotiations that were soon
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complicated by the worldwide economic depression. Oil production and profits 
dropped drastically, with 1931 ’s profit for Teheran tallying a paltry £310,000!7 
This catastrophic decline came at the worst possible time, for the Shah’s 
government had just initiated an ambitious seven-year economic plan, one that 
relied heavily upon oil revenues for funding. Out of frustration with this crippling 
drop in revenues, Reza Shah unilaterally cancelled the oil concession in 
November, 1932, a move that forced the British to take Persia’s demands more 
seriously. The British government soon referred the matter to the inchoate 
League of Nations, and accused the Persians of an illegal cancellation of the oil 
concession. The Persians countered by accusing the British o f meddling in what 
they considered to be an internal affair, and then reminded the British that the 
Armitage-Smith Agreement of 1920 had not been formally ratified by the Majlis, 
Persia’s parliamentary body. The League of Nations, serving as mediator, helped 
the two sides reach an oil agreement in 1933.
Once again, there were divergent opinions inside Persia regarding the 
fairness o f this latest oil concession. The compact did satisfy some of Reza 
Shah’s key demands. It reduced APOC’s concession area o f nearly one-half 
million square miles by 80%; it permitted the hiring o f only Persians for the 
company’s unskilled jobs; and it mandated the hiring o f more, qualified Persians 
for APOC’s skilled positions. However, it was on the subject o f profits that Reza
6 Heiss, p. 6.
7 Again, some discrepancies exist among the extant sources on economic figures. Heiss puts 
193 l’s profit figure at £307,000, while Katouzian and Bharier have £310,000 listed. Often, 
figures have been rounded up, which accounts for most discrepancies. However, as Katouzian 
reminds us, finding reliable sources of financial data regarding APOC (AIOC) is difficult- 
particularly during the company’s first 10-15 years of operation. In addition, finding reliable
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Shah was publicly and privately criticized for this submission to his British 
masters. The 1933 Agreement did not appreciably increase Persia’s oil profits, 
but did guarantee Teheran a minimum annual payment of £975,000, a part o f the 
agreement no doubt designed to provide the government with reliable income 
during times of economic depression or reduced market price for oil. Yet some of 
Reza Shah’s opponents, both in 1933 and, increasingly, in years to come, 
criticized this portion of the oil concession as an assent to British imperialism and 
economic exploitation, and charged him with conspiring with Great Britain in 
order to bolster his power-bloc within Persia. They claimed, with good evidence, 
that the country was not getting an equitable profit for its most valuable natural 
resource.
Another component of the arrangement that irked the court’s growing 
number of opponents, and a component that was o f great benefit to APOC, was 
the extension o f die oil concession by 30 years, from 1960 to 1990. Eventually, 
Persians in virtually every category condemned this extension: leftists, religious 
clerics, academics, traditional merchants, constitutionalists, and members o f the 
moderate middle class. They viewed it as a blank check with which the British 
could purchase hegemony in Persia until nearly the end of the century. The battle 
lines for future conflict with Great Britain were drawn with each passing day. As 
Mary Ann Heiss pointed out, this oil dispute of 1932-33 “foreshadowed in many 
ways the crisis o f the 1950s.”8
economic information for the Persian government during the early 20th century has been an 
equally daunting task.
8 Heiss, p. 7.
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Interestingly, the period between the 1933 Oil Agreement and the 
outbreak of the Second World War was a relatively calm one for Persia. There 
were several reasons for this seemingly odd lull in internal tensions with regard to 
the latest oil concession. First, the oil agreement itself contained enough 
redeeming points that the full scope of its incongruities were not to be realized 
until after the war. Indeed, the guarantee of a minimum annual payment to 
Teheran was, at least initially, a source of relief due to the fresh memory of the 
depression-driven decline in oil revenue in 1931. Second, Reza Shah was an 
ambitious, determined, and formidable politician. During the years after his 1925 
ascension to the Peacock Throne, he fortified his position as king and expanded 
his power-base inside Persia, or Iran, as she became known in 1935.9 It therefore 
became increasingly dangerous to malign publicly Reza Shah or to criticize 
overtly his programs. Although it appeared that the 1933 agreement placated his 
opposition and provided Teheran with an equitable oil agreement, dissenters still 
murmured epithets against Reza Shah, and pined for the opportunity to give full 
voice to their grievances and aspirations. This opportunity came in the form of a 
second, greater war.
9 In 1935 the shah resurrected Persia’s true name, Iran. The name Iran is derived from two old 
Persian words; ir- (meaning “pure” or “noble”), and -an  (meaning “land of’). The name Iran thus 
means, literally, “land of the pure”, and finds an Indo-European cousin in the moniker Ireland. 
The name Persia is derived from the Greek word perm , an appellation given after the Fars 
region’s aggrandizement of power ca. 550 B.C. Future European labels for the country were thus 
derived from this Greek designation.
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3. Prelude to Crisis: 1941-1949
As in other parts o f the world, the Second World War drastically altered 
Iran’s socio-economic fabric and political institutions. Without an understanding 
of the effects of four years of Allied occupation on the country, it is impossible to 
discern the immediate causes of Iran’s drive toward nationalization after the war.
Iran during the Second World War
Contrary to opposition accusations with regard to the 1933 Oil Agreement, 
Reza Shah did not entertain strong pro-British sympathies. While he required oil 
revenues to fund his economic exploits, Reza Shah resented his own reliance on 
AIOC and was an averse ally o f London during the inter-war years. In reality, he 
viewed the oil concession with the renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a 
necessary evil. Indeed, he had been courted by several American oil companies 
in the 1920s and 1930s, and even desired a concession with the United States to 
counter AIOC’s dominance inside Iran. Unfortunately, the British held the high 
ground in Iran, and American attempts to gain oil concessions in Iran proved 
futile due chiefly to AIOC lobbying and threats. Reza Shah likewise held strong 
antipathy toward Russia. In a series o f humiliating political and military defeats, 
the Iranians had seen their territory whittled away by expansion-minded Moscow, 
with its most significant loss coming during the Russo-Persian War o f 1825-
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1828.1 Though Russian expansionism briefly halted in the years after the rise of 
the Bolsheviks, in the late 1920s Soviet Russia resumed her aggrandizement 
drive, one accompanied by a more complex ideology than that ever provided by 
Tsarist Russia.
It was, therefore, Reza Shah’s resentment o f British and Russian 
imperialism that inevitably led to his unofficial complicity with the Axis Powers 
during the Second World War. With the monarch’s tacit approval, Nazi German 
agents operated in Iran during the early years of the conflict, a situation rather 
unsettling to the British and Soviets. Allied consternation with regard to the Reza 
Shah’s belligerence centered upon Iran’s geo-strategic value as a transportation 
route for Lend-Lease supplies entering the Soviet Union. During the war, military 
equipment and foodstuffs were transported to the Soviet Union via five main 
routes. The Persian Corridor became a precious asset to the Allies, as it was less 
vulnerable to Axis air and sea attacks, and was the only transportation route open 
all four seasons of the year. From 1941 to 1945, approximately 17.5 million long 
tons o f war materiel were shipped to the Soviets. Of this amount, 7.9 million long 
tons arrived via the Persian Corridor, thus illustrating Iran’s strategic worth to the 
Allied cause.2
When threats from the Russians and British did not sway the Iranian 
leader from his pro-German stance, the two countries invaded Iran on August 25, 
1941, and then deposed Reza Shah the following month, replacing him with his
1 The troubled Russo-Iranian relationship will be more thoroughly discussed below. Heavy- 
handed Russian and British treatment of Iran led inevitably to deep animosity on the part of most 
Iranians.
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son, Mohammed Reza Shah (b. 1919). The elder Pahlavi died while in exile in
1944. The two allies forced Tehran to sign die Tripartite Agreement in January,
1942, which allowed the Allies the “unrestricted right to use... all means of
communications” inside Iran.3 Soviet troops subsequently occupied the five
northern provinces: Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astarabad, and Khorasan;
while British forces moved into the southern region, this being the area already
under heavy British influence due to AIOC operations.
In the occupation’s wake, various political organizations quickly surfaced
or reemerged following the removal o f the much-feared Reza Shah from power,
and his replacement by his 22-year-old son. Of course, Mohammad Reza Shah
was a son entirely reliant upon the good graces of the British and Soviets for his
new position. James A  Bill elaborated on this phenomenon:
Iran in the 1940s was an exploding cauldron of political forces and 
issues. After sixteen years of repressive control, the country 
erupted when the Allies removed the lid of Reza Shah. Political 
parties and publications representing all shades of the ideological 
spectrum proliferated, spreading their social ideas and political 
messages. A large and vociferous group o f extreme nationalists 
decried external imperial intervention in the affairs o f their 
country. Within this coalition were committed groups who 
demanded the destruction o f the old aristocracy and an end to 
internal corruption and exploitation. On the other hand, strongly 
entrenched landed and bazaar [merchant] interests sought to 
protect their power and privilege. Some of these forces were 
willing to cooperate with external forces [British, Russian,
2 As cited in Michael Kahl Sheehan, Iran: The Impact o f United States Interests and Policies, 
1941-1954 (Brooklyn, NY: Theo Gaus’ Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 7. See also John Donovan, ed., U.S. 
& Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1949-56 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972).
3 As cited in Sheehan, p. 6. By “communications,” the Allies meant all roads, waterways, airports, 
and railways, including the 865-mile Trans-Iranian Railway. This railroad ran from Bandar Shah, 
on the Caspian Sea, through Tehran, and ended at Ahvaz near the Persian Gulf. The excerpt 
quoted is from Article 3ii(b) of the agreement.
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American, German] in order to protect the domestic status quo in 
which they thrived.
It was this occupation by Allied forces for the duration o f the war that gave rival 
political groups breathing room. It also helped divide the country into spheres of 
influence, if  not spheres o f hegemony, for the two occupying powers. In the 
north, a variety of nationalist and leftist groups sprang up under the protection and 
tutelage o f the Soviet Union. In the south, a hodge-podge o f religious, traditional 
parties likewise flourished under the auspices o f the British government. 
Although the Tripartite Agreement decreed against it, both countries gained 
virtual autonomy in their respective sectors, with the new, young Mohammad 
Reza Shah unable to contravene the two domineering powers.
Increase in American Involvement
However, cracks soon appeared in Great Britain’s armor, and it was this 
waning of British hegemony that placed the United States in a position to increase 
its heretofore scant presence in Iran. Because British forces were already thinly 
spread between the European, North African, and Asian theaters, the Crown 
requested that Franklin D. Roosevelt send U.S. troops to Iran to maintain the 
Persian Corridor for Lend-Lease traffic to the Soviet Union. In December, 1943, 
aid arrived in Iran in the form of the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC) 
under the initial leadership of U.S. Army Colonel Raymond Wheeler. The PGSC 
eventually numbered some 30,000 troops, and was charged with the maintenance
4 James A. Bill, The Eagle and die Lion: The Tragedy o f American-Iranian Relations (New 
Haven, CT. Yale University Press, 1988), p. 25.
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of transportation and communication routes used to convey supplies to Soviet 
Russia.5 Further, because the American mission was o f a purely technical nature, 
neither Mohammad Reza Shah’s government nor the people had reason to resent 
this foreign intrusion. In fact, many Iranians hoped that the ascendant American 
Republic would serve as a counterweight to Britain and Russia in the future, and 
so enable the country to chart a more independent course.
This period likewise witnessed deeper American involvement in Iran’s 
financial and criminal institutions. There were several economic missions in Iran 
during the first half of the 20th century, though only three of key merit will be 
mentioned here. The first large-scale, government-sponsored economic advisory 
mission, that o f lawyer and financial advisor W. Morgan Shuster, came to Iran in 
1910 to update the country’s chaotic public finance infrastructure. Unfortunately, 
Shuster’s mission was beset by problems o f every variety. His mission first 
encountered stiff resistance from Iran’s traditionalist, entrenched government 
officials, those men who habitually helped themselves to the money allotted to 
their respective departments. As if an early fulfillment of de Tocqueville’s 
prophecy, the Americans next encountered stiff resistance from future arch-rival 
Russia, who viewed Shuster’s mission as a penetration into that country’s sphere 
of influence.6 In December, 1911, despite fierce opposition from the Majlis, the 
cabinet and acting regent Naser al-Molk effectively terminated what was intended
5 John Donovan, ed., U.S. and Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1949-56 (New York: Facts on 
File, Inc., 1972), pp. 27-30. Colonel Wheeler was later replaced by General D.H. Connolly, who 
arrived in Iran in October, 1942. Sheehan, in pointing out the tactical importance of this Persian 
Corridor, notes that approximately three of every five tons of war supplies sent to South Russia via 
Iran came by way of the Iranian State Railway. See Sheehan, p. 10.
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to be a three-year assignment due to withering pressure from the two 
aforementioned parties. Shuster returned to the United States in disgust.
The second pertinent economic mission, that o f Arthur Millspaugh, had 
two parts. The first worked in Iran from 1922 to 1927, and the second was in the 
country during the Second World War.7 As in the case of Shuster, the two 
Millspaugh missions encountered opposition. The two main objectives o f the first 
mission were to improve the proficiency and revenue o f tax collection through 
greater use of the army in collection duties, Mid to increase foreign investment.8 
Millspaugh dueled with well-fortified forces within Iran: wealthy landlords, 
merchants (bazaaris), military officers, government bureaucrats, and members of 
the court. These elements were hostile toward Millspaugh’s reform attempts, and 
possessed the political and economic power necessary to defend their positions.
Yet there were other reasons for Millspaugh’s difficulties, First, 
Millspaugh’s reforms included taxes upon matches and tobacco, as well as 
government control o f tea and sugar. While his mission did improve the overall 
efficacy o f tax collection, these taxable commodities were mass-consumption 
items. Consequently, Iran’s poor majority was hit especially hard by these added 
tax burdens, causing widespread popular resentment toward the American
6 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots o f Revolution: An Interpretive History o f Modem Iran (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981), p. 90. Keddie observes that “the British apparently felt that since 
Iran would not allow British advisers, Americans would be next best ”
7 Ibid.
* Ibid. There was also an earlier failed attempt in 1921. Iranian diplomat Husain Ala was sent to 
the United States that summer to open talks for an oil concession and for an economic advisory 
mission. Though hesitant at first, Washington eventually commenced discussions and a 
concession agreement was reached between Tehran and Standard Oil Company o f New Jersey. 
However, British and Russian officials quickly derailed the arrangement, claiming the agreement 
was in violation of the 1907 Treaty- to which Iran was a non-signatory. Though approved by 
Iran’s Majlis (National Assembly), the concession soon lapsed due to vehement British and
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advisory group. Second, the American economic mission’s search for new 
foreign capital investment led logically to the United States. It naturally followed 
that Great Britain took exception to the potential intrusion o f a new competitor in 
its imperial playground, and the Empire exerted persistent diplomatic pressure 
upon the American State Department to end any commercial designs for Iran. In 
fact, an American company almost gained a major oil concession in the north 
when, in 1923, Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation successfully completed 
negotiations for an oil agreement that would be sweetened by a $10 million loan 
to the Iranian government. However, strong British and Russian diplomatic 
protests, together with tense U.S.-Iranian relations due to the recent murder of an 
American vice-consul by an infuriated mob in Tehran, effectively terminated 
Sinclair’s gains.9 The last two nails in the mission’s coffin were the decline of 
Russo-Iranian trade and growing hostility from Reza Khan, hostility due in part to 
Millspaugh’s acute political influence. The decline in hade with Russia came as a 
result o f Millspaugh’s refusal to come to terms with that country on the fate of 
Caspian Sea fisheries, for the former State Department oil advisor believed that 
Iran held an exclusive claim to these fisheries. In 1927 Millspaugh finally, and 
resentfully, resigned his position and returned to the United States.
Arthur Millspaugh’s next foray into Iranian economics and politics came 
in November, 1942, when he was contracted as administrator general of finances 
after Iran’s occupation by Russian and British forces during the Second World 
War. This time, the American mission met with less success than Millspaugh’s
Russian protests. With regard to the killing of the vice-consul, it was apparently a case of 
mistaken-identity.
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previous attempt. During the war the Iranian economy was in dire straits due to a 
variety of financial, agricultural, political, and social causes. There was a poor 
harvest in 1942, which led to grain shortages and food hoarding by greedy 
speculators. The monopolization of transportation routes by the Allies hindered 
the conveyance of the scant food supply Iranians did have To keep their troops 
amply supplied the Allies devalued die rial, Iran’s monetary unit, by forcibly 
increasing the money supply and thereby enhancing Allied purchasing power. 
The removal o f Reza Khan from power in September, 1941 allowed sundry tribal 
groups, such as the Kurds and Azerbaijanis in the north and the Bakhtiaris and 
Baluchis in the south, to regain their autonomy, further weakening the authority of 
an already struggling central government. Because lesser civil servants lived on 
fixed incomes during a period of increased inflation, the demand for bribes to 
augment their small salaries increased significantly. All in all, conditions in Iran 
were miserable for the country’s impoverished rural majority, while the landed 
aristocracy, urban bazaaris, and embedded traditional elite continued to live in 
relative prosperity.
To deal with the plethora of obstacles facing him, Millspaugh successfully 
lobbied for sweeping powers with which to enact reforms. In May, 1943 the Full 
Powers Law granted his advisory group authority over virtually all aspects o f the 
government’s economic programs. As Nikki Keddie stated, this authority covered 
everything: “finances, banking, government industry, commerce, and emergency 
wartime controls.” “Americans,” Keddie summarized, “were put in charge of all
9 Keddie, p. 115.
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key economic departments.”10 In putting this power to use, Millspaugh did 
achieve some limited successes. He was able to improve the efficiency of the 
government’s grain-storage apparatus, and lobbied vigorously to end its 
monopolization of industry. However, most o f the mission’s reform efforts failed, 
due in part to his refusal to assimilate Iranian experts into his American mission 
team, and to opposition from a wide range o f Iranian officials. The final blow to 
the mission came in 1944, when Millspaugh tried unsuccessfully to serve the 
leader of the National Bank of Iran termination papers!19 It was this abuse o f his 
advisory position that unified traditionalists and reformers in opposition against 
him, for they viewed his attempt to fire an Iranian government official as an 
arrogant interference into their domestic realm. Shortly thereafter, the American 
group resigned and returned to the United States.
The third pertinent American economic mission, that o f Overseas 
Consultants, Inc. (OCI), worked under contract with Tehran to develop the Shah’s 
ambitious Seven-Year Plan for modernization and economic growth.11 Before 
summarizing OCI’s work in Iran, the close o f the war and immediate postwar 
Soviet involvement must be discussed.
Soviet Machinations in Postwar Iran
As stated above, Iran was invaded by British and Soviet forces in August, 
1941, ostensibly to secure a transportation corridor that would be open year-round
10 Ibid., p. 116.
11 Technically, OCI was a consortium, as it included a mixture of private firms. However, the 
majority of companies were American.
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and safe from Axis attack. In January, 1942, the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and Great Britain signed the Tripartite Agreement, by which the three countries 
generously granted themselves the right to monopolize “all means of 
communications” inside Iran in order to transport Lend-Lease supplies to the 
Soviets. Another provision of this agreement stated that all Allied personnel had 
to be evacuated from Iran within six months of the war’s end.
During the war, the two main occupation zones became havens for 
resurgent political parties. The zones also became reflections of die political 
ideologies of their respective occupying powers. (However, it must be noted that 
the British and Soviets were not wholly dominant in their zones. Indeed, leftists 
did make inroads in Britain’s southern sphere, as shown by several Communist- 
inspired strikes in the southern oil fields). In the south, the British found willing 
allies in the various tribal coalitions and political groups that were mainly 
traditional in ideology. Because of the complexity and variety o f their political 
agendas, these parties will be more closely examined below, chapter five. For our 
purposes, a brief synopsis o f the political landscape in the north is necessary.
In the five northern provinces that constituted their zone, the Soviets 
obviously favored leftist political groups and trade unions, and were active in the 
lending of monetary, military, and political aid to them. James A. Bill provided a 
concise description of the foremost leftist party, Tudeh, in his book The Eagle and 
the Lion: The Tragedy o f American-lranian Relations. Bill points out that the 
Tudeh party was relatively popular in the north, particularly in industrial areas
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such as the city of Isfahan.12 After its formation in 1941, the party’s membership 
and popularity gradually increased, reaching the height o f its influence in the 
summer of 1953, when its roster hit 25,000 and it boasted some 300,000 
sympathizers.13 Soviet influence was also felt in eastern Azerbaijan, where, on 
December 12, 1945, Tudeh rebels backed the establishment o f a new government 
under the leadership of Ja’far Pishevari. The coalition that organized die revolt, 
the Democrats, was a mixture o f various political groups with a common goal of 
self-government, and received its most substantial backing from both the Tudeh 
party and Soviet occupation forces. Another breakaway government, the Kurdish 
National Republic, was established on December 15 at Mahabad using a similar 
political formula.
Given the success o f leftist political groups in their zone and their 
dependence on their northern neighbor, it came as no surprise that the Soviets 
were reluctant to withdraw their troops in accordance with the Tripartite 
Agreement of 1942. The recognized date for the final withdrawal o f Allied troops 
from Iran was March 2, 1946, six months after the cessation o f hostilities. The 
last American troops evacuated Iran on December 31, 1945, and British forces 
likewise exited Iran in compliance with the March 2 deadline. Moscow did not 
reciprocate. The Soviets were undoubtedly concerned that the two new 
autonomous governments in northern Iran, both friendly to Moscow, would be 
unable to withstand the inevitable assault from the Iranian army should Red Army 
troops withdraw. For the next three months, the situation in Iran became
12 Bill, p. 67.
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increasingly tense, as the two Western powers viewed Moscow’s decision to stay
in Iran as a potentially damaging loss o f north Iranian oil reserves to the Eastern
Bloc. London and Washington barraged Moscow with diplomatic notes that
protested the Soviet Union’s violation o f the Tripartite Agreement. Tehran filed a
grievance with the United Nations.
Then, on March 24, 1946, the Soviet Union unexpectedly pledged that
Red Army troops would be removed from Iran within six weeks i f  the two
countries reached an agreement the following month.14 Given the threats
employed by Stalin, Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam was forced to make
several sweeping compromises to the Soviets, as described here by Mohammad
Reza Shah in Mission for My Country:
He agreed to recommend to Parliament the establishment of a joint 
Russian-Iranian oil company (the Soviets to hold 51 per cent of the 
stock) to exploit the oil resources of northern Iran; to grant three 
cabinet posts to Tudeh party members; to recognize the rebel 
Azerbaijan Government; and, finally, to withdraw Iran’s complaint 
against Russia before the United Nations.15
This agreement, signed on April 4, 1946, declared that Soviet troops would be 
withdrawn from Iran on or before May 6 o f the same year, and that within seven 
months of the April compact Qavam was to place a proposal for the establi shment
13 Ibid., p. 67-8. Bill cites Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 321.
14 Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall o f the Shah (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
p. 34. See also Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Soviet-Iranian Relations: A Quarter-Century Of Freeze and 
Thaw”, The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era, eds. Ivo J. Lederer 
and Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 60. The reasons for 
this sudden turnabout are still shrouded in mystery, though ongoing research in the Soviet 
Archives will hopefully shed new light on the subject. The two most likely motivations for 
Stalin’s decision to withdraw from Iran will be discussed below.
15 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission fo r My Country (London, 1961), p. 116. The three 
leftist cabinet members appointed by Qavam were Dr. Fereydun Keshavarz, Dr. Morteza Yazdi, 
and Iraj Eskandari.
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of a Russo-Iranian oil company before the Majlis. For six months Qavam stalled 
and feinted, but was finally and forcefully reminded by Moscow that the Majlis 
needed to approve that portion of the April agreement. However, Qavam still 
maintained some leverage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. A stipulation of the 
agreement called for tacit recognition by Tehran of the rightful autonomy of 
Iran’s two breakaway provinces, Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Yet Qavam was also 
aware that Moscow was eager for Iranian oil, and that Stalin and Molotov were 
not willing to risk a diplomatic rift should the Shah opt to march the Iranian army 
into the two rebellious states. The move worked. In December, 1946, the Shah 
ordered three Iranian army columns to march on Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, with 
no substantive resistance encountered by the rebels, and with barely a whimper 
heard from the Soviet embassy.16 Finally, on October 22, 1947, Qavam brought 
the proffer before the recently-elected Fifteenth Majlis, where, due to the passing 
of the threat o f Soviet intervention, it promptly failed by a vote of 120-2.17 After 
the failure o f the oil concession to pass the Majlis, the Soviets angrily railed 
against the Iranians, but to no avail. American coercive diplomacy and Iranian 
obstinacy combined to defeat Soviet designs. One storm had seemingly passed. 
Another storm was still looming.
16 General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1965), p. 377. 
General Arfa also pointed out that, for Qavam and Mohammad Reza Shah, the move could be 
justified as an act of compliance with the April, 1946 agreement. Elections were necessary 
throughout the country so that a new Majlis could be elected and the oil concession approved. 
Arfa stated the following: “On the 3rd December Qavam issued a declaration, stating that in order 
to implement the holding of elections in all the provinces of Iran the Imperial Army had received 
orders to occupy all the regions where the elections would be held, including Azerbaijan.’'
17 Kazemzadeh, p. 65. See also Arfa, p. 386. The Majlis also passed a new law in November, 
aided by the spirited support of Dr. Musaddiq, that 1) forebade all concessions to a foreign entity 
without Majlis’ approval, and 2) instructed the central government to negotiate a new, more 
favorable agreement with AIOC.
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U.S. Intrigue in Postwar Iran
It was evident to American officials during the war that U.S. involvement 
in Iran would substantially increase after the war’s close, though the scope and 
circumstances of this involvement were yet to be determined. In the immediate 
postwar years, American interest in Iran escalated due to four main reasons. Two 
reasons can be categorized as initiatives taken by the American government or by 
private commercial interests. Two reasons can be categorized as reactions by the 
U.S. government to Iranian governmental policies or to the overarching effects of 
Soviet-American rivalry.
First, the traditional vanguards o f Westernism in the Near East, Britain 
and France, had been severely decimated by the two long wars of the century. In 
the waning months of the war and amid the first unnerving signs of the impending 
Soviet-American rivalry, U.S. analysts realized that although Britain and France 
were still needed as part o f a strong anti-Communist treaty organization, the 
United States would increasingly serve as the anchor in the East-West tug-of-war. 
Given the weakened state of British military, material, and economic resources, as 
well as the rising flame of anti-colonial sentiments worldwide, the Americans 
realized that the United States would need to shoulder increased responsibilities in 
Iran after the war.
Second, and contrary to later assertions by U.S. State Department officials, 
Washington had for some time maintained commercial designs for Iran, with the 
entrenched AIOC serving as a significant barrier to die signing of multiple oil 
concessions throughout the first half o f the 20th century. Though relative
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newcomers to the Near East, Americans had made inroads in Saudi Arabia in the 
1930s, and were eager to expand oil extraction operations to Iran. Thus, the two 
previous reasons provided for increased U.S. entanglement in Iran constitute 
divergences in policy. These two divergences can be labeled as initiatives 
launched by the American government and by private commercial interests. 
(However, one could argue that American usurpation of traditional British 
domination in the Near East after the war was a reaction to the decline of British 
power in the area.)
Third, the United States government became increasingly entangled in 
Iran’s affairs as a reaction to Soviet machinations in Iran during 1945 and 1946. 
It was the Soviet occupation of northern Iran, a violation of the Tripartite 
Agreement, which heightened simmering tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the 
United States, hi this way, American involvement in Iran was hastened by the 
dynamics o f the Cold War, a phenomenon that will be described more completely 
in subsequent chapters. The obverse is also true. Hie Cold War was accelerated 
on its course through the Soviet-American confrontation in Iran regarding the 
delayed Russian withdrawal from Azerbaijan.
Fourth, the American government became increasingly involved in Iran’s 
affairs as a reaction to invitations made by elements within that country’s central 
government. Certain members of the Shah’s government, including General Ali 
Razmara, believed that a policy dubbed “positive equilibrium” best served Iranian 
interests. This policy sought to grant economic and resource concessions to all 
foreign parties so that Iran could maintain favorable relations with both sides of
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the ideological-political rivalry.18 Iran’s invitations for military, humanitarian, 
education, and economic missions from the United States increased noticeably in 
the 1920s and 1930s, which was also, not coincidentally, a period of increased
' j
expansionist rhetoric from incipient Communist Russia. These last two reasons 
for increased American involvement in postwar Iran are, in reality, reactions to 
policies pursued by elements within Iran’s ever-changing central government.
As previously mentioned, the final important American economic mission 
to Iran was that o f Overseas Consultants, Inc. (OCI), under the leadership of Max 
W. Thornburg. Working at the behest o f the Shah, OCI developed an ambitious, 
$650 million investment plan to improve the nation’s agricultural, transportation, 
industrial, military, and economic infrastructure. It was an attempt by the young 
Shah to launch a new Seven Year Plan in Iran19 Given the economic plan’s 
immense cost, the American advisory group suggested that the plan be financed 
through a combination of loans via the World Bank, financial aid from the U.S. 
government, and AIOC oil profits. Unfortunately, the Iranian central government 
was in dire straits after the war, and Tehran could not raise the minimum $25 
million start-up cost forecasted by OCI.20 The U.S. government, when
18 M. Reza Ghods, “The Rise and Fall of General Razmara”, Middle Eastern Studies (Vol. 29, No. 
1, January, 1993), p. 28. General Razmara would later distance himself from the Americans. In 
the months immediately preceding his March, 1951 assassination, Razmara sought a closer 
relationship with the Soviet Union and with the Tudeh Party as a means of offsetting British 
domination in the south.
19 Heiss, p. 16.
20 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day Publishers), p. 81. 
Mohammad Reza Shah places the plan’s total at $656 million. OCI received $3 million for the 
contract. He also provided a breakdown for how the funds were to be allocated:
For the general improvement of social conditions 28.6%
Agriculture
Transport
Industry and mining 
Petroleum plants
25.0%
23.7%
14.3%
4.8%
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approached by Mohammad Reza Shah about the availability o f American loan 
money, offered only token assistance. The aid offer was not enough to finance 
the ostentatious development plan. On March 15,1951, the Majlis passed the bill 
nationalizing AIOC, and soon after Iran lost access to needed oil revenues due to 
British naval and legal blockades.21 It was the nationalization of AIOC and 
subsequent derailment of the new Seven Year Plan that, in part, prompted the 
Shah’s opposition to Musaddiq.
The Rejection o f the 1949 Supplemental Oil Agreement
Events moved quickly in Iran after the failure of die Soviet oil concession 
to pass the Majlis. It is important that we view the oil nationalization period of 
1951-1953 as being directly linked to developments in Iran during and 
immediately after the Second World War. Resentment toward foreign domination 
had been present in Iran for centuries. Yet the wartime invasion o f the country by 
British and Soviet forces deepened already embedded hostility toward the two 
countries. It must be pointed out that this was not some nebulous, unfounded, 
unwarranted xenophobia, but a heated defensive reaction toward real violations of 
Iranian sovereignty. The forced entry into Iran, the Allied monopolization of the 
country’s goods and services, the devaluation of the rial, the machinations of 
Soviet and British agents in Iran, Mid die long stay by Red Army troops in the
Communications 3.6%
21 The upper house of parliament, the more conservative Senate, was provided for in the 1906 
Constitution, but not officially formed until 1949. The Senate ratified the nationalization bill on 
March 20, 1951. The Parliament (the Majlis, or lower house; and the Senate, or upper house) 
urged Mohammad Reza Shah to appoint Majlis chairman Or. Mohammad Musaddiq as prime 
minister. The monarch, unable to quiet Musaddiq’s cries for nationalization, reluctantly
38
north all served to drastically increase popular resentment toward the Allies. This 
animosity was particularly acute with regard to Britain’s Iranian bedrock, the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In 1979; three decades of internal oppression 
galvanized one e-disparate political elements against the Shah. In the same way, 
nearly two centuries o f British domination galvanized antithetical forces in Iran 
against the AIOC, and these forces coalesced in postwar Iran to nationalize the 
country’s oil resources in 1951.
An important landmark in the run toward nationalization was the 
November, 1947 passing of a new law prohibiting concessions to any foreign 
power without the approval o f the Majlis.22 The key proponent of this new law 
was, not surprisingly, Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq, a veteran politician who had 
spent the better part o f his storied career fighting internal corruption and external 
domination. At the same time, Musaddiq demanded that the 1933 Agreement 
with AIOC be renegotiated, as it unfairly deprived Iran of deserved oil profits. 
Soon thereafter, a special committee was appointed by the Majlis to review the 
government’s 1933 concession, draft recommendations for new government 
demands, and open negotiations with AIOC. Over the next two years the central 
government met with AIOC officials, and the two sides finally signed a compact
consented, and Musaddiq’s premiership was approved by the Majlis on April 30,1951. Musaddiq 
formally executed the nationalization on May 1, 1951.
22 See Heiss, pp. 8-9: “If Qavam thus sought to close the door to a Soviet concession, it was 
locked forever by a new law sponsored by future prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq and 
passed by the Majlis in November, 1947. The law was both a direct descendant of the 1932 
cancellation of APOC’s concession and a lineal ancestor of the 1951 nationalization laws... In a 
single stroke the 1947 law thus delivered a-deathblow to Soviet designs in northern Iran and set 
the stage for the Anglo-Iranian dispute of the 1950s.”
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on July 17, 1949, known alternately as the Gass-Golyashan, Sa’ed-Gass, or 
Supplemental Oil Agreement.23
However, the Supplemental Oil Agreement was a source of intense 
controversy before the ink was dry. The agreement had been forcefully supported 
by Prime Minister Mohammad Sa’id, whom many hostile critics charged was a 
British stooge. The Shah favored the agreement, as it would have successfully 
closed the long and labored negotiations and provided firm financial support for 
his forthcoming Seven Year Plan. In fact, the Shah anticipated easy passage for 
the agreement through the Majlis as that body, as well as the newly-formed 
Senate, were dominated by pro-Shah elements he had helped place in power 
during the last election.24
Yet opposition to the compact increased rapidly in late 1949, led 
noticeably by Musaddiq. At the outset o f the negotiations in 1948, the Iranian 
government delivered a list o f 25 “points,” or demands, to AIOC. Among the 
grievances listed by the oil committee, there were a number o f points regarding 
control o f die company, not just the unequal profits made by the Iranian 
government.23 The Iranians pointed out that, though part o f the 1933 Agreement, 
AIOC had made few concrete attempts to assimilate Iranian workers into its lower 
ranks and management staff. Instead, the British had remained true to the practice 
of hiring unskilled Indian workers for lower positions and overlooking Iranians 
the hiring for administrative and technical positions. Tehran objected to the
23 Ibid., p. 13.
24 Katouzian, The Political Economy a f Modem iron, p. 158.
25 Heiss, p. 12. Company profits in the years 1945-50 were £250 million. Iran’s share for the 
same period was a scant £90 million.
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selling of Iranian oil at a substantial discount to the Royal Navy while oil prices in 
Iran remained high. The Iranian list also cited the unfairness o f the former 
agreement’s concession length, 60 years, and demanded periodic re-negotiation of 
any oil agreement so as to provide Tehran with flexibility and to blunt decades- 
old British political domination of the country’s southern region. What the AIOC 
had difficulty understanding was the decidedly political nature o f these Iranian 
protests. While they demanded a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement similar to that 
recently reached between Venezuela mid an American oil consortium, the Iranians 
were also after increased control over AIOC operations. They wanted Iranians 
seated on the company’s board of directors, an increase in the country’s 20% 
ownership share, complete access to the company’s ledgers, and influence over 
the daily operations and future projects o f the company.26
What the opponents o f the compact desired and what the Supplemental Oil 
Agreement actually promised were very different First, AIOC remained 
intransigent on the issue of profit-sharing, and consistently refused during the 
two-year negotiations to agree to a 50-50 division based on the U.S.-Venezuela 
model. Instead, the agreement signed with AIOC’s Neville A  Gass provided for 
only a slight increase in Iran’s per-barrel- profit (from 22 to 33 cents), and a 
guaranteed minimum annual payment o f £4 million.27 U.S. Policy Planning 
Director Paul Nitze later observed that Iran’s proposed share fell far short of 
Venezuela’s per-barrel-profit of 80 cents, though at the time London believed the
26 For the full text of the Gass-Goishayan Agreement, see Sunil Kanti Ghosh, The Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Dispute: A Study o f the Problems o f Foreign Investment and Their Impact on International 
Law (Calcutta, India: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhjay, 1960).
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offer the best oil-profit deal extant in the Near East!28 Second, the political 
aspects o f the Twenty-Five Point Protest went mostly unresolved, and so drew the 
ire o f critics from very disparate political comers o f Iran, Although die Majlis 
was at that time dominated by pro-agreement and/or pro-Shah deputies, the 
opponents o f the agreement launched a well-coordinated filibuster on the floor, 
and successfully tabled the issue for the remainder of the Fifteenth Majlis. The 
session expired July 28,1949, and thereby forced the agreement to be taken up by 
the Sixteenth Majlis- to be elected and convened in early 1950. The agreement's 
opponents had bought themselves valuable time.
27 Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Giasnost: A t the Center o f Decision (New York: Grpve 
Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 129; Heiss, p. 13.
28 Ibid., p. 129.
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4. Nationalization Drive: 1950-1951
Between the close of the Fifteenth Majlis and the 1950 elections for the 
Sixteenth Majlis, a very broad coalition opposed to the Supplemental Oil 
Agreement was organized behind the inspired leadership of, among others, Dr. 
Mohammad Musaddiq. The life o f this towering figure and the fight for oil 
nationalization are intertwined, so much so that they are inseparable and make a 
brief sketch of the man necessary.
Mohammad Musaddiq, the National Front & the Oil Nationalization Banner
Musaddiq was an intelligent, devoted, passionate, and honest political 
leader with a long history of fighting foreign interference in Iran and resisting the 
country’s despotic elements. Musaddiq was bom Mirza Mohammad Khan in 
1882 to well-to-do family with ties to the ruling Qajar Dynasty. His mother, 
Najm al-Saltaneh, was a woman of prominence, a grand-daughter of Prince 
Regent Abbas Mirza.1 Musaddiq’s attachment to his mother was strong due to 
her loss o f three husbands to the grave, including his father Mirza Hedayatullah.2 
Her dictum, “The weight of an individual in society is determined by the amount 
of hardship he endures for the sake of the people,” remained Musaddiq’s adopted
1 Mohammad Musaddiq, Musaddiq’s Memoirs, ed. by Homa Katouzian, trans. by S.H. Amin and 
H. Katouzian (London: JEBHE National Movement of Iran, 1988), p. 2.
2 Ibid., p. 133n. Najm al-Saltaneh outlived three husbands, the second of whom fathered 
Musaddiq. Starting with the first marriage her husbands were: Murtiza Quli Khan Vakil al-Mulk 
Kirmani (d. 1879); Mirza Hedayatullah Vazir-Daftar (d. 1892); Mirza Fazlullah Khan Vakil al- 
Mulk (no date of death given).
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maxim for his entire life, and greatly influenced his attitude toward civil service.3 
At age 14 he commenced his career as a state treasury officer in Khurasan upon 
the death of his father, and was quickly recognized as holding promise as a public 
servant. At age 19 he married Zia’ al-Saltaneh, with whom he would have five 
children. During the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, the young Musaddiq 
was involved in two reform organizations, an early sign of his activist political 
views. In 1911 he went to Neuchatel University in Switzerland, where he 
graduated with a doctorate in law in 1914 at age 32.4
Upon his return to Iran after his graduation from Neuchatel, Musaddiq 
continued his illustrious career. He taught briefly at the School o f Law and 
Political Science in Tehran, authored several works on legal and political issues, 
and served as governor-general o f Fars Province during the years 1921 and 1922.5 
He went on to serve in the Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Majlises, with 
gaps between these stints usually caused by imprisonment by the Pahlavi regime 
or temporary retirement from public life. He was an ever-present thorn in die side 
of Reza Shah, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, and vigorously opposed his 
attempts to strengthen the monarchy. Musaddiq was dedicated to increasing the 
vitality and durability o f representative government in Iran and never entered the 
Pahlavi camp, though Reza Shah and his son tried repeatedly to make him their 
ally. Indeed, it was Musaddiq’s uncompromising stance toward despotism, 
corruption, and foreign influence that would make him a myriad of lifelong 
enemies, both inside and outside Iran.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 Ibid.
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During the fall and early winter of 1949-1950, opposition to the 1949
Supplemental Oil Agreement gathered itself around the ebullient personage o f Dr.
Musaddiq, and named itself the National Front (NF), or Popular Movement of
Iran. The NF has sometimes been called a nationalist political party, though this
is a misnomer. In reality, the National front was an umbrella group that
represented manifold political organizations with often contradictory views, yet
who were united on the issues of opposition to the agreement and, later, oil
nationalization. General Hassan Arfa, formerly the chief-of-staff during the
Iranian army’s reoccupation of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and a strong ally o f the
Shah, later summarized the National Front’s organization:
...the progressive deputies o f the 16th Majles joined in a ‘National 
Front’ Organisation, at the head o f which were Dr. Mosaddeq and 
Kashani, each controlling a separate and politically widely 
differing group temporarily allied for the struggle against die 
A.I.O.C. issue, the group of Mosaddeq chiefly comprising 
intellectuals, students and university professors, and that of 
Kashani bazar merchants, artisans, small shopkeepers and 
workers.6
Thus, the Front was, in essence, a coalition with a leadership comprised of the
prominent members o f several distinct political parties, as well as many “non-
7 ' 
partisan figures.” It was only their contempt for the Supplemental Oil
Agreement that brought them together in this forced marriage, and it is exactly
this superficial relationship that made NF’s splintering inevitable when pressures
mounted. For the moment, the well-educated Musaddiq served as the National
Front’s recognized leader in the Majlis, independent Shi’i cleric Ayatullah Sayyed
5 Ibid., pp. 209-227.
* Arfa, p. 392,
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Abulqasim Kashani drew support for the Front from the country’s more 
traditional citizenry, such as merchants, artisans, and laborers. The Iran and Pan- 
Iranist parties provided further help in rallying the country against the new 
contract with AIOC.
Further, the National Front was not a nationalist party in the European 
sense of the word. During the Cold War that term was used rather flippantly to 
describe every possible non-European political movement with anti-imperialist 
and/or anti-Western sentiments. European nationalism was bom in the wake of 
the French Revolution, and spawned a flurry o f political disintegration and 
amalgamation in Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries. In reality, 
European nationalism was, in part, a reaction to Ottoman incursions in the 
Balkans. European socio-political theorists and statesmen, in order to reverse 
centuries o f Ottoman political dominance in southeast Europe, encouraged the 
identification o f die Balkan peoples by ethnicity, culture, language, and religion. 
They emphasized that Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, etc. were Europeans and 
Christians, and so should not be subject to an empire with a decidedly Islamic 
flavor. This form of nationalism sought separation and autonomy. Homa 
Katouzian observed that Iranian nationalism “has been the ideology of despotism: 
the ideology o f Reza Shah, his son, and their clientele.”8 The term should be used 
with more discretion. To say that the National Front was a nationalist party is 
nebulous and does not paint an accurate portrait o f its organization and unifying 
causes. Also, one cannot even label the Front a party per se, as a hue political
7 Musaddiq, pp. 26-28.
8 Katouzian, p. 171.
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party must possess a unifying platform, or an ideology. The National Front was a 
coalition with a small number of common goals, and in this way was similar to 
die Progressive Movements' in America of the early 20th century. Both 
movements had rather short lists o f common objectives. Beneath the •surface 
lurked disunity due to contradictory ideologies, personal rivalries, and cross- 
purposes among the members.
Despite the Shah’s attempts to rig the elections, Musaddiq and six other 
National Front deputies were seated in the Sixteenth Majlis on February 9 ,1950.9 
The showdown between the Shah’s circle and the agreement’s opponents was set. 
Although die coalition only had seven deputies in the Majlis, they had the asset of 
an aroused public. It soon became obvious to the Shah’s bloc that it was futile to 
resist the rising tide o f anti-agreement feeling, and Prime Minister Mohammad 
Sa’id, after receiving sharp criticism for his role in the Supplemental Oil 
Agreement, was fired from his post by the Shah the following month and replaced 
by Ali Mansur. By June it was obvious that Mansur would be an ineffective 
block to the opposition, and the Shah, under pressure from die British and 
Americans, appointed General Ali Razmara as his replacement bn June 26. It was 
common knowledge that former chief-of-staff Razmara had lofty political 
ambitions. However, the Shah was also aware that Razmara was more conducive 
to an agreement with AIOC, and possessed the political determination to hammer 
the compact through National Front opposition.
9 Ibid., p. 28. The other six deputies were Sayyed Abulhassan Hayerizadeh, Husain Makki, 
Muzaffar Baqa’i, Abdulqadir Azad, Mahmud Nariman, and Aii 'Shaigan.
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The reasons for Razmara’s willingness to deal with AIOC are worthy of
discussion. Both Razmara and the Shah, though otherwise heated political rivals,
agreed to oppose the National Front’s cries for nationalization for practical
reasons. Both had reservations about nationalizing AIOC because they did not
believe Iran possessed the transportation infrastructure, communications,
marketing organs, and trained personnel necessary to operate the monstrous
company. In an interview with the Shah in early 1951, journalist Mohammad
Heikal noticed the consternation with which the monarch viewed nationalization:
I had my first meeting with the Shah in the early spring of 1951... 
he did not hide his misgivings about nationalization. He pointed 
out that the AIOC had 53,000 employees. How were their salaries 
going to be paid if nationalization went through? Where could 
Iran get the money needed to pay compensation? If this was 
borrowed it would take as long as the repudiated concession would 
have lasted (to 1993) to pay off die debt. And how was Iran going 
to be able to transport and market the oil, even if  it could go on 
producing it? Many of these were quite legitimate questions to 
ask, as events were to show.10
Although the Shah and Razmara agreed on these fiscal reasons for the support of 
the Supplemental Oil Agreement, they disagreed on the diplomatic motives for its 
approval. Though the Shah supported the passage of the agreement through the 
Majlis, and had tried to stymie the National Front’s efforts, he did not do so 
because of fond feelings for the British. True, the fate o f the Qajar and Pahlavi 
Dynasties had historically been tied directly to British support, but this does not 
mean the Shah was an eager, or even willing, English dependent. Both the Shah 
and his father were extremely resentful o f British interference in Iran, and the
10 Mohamed Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 57.
48
younger Shah may have supported nationalization had Iran’s geopolitical, 
economic, technical, and military position been stronger.
Positive Equilibrium vs. Passive Balance
In contrast* Ra^nara had further, diplomatic reasons for his support o f the
Supplemental Oil Agreement. Unlike the Shah, Razmara favored passage of the
AIOC compact in addition to new trade concessions with the Soviet Union. This
policy, often called “positive equilibrium” or “positive balance,” involved the
granting o f equal concessions to all the prominent foreign powers in order to pit
the powers against themselves, and so retain some freedom of movement. M.
Reza Ghods interviewed the prime minister’s deputy, Dr Ali Akhbar Mohtadi,
and questioned him about this policy and about Razmara’s attempts to reach a
trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1950:
...Razmara thought, after the events in Azerbaijan, Iran’s 
traditional policy of equilibrium [between Britain and Russia] had 
become dangerously one-sided. As Commander-in-Chief o f the 
Iranian Army during the Azerbaijan crisis, he had realized that if 
the Soviets had wanted to use force, the Iranian army would never 
have been able to recover Azerbaijan... In the dangerous era of the 
Korean War and the Cold War, it was vital for Iran to maintain 
equilibrium between all three powers [the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union], He believed that positive 
equilibrium was the only way for Iran to maintain its 
independence. This was the real motive behind the trade 
agreement.11
Razmara viewed an agreement with AIOC and new concessions to the Soviets as 
the means o f balancing the imperialist powers against each other, and reasserting 
Iranian independence. Mohammad Reza Shah was a vigilant anti-Communist,
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and was not amused by Razmara’s cozy attitude toward the Soviets. However, he 
dared not opposed Razmara, as the prime minister was integral to his crusade to 
have the oil compact approved, and the Shah could ill afford the loss o f his Seven 
Year Plan, a plan that partially depended on oil profits for its start.
It was this positive equilibrium policy that inevitably brought Razmara 
into a confrontation with the chief proponent o f nationalization, Dr. Mohammad 
Musaddiq. Musaddiq was a champion of a policy that has become popularly 
known as “negative equilibrium,” or the refusal to grant major concessions to any 
foreign power. However, as Homa Katouzian noted in his introduction to 
Musaddiq’s Memoirs, this English translation is incomplete. The Persian term for 
this policy, Siyasat-i muvazeneh-yi manft, is better translated “passive balance,” 
and was a foreign policy articulated, if not invented, by Musaddiq.12 Simply put, 
this policy declared that Iranian internal affairs had been dominated for nearly two 
centuries due to the government’s bad habit o f giving favorable trade concessions 
to the Russians and British. So long as the AIOC remained entrenched in the 
south, and i f  the Soviets were given new concessions in the north, Iran’s 
subservience would be perpetuated indefinitely. Musaddiq’s first formal 
evocation o f this policy came after Qavam’s agreement with Moscow in April, 
1946. During subsequent deliberations in the Fourteenth Majlis, Musaddiq 
declared himself willing to ink a deal with the Soviets if  Iran sold oil to them. But 
he was opposed to a joint Russo-Iranian oil company because Tehran would be 
the minority shareholder (49%), and because this arrangement was guaranteed for
11 Excerpted from Ghods, “The Rise and Fall of General Razmara”, p. 28.
12 Musaddiq, p. 19; 19n.
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the first 25 years of the concession. If Iran signed the agreement, Musaddiq 
argued, Soviet domination of northern Iran and profound influence over the 
central government would be guaranteed
The Destruction of Ali Razmara
After die Supplemental Oil Agreement floundered in the Majlis during the 
summer of 1950, the National Front was able to steal momentum from the 
agreement’s supporters, aid Musaddiq’s “passive balance” slogan ignited an 
already smoldering public. On November 25, the eighteen-member Majlis oil 
commission recommended the agreement’s rejection. The following month 
Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) announced a new agreement 
reached with the Saudi Arabian government, one that divided profits 50-50. This 
was a severe blow to the Supplemental Oil Agreement, as any economic measure 
of an AIOC concession was bound to employ the American example as its 
standard. To U.S. Secretary o f State Dean Acheson, the ARAMCO profit-sharing 
stipulation made Iran’s Supplemental Oil Agreement “obsolete.”13 The Majlis 
maintained similar sentiments, and formally rejected the deal, in its current form, 
on January 11,1951. The Majlis was still willing to consider an oil compact with 
AIOC, but not until more concessions were proffered by the British. In February, 
the oil commission asked the government to study the feasibility of 
nationalization. This marked a crucial turning point in the oil discussions, as
13 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1969), p. 503.
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nationalization was now considered a viable option in the ongoing confrontation 
with AIOC.
Razmara, however, was not finished. The durable prime minister still 
believed that an arrangement with the company was possible if the British 
attached certain compromises to a new offer. In early 1951 he pressured the 
British to provide loan money for his ailing government, which was running a 
monthly deficit of £1.5 million. Razmara claimed that if  the economic situation 
in Iran were allowed to deteriorate, nationalization of the oil industry would be 
inevitable.14 On the other hand, if AIOC could guarantee loan money, or provide 
advances on oil reserves to be sold later, Razmara could gain the time necessary 
to defeat the nationalization drive. At the same time Razmara informed AIOC 
that, unless more compromises were made by them in a new offer, he could not 
guarantee the passage of a new oil agreement. On February 8, the AIOC 
consented to Razmara’s request, and a secret advance of £5 million was 
transferred to the Iranian government. On February 10, the AIOC made Razmara 
a counteroffer that included profit-sharing using a formula similar to ARAMCO’s 
50-50 arrangement. Although this new offer did not address Iran’s political 
grievances, such as increased Iranianization of the workforce and accessibility to 
AIOC’s ledgers, it did include a concession on a previously contentious financial 
issue. If the offer could be brought to the oil commission, maybe a counteroffer 
could be made and, over time, a mutually-beneficial agreement reached. 
Unfortunately, Razmara kept the offer a secret Some analysts have surmised that 
the prime minister’s government wanted to keep negotiations out o f the public eye
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until a better offer could be announced. Others asserted that Razmara had more
selfish designs, and hoped to pull out a new offer in a publicized stunt that would
crush his opposition and bolster his own political stock. Regardless, he would
never get an opportunity to play his last card.
In late February, the prime minister went on the offensive. General
Hassan Arfa stated that
General Razmara ordered his Finance Minister, Gholam Hoseyn 
Fruhar, to read in the Majles a declaration purporting to show in 
great detail that the nationalisation o f the oil industry was not in 
the interests o f Iran. The technical arguments and the style o f this 
declaration, although written in Persian, led to a belief that it had 
been prepared by the AIOC and translated from English. It was 
refuted point by point by the National Front deputies, and attacked 
in the progressive press, which had got completely out o f hand, 
accusing the ministers o f being traitors, sold to foreigners, etc. It 
was afterwards said that for the purpose o f bargaining the 
Government had not made them public.15
Though a source of hope for the British, the speech by Fruhar was met with 
hostility from the NF and the public. As expected, Razmara was harangued in the 
populist press, accused of complicity with the English by the Front’s deputies, and 
harshly criticized by Musaddiq ally Ayatullah Kashani and other members o f the 
religious right.
On March 7 Razmara was assassinated at a religious ceremony outside 
Shah Mosque. Only three days before, he had delivered a message to the oil 
commission emphasizing British opposition to nationalization, and simultaneous 
eagerness on AIOC’s part to find an equitable solution. The assassin was alleged 
to be Khalil Tahmasibi, a member o f the rightist group Fada’iyan-i Islam
14 Heiss, p. 49.
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(Devotees o f Islam) who was infuriated by the prime minister’s complicity with 
foreign elements. It has since been asserted, with only slight evidence, that an 
Iranian army officer fired the fatal shots that killed Razmara In fact, the non­
commissioned officer in question was a personal guard for Asadullah Alam, a 
longtime ally of the Shah.16 It is possible that the Shah was aware of the plot, if 
not directly involved in its development, and that Alam conspired to assassinate 
Razmara to mute his political ambitions. In this scenario, Tahmasibi was the 
assassination’s public scapegoat, but the Shah’s forces actually pulled the trigger.
This line of reasoning is questionable. Razmara seemed the only man in 
Iran brave enough to argue publicly against nationalization, and the Shah, though 
opposed to the premier’s political designs, may have wanted to keep Razmara as a 
battering ram against the National Front. Another interpretation holds that 
Razmara was assassinated with the Shah’s consent to clear the path for a more 
loyal prime minister, one who would continue the anti-nationalization campaign 
and maintain a close alliance with the Shah. Unfortunately, we may never know 
the answers to these questions.
Upon the death of Razmara, the Shah appointed longtime family friend 
Hosain Ala to the premiership on March 11. The outcome of his short tenure was 
predictable. A favorite of the British, Ala had spent years in Iran’s diplomatic 
service, and had worked both in Europe and the United States. Though deeply 
opposed to nationalization, particularly for practical reasons, he sought to use the 
threat of nationalization to force AIOC to negotiate a more favorable contract.
15 Arfa, p. 392-393.
16 Musaddiq, p. 30.
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After the loss o f Razmara, the British became more eager to strike a deal 
with his replacement. But Ala’s fight was a futile one. On March 15, the Majlis 
voted unanimously to approve the oil commission’s document supporting, if only 
in principle, nationalization. (The Senate ratified the legislation five days later). 
The Majlis also granted the commission 60 days to assemble a written plan 
detailing nationalization’s actual implementation.
The British were alarmed, and after a flurry of threatening diplomatic 
notes, finally approached Ala on April 26 in an attempt to reopen negotiations. 
By this time, however, it was too late. Musaddiq had been serving on the 
eighteen-member oil commission, and the commission had been working on the 
resolution, known as the Nine-Point Bill, that would implement nationalization of 
AIOC. Seeing that nationalization was now inevitable given the oil commission's 
continued recalcitrance, Ala resigned his post on April 28, 1951.
Musaddiq Ascends
After accepting Ala’s resignation, the Shah hoped to install Sayyed Zia al- 
Din as prime minister in the hope that he would dissolve the Majlis and broker a 
new agreement with AIOC. (Mohammad Reza Shah and the Majlis had to agree 
on the choice). However, on the day of Ala’s resignation the Majlis clamored for 
Musaddiq’s appointment to the premiership, believing that possession of the 
position would tip the scales in favor of nationalization. The Shah’s forces seem 
to have been taken off guard, for they unwittingly offered Musaddiq the job 
during an ensuing Majlis session. They thought that, as on previous occasions,
55
Musaddiq would angrily decline to work with his loathed enemy. His Memoirs 
will be quoted here at length:
On Saturday, 28 April, 1951, I was asked to go to the 
Majlis, although this was not a regular business day. Most of the 
other deputies were also present to hold discussions in a closed 
session, and duly convey to the shah-in-shah the deputies’ broad 
consensus on their nominee for premiership. I was surprised to 
learn about Mr Husain Ala's resignation from premiership...
Most deputies believed that, as in the 1921 coup [by Reza 
Khan, the Shah’s father], Sayyed Zia al-Din’s premiership would 
result in wholesale arrests and persecutions. But they neither dared 
to put someone else up, nor did the circumstances permit the 
nomination o f the candidate of foreign powers...
The discussion got under way, and the exchange of views 
went on for quite some time. Then, in order to speed up matters 
[in Sayyed’s favor], a deputy [Jamal Imami] who- a few days 
before the assassination of former premier Razmara- had met me at 
my house to bring me the shah’s offer of premiership, suggested 
my name, being certain that I would turn it down. I agreed 
instantly. This relieved the deputies from their predicament, and 
they all clapped and congratulated me.
I agreed to serve so that the bill for the repossession of the 
oil industry would not be lost, but would be passed by the Majlis 
and become law. If Sayyed Zia al-Din had become prime minister 
there would have been no Majlis left for me to be able to pursue 
the matter. He would have had me arrested or sent into exile along 
with others, and, in one word, fenced up the country so there 
would not be the slightest noise from anyone or anywhere to 
distract him from finishing his task.17
The Shah’s camp, in offering the premiership to Musaddiq, had hoped to silence 
those who were calling for the wily deputy’s nomination, and fully expected the 
fiery NF kingpin to decline the offer. Yet Musaddiq, an experienced and 
formidable politician, correctly gauged the dangers of refusing the offer. Given 
al-Din’s political allegiance and the position’s usefulness as a means of realizing
17 Ibid., pp. 264-265.
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nationalization, Musaddiq quickly consented. Upon his acceptance of the 
nomination, 79 of 100 votes cast in the Majlis favored Musaddiq.18
Nationalization Realized
On April 30, 1951, the Nine-Point Bill was passed by the Majlis.19 The 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was to be nationalized by the Iranian government. 
Musaddiq, however, had still not received official confirmation from the Shah. 
Musaddiq feared that if  the Shah issued the notice (farmari) formalizing his
premiership, the Shah’s forces would filibuster during confirmations for
0(\Musaddiq’s cabinet and shelve discussion of the Nine-Point Bill indefinitely. 
The appointee forced the Shah to delay his investiture until after the Nine-Point 
Bill was passed by the Majlis in order to avoid opposition roadblocks to his 
cabinet appointments and nationalization legislation. The next day, May 1, 
Musaddiq was officially declared prime minister by the irritated Shah, and the 
former named his cabinet on May 2. On June 19, AIOC operations and 
installations were formally taken over by the Iranian government The National 
Front’s dream of nationalization had been realized. Whether or not 
nationalization could endure withering British pressure remained unclear.
18 Heiss, p. 62.
19 Again, for the text o f  this law see below, APPENDIX A.
20 Musaddiq, pp. 266-267.
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5. Musaddiq’s Fall: 1951-1953
Nationalization o f the oil industry was, at best, only a temporary unifier of 
disparate political forces in Iran. On other issues, it would soon be revealed that 
most members of the National Front were nothing more than political transients, 
and had little in common save a thirst for what Musaddiq called “repossession of 
the oil industry.”1 This internal disunity, opposition from the Shah, and Anglo- 
American covert operations later converged to topple the Musaddiq government 
and bring an abrupt end to nationalization.
Motives for Iran’s Nationalization
Although the Nine-Point Bill had been passed, and AIOC operations were 
to be ceded to Iran, Musaddiq was aware that treacherous ground lay ahead. The 
company’s British employees were less than enthusiastic about working under 
Iranian supervision, and so resisted the nationalization. AIOC officials were 
anxious about the prospect of losing expensive equipment and installations, 
potentially without compensation. Granted, Musaddiq had promised that 
nationalization would be accompanied by compensation payments to AIOC, 
vowing to “set aside” 25% of net oil profits “to meet all the legitimate claims of 
the country.”2 Yet Musaddiq, like many of his compatriots, viewed Iran’s
1 Musaddiq, p. 265.
2 Saikal, p. 39. The quote is excerpted from a message (dated June 21, 1951) by Musaddiq. 
Saikal, in turn, excerpted Musaddiq’s quote from a Persian language source, M. Fateh, Panjeh Sal- 
e Nctft-e Iran [Fifty Years of Iranian Oil] (Tehran, 1956), p. 525. The stipulation Musaddiq
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nationalization as a right, not as a crime. As the crisis slipped into August, it also
became uncertain whether or not AIOC would receive compensation for lost
revenues, both present and future, should Britain be forced to acknowledge
nationalization. Some supporters of nationalization argued that, given Great
Britain’s historic machinations in the country’s internal affairs, the move was
justified, and no compensation was due AIOC save for lost materials. For them,
nationalization constituted the attempt of a sovereign nation to reassert its
independence of movement by the removal o f an instrument o f foreign influence,
namely, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Moreover, Iranian pro-nationalization elements were not motivated
primarily by fiscal concerns, though the British often believed So. True, the 50-50
agreement between ARAMCO and the Saudi government in late 1950 did serve
as the new standard for any settlement short o f nationalization. In reality, the
desire for increased and equitable income was not the overriding impetus for the
nationalization drive, as Musaddiq testified during the early stages of the push:
I believe more in the moral than economic aspect of nationalization 
of the oil industry. Assuming that we could not extract and sell as 
much oil as the company, we should be able under any 
circumstances to satisfy domestic consumption and secure the 
equivalent of the current revenues received from the company; the 
remaining oil should stay in the ground until the future generation 
could better benefit from it.3
Many analysts have argued that Western officials, particularly the British, often 
had difficulty discerning the moral and political underpinnings of the Popular
mentioned was from Article 2 of the Oil Nationalization Act. For the text of the Nine-Point Bill 
[Oil Nationalization Act], which included this provision, see below Appendix A.
59
Movement’s nationalization agenda. This is a correct interpretation. Sheer profit 
was not the National Front’s cornerstone, though a fair division of revenue was 
important to Musaddiq. Rather, pro-nationalization forces viewed the 
“repossession” of the oil industry as a means of both assuaging past grievances 
and guaranteeing the country sovereignty over its own destiny in the future. The 
nationalization drive was a struggle for control over Iran’s future, a future not to 
be left to the tender mercies of British dominion.
Further, many National Front members considered Iran’s seized assets as a 
deposit guaranteeing stability to later generations. Musaddiq viewed oil profits 
generated by the new National Iranian Oil Company as a resource that would fund 
improvements in the social, economic, medical, and educational conditions within 
the country. In June, 1951, Musaddiq justified nationalization in a response to 
British condemnations of the act:
Our long years of negotiations with foreign countries 
concerning the legitimacy of our claims to ownership of the 
industry, which no power in the world can deny us, have yielded 
no results this far. With the oil revenues we could meet our entire 
budget and combat poverty, disease, and backwardness among our 
people. Another important consideration is that by the elimination 
of die power of the British company [AIOC], we would also 
eliminate corruption and intrigue, by means of which the internal 
affairs o f our company have been influenced Once this tutelage 
has ceased, Iran will have achieved its economic and political 
independence...4
Nowhere are the moral and political dimensions o f Musaddiq’s thought 
more evident than in his address to the International Court at The Hague in June,
3 This Musaddiq quote is excerpted from R.K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1975), pp. 192-193.
Saikal, p. 39. Again, this is a Musaddiq quote.
1952. Great Britain, as in the case of Reza Khan’s 1932 unilateral abrogation of 
the Anglo-Iranian oil concession, had appealed to the Court in May after 
nationalization was implemented. Musaddiq quoted extensively from this address 
in his Memoirs, and the following is an excerpt from his address at The Hague:
The history of Anglo-Iranian relations is much too long for 
me to try and present it here in full detail. Suffice it to say that in 
the nineteenth century Iran was a scene of rivalry between the 
imperialist policies o f Britain and Russia... Being a victor of the 
First World War and virtually without a rival in the Middle East,
Britain then seized the opportunity to conclude the 1919 [Oil] 
Agreement which, by putting the Iranian civil and military 
administration in the hands of British officers and civil servants, 
would have brought Iran exclusively under Britain’s political and 
economic domination. When the agreement was met with the 
strong resistance of freedom-loving and patriotic Iranians, British 
diplomacy decided to impose its strategy via a different route, and 
imposed the dictatorial regime [of Reza Shah], which it continued 
to support for twenty years. The main purpose behind this strategy 
was Britain’s exclusive monopolistic appropriation of our oil 
resources. Therefore, that which was supposed to enhance and 
increase our national wealth became the source of our insufferable 
ills and misfortunes. This dominion was achieved by using the 
concessionaire company [AIOC]...5
These ethical and political motives for nationalization were also evident in 
Articles 1, 4, and 6 of the Nine-Point Bill (dated April 30), which provided a 
schedule for implementation:
Article 1. With a view to arranging the enforcement of the 
Law of 24 and 29 Isfand 1329 (15th and 20th March, 1951) 
concerning the nationalisation of the oil industry throughout 
Persia, a mixed Board composed offive Senators and five Deputies 
[of the Majlis] elected by each o f the two Houses and of the 
Minister of Finance or his Deputy shall be formed...
Article 4. Whereas, with effect from 29th Isfand 1329 (20th 
March, 1951), when nationalisation of the oil industry was 
sanctioned also by the Senate, the entire revenue derived from  oil 
and its products is indisputably due to the Persian nation, the
3 Musaddiq, pp. 323-324.
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Government is bound to audit the Company’s accounts under the 
supervision o f the mixed Board which must also closely supervise 
exploitation as from the date of the implementation of this law 
until the appointment of an executive body...
Article 6. For the gradual replacement o f foreign experts 
by Persian experts the mixed Board is bound to draw up 
regulations fo r sending, after competitive examinations a number 
o f  students each year to foreign coimtries to undertake study in the 
various branches o f required knowledge and gain experience in oil 
industries, the said regulations to be carried out by the Ministry of 
Education, after the approval o f the Council o f Ministers. The 
expenses connected with the study o f such students shall be met out 
o f oil revenues,6 [Italics added]
The italicized portion of Article 1 illustrates the oil commission’s intention 
to wrest control of the company’s board from the British, and replace it with a 
new board comprised of elected Iranian officials. This was also an attempt by 
anti-Shah forces to check the power of the monarchy by granting jurisdiction over 
NIOC to the Iranian Parliament. (A successful arrangement only if the king did 
not manipulate elections!) Only one Board member, from the Ministry of 
Finance, was to be an appointee chosen by the monarch and confirmed by 
Parliament.
Article 4 highlighted the Iranians’ belief that they were justified in their 
nationalization of British property and operations. This Article also echoed pre­
nationalization demands that AIOC open its books to Iranian eyes.
Article 6 emphasized the need for the integration of Iranians into all levels 
of NIOC. In fact, as a fulfillment of Musaddiq’s vision, oil revenues were to be 
used to educate talented young Iranians in all aspects o f company operations.
6 Excerpted from the English translation in Parliamentary Debates, 1950-1951, June 11 1951, 
H.C. 488, deb. 5s, (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1951), pp.1665-1666.
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Unfortunately, AIOC negotiators and British Foreign Office officials 
frequently underestimated these moral and political motives o f the nationalization 
movement, and instead dismissed them as examples o f Persian ‘emotionalism. ’ 
To the British, it seemed that the center of the dispute was a fair division of oil 
profits. Though this was a critical demand by the Iranians in negotiations before 
and after nationalization, it was, in Musaddiq’s mind, superceded by the political 
goal o f self-determination. To Musaddiq, an Iran free of foreign machinations, 
with its natural resources at its dispatch, was an Iran free to chart its own course.
The British Position
London was, not surprisingly, infuriated by the Iranian commercial coup. 
However,/their objections to nationalization lacked the moral and political 
rationalizations common in Musaddiq’s arguments. The objections posed by the 
British government and AIOC were predominantly legal, mechanical, and 
financial in nature. First, they perceived the seizure of AIOC equipment and 
operations as a violation of the 1933 Agreement, which specifically prohibited 
unilateral nationalization under Articles 21 and 26.7 Foreign Secretary Herbert 
Morrison addressed the House of Commons on May 1, 1951, the day after 
nationalization became law in Iran, and the same day Musaddiq was proclaimed 
prime minister by the Shah. In his message, Morrison decried the Iranian action 
as, basically, a breach of contract. The foreign secretary cited the 1933 
Agreement, and asserted that the unilateral abrogation of AIOC was a violation of 
proper business conduct. If a conflict arose between AIOC and the Iranian
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government, and the two parties could not reach a satisfactory compact, then the
parties were obliged to submit the disagreement to an arbitrator:
Article 21 of this concession provides that no change may be made 
in the position of the Company under the concession, even by 
legislation, except by agreement between the Persian Government.
Article 22 provides for recourse to arbitration in the event of a 
dispute between the Government and the Company8... we cannot 
admit that the contractual obligations under which the Company 
has operated and has made this great investment in Persia can be 
abrogated unilaterally9...the [British] Government cannot accept a 
situation in which one party to an agreement acts unilaterally 
without discussion.10
In reply, the Iranians argued that the 1933 Agreement, and every agreement dating 
back to the D’Arcy Concession, was void because'it had been signed under 
duress. As the Shah commented in Answer to History, British and Russian 
pressure on Iran in the 19th and early 20th centuries was immense. When the 
Iranian central government’s policies conflicted with the foreign policy objectives 
of the two great powers, economic, political, and military coercion were utilized 
in order to restrain Iranian ambitions.
Morrison also reminded his compatriots that AIOC had been engaged in 
negotiations with Tehran for several years before nationalization, and had put 
forth several offers that, to the British, were fair. During Razmara’s premiership, 
the Company advanced Tehran £5 million to buttress the treasury, hoping that 
time could be bought for the premier’s faltering anti-nationalization campaign. 
Perhaps, the British had speculated, Razmara could gather his forces, launch an
7 Heiss, p. 52.
8 Parliamentary Debates, 1950-1951, May 1 1951, H.C. 487, deb. 5s, p. 1008.
9 Ibid., p. 1012.
10 Ibid., p. 1014.
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assault, and push the Popular Movement back on its heels. During Ala’s short 
tenure, AIOC made another offer with the Crown's support, one that took into 
account ARAMCO’s recent 50-50 profit split with Saudi Arabia.11 Morrison 
pointed this out to his colleagues, and, o f course, to Tehran. Unfortunately, by 
early 1951 anti-British sentiment in Iran ran so high that any agreement short of 
nationalization suffered a good chance of defeat in the Majlis. The National Front 
and its allies had arched their backs and sunk their heels. Compromise was no 
longer an option.
Moreover, Morrison contended that Iran had benefited substantially from
AIOC’s presence, and questioned the new company’s ability to operate without
British expertise and resources:
It [AIOC] has provided employment for many tens of thousands of 
Persians... Its record as an employer of labour has been a good 
one, and the conditions under which its employees live and work 
are not only far in advance of ordinary Persian standards, but as the 
International Labour Office have bome witness, compare 
favourably with those existing in any part o f the Middle East...It 
would clearly be a matter of the greatest difficulty for the Persians, 
even if they were unilaterally to take over production themselves, 
to acquire die ability to operate and maintain installations.12
While it is true that living conditions for AIOC’s Iranian workers were 
improved by their employment, and that, generally, their condition was better than 
that o f their fellow citizens, the British had shut their eyes to the Company’s 
sinister side. AIOC received little direct supervision from the Crown, and so was 
permitted a free hand in southern Iran. Over time, AIOC became a de facto 
autonomous state within Iran’s borders. The Company bribed local tribal and
11 Ibid., p. 1012.
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government officials, manipulated southern elections, applied political pressure 
when Tehran ran afoul o f the Crown, and consistently refused to submit to Iranian 
rule of law. At no point during the crisis did British officials concede that their 
commercial bastion in Iran had been habitually employed as a tool to undermine 
Iranian sovereignty. Instead, AIOC had been a useful instrument for the 
advancement of British interests in Iran, as well as the hindrance of initiatives that 
contravened British policy. In fact, in Morrison’s biased view, he argued quite the 
opposite:
The United Kingdom has a longstanding friendship with Persia, 
whose political independence and territorial integrity we have 
consistently helped to preserve and which remain a matter of deep 
concern to us. Persia’s economic life is intimately linked with our 
own, as her Government well realise. Our only desire is to see 
Persia, strong, prosperous and independent, and to cooperate with 
her to these ends in so far as she may desire such co-operation.13
(After the Second World War, the shrinking British Empire was also not in a 
mood to cede needed resources and revenues. Further explanation of this aspect 
o f British resistance will be provided below, chapter seven).
The Jackson Mission
Given the divergent, entrenched opinions held by Great Britain and Iran, it 
was feared that an unbreakable stalemate would soon set in. In order to keep the 
two sides talking, the Americans pushed AIOC to reopen negotiations with the 
Iranian government. The British consented, and AIOC vice-chairman Basil 
Jackson arrived in Tehran on June 10 to present the Musaddiq government with a
12 Ibid., pp. 1010-1011.
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new series o f offers. To the dismay of the Americans, however, the talks ended in 
fruitlessness. The Iranian delegation first demanded that AIOC turn over its 
accounts and receipts, except for 25% to be retained as compensation by the 
company for nationalization, as per the Nine-Point Bill. Jackson, accompanied by 
U.S. Ambassador to Iran Henry Grady and British Ambassador Sir Francis 
Shepherd, immediately rejected this demand for obvious reasons. The company 
offered Tehran a payment of £10 million to ease Musaddiq’s economic stress.14 
Jackson also offered to form a neutral, subsidiary company, separate from AIOC 
and the phantom NIOC, to resume oil operations until an agreement could be 
reached. Once again the offers were quickly rejected, as the Iranian prime 
minister opposed any agreement, even a temporary stopgap to continue the flow 
of oil and revenue, that did not provide tacit admission o f Iran’s unilateral 
nationalization. Negotiations were also not helped when, as James F. Goode 
contends, Jackson violated his instructions by announcing that NIOC would be 
unable to find tankers willing to distribute Iranian oil due to the forthcoming 
British boycott.15
During the meetings Shepherd, Grady, and Jackson urged Musaddiq to 
forge a temporary arrangement short o f full-fledged nationalization that would 
permit British employees to continue oil production and export. If not, they 
warned, Iran’s paper tiger, NIOC, would be logistically unable to remain in
13 ibid.,p. to il.
14 Heiss, p. 72.
15 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 32.
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operation and the company would be required to shut down.16 Musaddiq was 
recalcitrant, and the AIOC delegation soon departed Iran.
Before their departure, Musaddiq commanded that the company's 
installations be seized nationwide: The British were infuriated, and dispatched 
H.M.S. Mauritius to the mammoth refinery-port of Abadan on the Persian Gulf. 
The company’s British employees threatened to withdraw entirely if the Iranian 
government took over operations. Many government officials, particularly in the 
opposition Conservative Party, demanded that AIOC’s British employees remain 
in Iran for fear that, if  they left, they would never be permitted to return. Further, 
some officials in London called for direct military intervention, arguing that 
British lives and interests were in jeopardy.
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was alarmed at the prospect of 
escalation, and sought to diffuse the matter by arranging a meeting between the 
American and British governments. On July 4, Acheson, British Ambassador Sir 
Oliver Franks, U.S. policy planning director Paul Nitze, Doc Matthews, and 
George McGhee met together on W. Averell Harriman’s veranda to discuss the 
rising tensions. Two hours later, the participants concluded that direct British 
military intervention in southern Iran would be a move most unwise, as Acheson 
summarized:
Armed intervention by Britain at Abadan in the would, in all 
probability, lead to armed intervention by the Soviet Union in 
Azerbaijan in support of their oil concession [the failed April, 1946 
concession], which the Iranian Government had negotiated and the 
Majlis rejected. Even though some in London might not be 
shocked at a partition o f Iran into spheres of influence, it would 
both fail to gain control o f the oil fields for Britain- a more
16 Heiss, p. 73.
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difficult assignment than seizing the refinery- and create an uproar 
in the United Nations. In this battle it seemed inevitable that 
Washington, in view of its leadership of the 1946 fight to get 
Russian troops out o f Iran, would end up at loggerheads with 
London. Finally, if Mosadeq or an even more extreme government 
invited Russian intervention in the hope of forcing withdrawal of 
both foreign forces, we might end up with the British out and the 
Russians in. In short, armed intervention offered nothing except 
great trouble.17
For the British, overt military action was later ruled out due both to lack of 
American support and fear of Soviet retaliation. During the meeting, Acheson 
also suggested that, should the Iranians accept, Harriman be dispatched to Tehran 
“not as a mediator, but, in the interest of peace and stability, to urge the
■'* J O
resumption of direct talks” between the two intransigent parties.
The Harriman Mission
U.S. President Harry Truman approved Aeheson’s suggestion, and 
included the offer in a reply to a letter from Musaddiq that explained Iran’s 
perception of events. In Truman’s reply, dated July 8, 1951, the president played 
the part o f neutral, and encouraged the two parties to find a transitory agreement 
that would maintain company operations and permit the two sides ample time to 
enter protracted negotiations. In his message, Truman reminded Musaddiq of the 
recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that suggested the two sides 
return the situation to its state before nationalization, this to afford time for an 
equitable solution:
17 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1969), p. 507.
18 Ibid., p. 508.
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Recently I have come to believe that the complexity of the 
problems involved in a broad settlement and the shortness of the 
time available before the refinery [at Abadan] must shut down [due 
to the successful British boycott and diminished workforce]- if the 
present situation continues- require a simple and practicable modus 
vivendi under which operations can continue and under which the 
interests of neither side will be prejudiced... The International 
Court of Justice, which your Government, the British Government 
and our own all joined with other nations to establish as the 
guardian of impartial justice and equity has made a suggestion for 
a modus vivendi...Therefore, I earnestly commend to you a most 
careful consideration of its suggestion...I have discussed this 
matter at length with Mr. W. Averell Harriman... Should you be 
willing to receive him I should be happy to have him go to Tehran 
as my personal representative.. .19
Thus, early on in the oil nationalization crisis, the U.S. government hoped 
to remain neutral. The Truman Administration’s initial response was rather 
restrained. Truman urged Musaddiq to submit to the Court’s preliminary finding, 
reach a temporary solution that would keep oil flowing out of Iran, and pressed 
the venerable premier to accept Harriman’s assistance. Both London and Tehran 
were initially resistant to the proposal, yet after some gentle nudging of the 
English by the Americans and a change o f heart by Musaddiq, Harriman flew to 
Tehran with Britain’s obligatory blessing. Harriman arrived in Tehran on July 15, 
bringing with him an experienced team that included William Rountree from the 
Department of State and oil expert Walter Levy.20
19 Harry S. Truman, Public Papers o f the Presidents c f the United States, no. 150, (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 381-382.
20 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 37. On the day of Harriman’s arrival, a Tudeh-sponsored 
protest against American involvement turned violent. A clash broke out between the leftists and 
members of the National Front coalition, which left at least 20dead and several hundred injured. 
Events such as these contributed a shift in American policy toward active opposition of 
Musaddiq’s government. The Americans, as will be discussed below, feared that prolonged 
upheaval in Iran increased the likelihood of a leftist coup.
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After his arrival in Tehran, Harriman held a series of meetings with 
Musaddiq, former premier Husain Ala, and several parliamentary officials. 
Unfortunately, the two parties remained obstinate on several pertinent points. 
Harriman had suggested to the British that they reiterate their tacit recognition to 
the March 20 Majlis law, one which sanctioned the nationalization in principle, 
yet did not implement it. Harriman did so to permit an endorsement of the 
Iranians’ moral and political claims that nationalization was justified. Yet 
Harriman also hoped that, by conceding the legality o f only the March 20 law, 
British officials could retain the domestic image that they were standing firm 
against Iran’s unilateral nationalization. The British agreed to Harriman’s 
proposition. Harriman then persuaded the Iranians to withdraw their demand that 
the British recognize the Nine-Point Bill o f April 30, which established a 
timetable for nationalization’s actual execution.21
Unfortunately, this breakthrough was one o f only two substantive 
advances made during the sessions, the other being his agreement to entertain yet 
another English delegation. On virtually every other issue there was disagreement 
between Harriman’s mission and the Iranian negotiators. Acheson stated later 
that
[t]he [Harriman] mission succeeded in its immediate purpose of 
turning back Britain and Iran from the brink of hostilities. It failed 
in its more ambitious purpose of finding a solution to the oil 
dispute, though often seeming close to a breakthrough. It failed, I 
believe, for the same reason that the Marshall mission to China "in 
1946 failed, because neither party to the dispute wanted a solution; 
each wanted to defeat the other on a central nonnegotiable issue22 
[Italics added]
21 Heiss, p. 85.
22 Acheson, p. 508.
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It was this recalcitrance on both sides o f the dispute that proved fatal to all future 
negotiations.
The Stokes Mission
On July 30, as a fulfillment of its pledge to continue negotiations, the 
British government announced that Sir Richard Stokes would go to Iran on 
August 4. The Americans were less than enthusiastic about the Labour 
government’s choice, as Harriman had preferred Hugh Gaitskell. Stokes, as 
Goode observed, “was wrong for these delicate negotiations. He was a bluff, 
hearty, slap-on-the-back kind of fellow” with a temperament ill-suited to the 
often-tedious meetings with Musaddiq.23 Some analysts, including Goode and 
Heiss, have commented that the choice of Stokes was a grave miscalculation. 
However, one could also argue that Foreign Office officials knew what they were 
doing, and chose the flinty Stokes by design, believing his indelicate, 
uncompromising manner might rattle Musaddiq into an agreement. Further, the 
British had little desire to work with Musaddiq. Whitehall was already curious 
about other options, which emphasized closer Anglo-American opposition to 
Musaddiq, and cooperation with a more malleable Iranian regime after 
Musaddiq’s fall.
Regardless, the Stokes mission was destined for failure. First, Musaddiq 
made an about-face on his earlier commitment to permit new negotiations to be 
based on the March 20 law. Instead, Musaddiq returned to his earlier position,
23 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 40. Goode based his sketch, in part, on British 
Ambassador Shepherd’s description.
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that any talks must be preceded by British recognition of the Nine-Point Bill for
the implementation of nationalization. Should the Crown not make this
concession, Musaddiq believed, it still did not change what he felt to be a new
reality. Musaddiq later explained his stance in his Memoirs:
Even if the British government had not accepted the oil 
nationalisation, it would not have altered the fact o f its 
nationalisation, for every country can nationalise an industry for 
the sake of the public good, and realise the benefits which 
individuals or concessionaire companies reap from it. The 
difference here though is that when a powerful government or her 
subjects are the concessionaires, the recognition of the 
nationalisation would have an impact on the determination of the 
terms of compensation. In this case, the British acceptance of the 
principle o f the oil nationalisation throughout Iran meant that if the 
dispute was referred to arbitration, that company could not demand 
compensation for loss of future profits, only for its property.24
Again, Musaddiq returned to his earlier contention that Iran, as a sovereign state, 
could legally nationalize an industry within its borders.25 Further, Musaddiq 
argued that, even if  Great Britain refused to agree to the April 30 law, 
nationalization was a fact. Musaddiq also maintained that any compensation for 
nationalization did not extend to the deprivation of future profits as the British 
lobbied, but only to property losses.
Stokes, predictably, played the part of a street-tough. He informed 
Musaddiq that, contrary to the prime minister’s assessment, the West could afford 
the loss o f Iranian oil. In saying this, Stokes sought to dispel Musaddiq’s false 
perception that Great Britain must reach a solution because the demand for 
Iranian oil was so high. Stokes was correct on this account, for already Western
24 Musaddiq, p. 314.
25 Again, notice the ethical and political flavor of his argument.
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companies were boosting oil production to cover the gap left by AIOC’s drop in 
exports. But Musaddiq would hear none of this, and instead believed that this was 
yet another British bluff designed to force Iranian concessions.
While in Tehran, Stokes also issued a proposition to Musaddiq which 
provided a semblance of nationalization, but preserved actual control o f oil
production for the British. The Eight-Point Proposal, as it became known,
/
provided for the cession of oil accouterments and installations to Iran, and 
established a new British company to ran the daily operations. The Iranians were 
not fooled. Musaddiq could endure British control o f the company’s marketing 
apparatus, but could not stomach the continued presence of British officials and 
technicians in positions o f power.26 Again, Musaddiq wanted political control of 
the company, not a mere facade of nationalization. On August 22, Stokes 
temporarily suspended the talks, and departed for home the next day. Averell 
Harriman, who had accompanied Stokes to Tehran to assist, left on August 24. 
On September 25, the Iranian army entered Abadan and ordered the British 
citizens therein to leave the country.27 On September 6, 1951, Great Britain 
formally ended all negotiations with Iran, and stalemate settled over the crisis.
Anglo-Iranian Deadlock
For simplicity’s sake, the following two years of the crisis, from 
September, 1951 to August, 1953, will be briefly outlined here, with only 
developments influential to the crisis’ Outcome being highlighted.
26 Heiss, p. 90.
27 Katouzian, p. 174. See also Musaddiq, p. 315.
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With a general election swiftly approaching on October 25, 1951, Britain’s 
Labour government sought new avenues that might shake Iran’s will and restart 
negotiations. The party’s leadership was well aware that the Conservatives had 
made Labour’s soft policy in Iran an issue in the forthcoming elections. 
Nonetheless, it had been decided in a September 27 cabinet meeting that, given 
the circumstances, direct military intervention in Iran was inadvisable. Instead, 
Clement Attlee’s government opted to appeal to the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). The Crown sought a resolution that declared the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) competent to issue a verdict on the Anglo-Iranian oil 
dispute. The previous July, the International Court had issued a ruling that 
supported AIOC’s claim that Iran’s unilateral seizure of the company was illegal, 
and that the situation in Iran should be returned status quo ante.2* The Court had 
decided that, once AIOC resumed interim control, negotiations could proceed and 
a mutual agreement reached. Iran had argued, to no avail, that ICJ had no 
jurisdiction in the case. If UNSC passed a resolution that upheld the Court’s 
decision, the British could further isolate Iran, and Labour’s soft policy would be 
made firm in time for the October elections.
The move proved to be a serious blunder. The Americans had warned 
Whitehall that an appeal to the U.N. would only stir-up anti-Western feeling, and 
that Britain was unlikely to get the seven votes needed to pass the resolution. 
Further, Musaddiq flew to New York to defend personally Iran before the 
Security Council, providing Iran with free publicity for its cause. Musaddiq’s 
two-day defense consisted mainly of impassioned denunciations o f British
28 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 37.
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colonialism, objections to the 1933 Agreement, and appeals to the Council’s 
moral sensitivities. Great Britain’s representative during the four-day discussion, 
Sir Gladwynn Jebb, selected a more logical approach, basing British support for 
the resolution on Iran’s violation of established business practices, etc. On
October 18, The Iranians won the case. Musaddiq later summarized the
encounter:
... [T]he council decided that its standing orders required it to leave 
the case in abeyance until the International Court had adjudicated
on Iran’s objection to its competence to hear the British
government’s complaint... Let it be said that the exposition before 
the council of the original as well as translations of the evidence 
about the corruption- resulting from Reza [Khan] Shah’s 
dictatorship- of the Ninth Majlis elections, which had led to the 
enactment of the 1933 Agreement, had a favourable impact on the 
council’s attitude.29
In the end, Musaddiq’s assertion that the 1933 Agreement had been signed under 
duress, moral arguments regarding Great Britain’s historic undermining of Iranian 
sovereignty, and his contention that the Security Council did not have the right to 
intervene in an internal Iranian affair combined to table the British proposition. 
Only two countries, the United States and Brazil, voted in favor of Great Britain, 
while four countries voted for Iran and seven abstained. On October 25, the 
Conservatives took control of Parliament by a count of 321 to 295 seats.30 This 
change in government was to have a significant influence on the direction of 
British policy toward Iran, for the Conservatives had been brought to office in 
part because of their promise to adopt a tougher line with Musaddiq than had the 
Labourites.
29 Musaddiq, p. 323.
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Meanwhile, economic conditions in Iran declined as 1952 progressed. Oil 
exports were severely curtailed due to the departure of trained oil technicians, and 
to the success of the British-led boycott o f Iranian oil. On the former point, the 
Iranians had difficulty managing such a gargantuan oil operation not for lack of 
intelligence, but for lack of experience. There were some trained Iranian workers 
in middle and upper level technical and administrative positions in AIOC, yet the 
number was slight given the enormity of the company. After AIOC formally 
withdrew its staff from Abadan in early October, 1951, NIOC was left to its own 
devices. Indeed, the oil commission exhibited its concern about the need for 
qualified Iranian employees by including Article 6 in the Nine-Point Bill. Article 
6 called for the selection of Iranian students, a function of the Ministry of 
Education, for study-abroad programs specifically geared to the oil industry (See 
APPENDIX A). During the nationalization drive Musaddiq was aware that it could 
take years for a trained cadre of Iranians to supplant the new oil company’s 
Western employees. However, he naively clung to the hope that, in the interim, 
the nationalized company’s British employees would be willing to work for the 
Iranian government, so long as their salaries were paid. Musaddiq underestimated 
the loyalty and prejudice of AIOC’s British workforce, which stubbornly refused 
to submit to Iranian stewardship.
Regarding the latter point, the British blockade, the majority of 
international oil companies were supportive o f the AIOC boycott. They believed 
that if they violated British sanctions by purchasing or transporting Iranian oil, 
other countries would also be encouraged to abrogate unilaterally their
30 Heiss, p. 99.
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agreements. If these oil companies honored the British sanctions and made Iran 
suffer for its nationalization, then other nations would be deterred from taking 
similar action. In addition, a major shareholder in the company, the British 
Crown, strictly enforced the naval blockade of Iran, which further discouraged 
‘carpetbaggers’ who desired to capitalize on AIOC’s misfortunes. When a 
renegade company did try to run the blockade, as in the case o f the Panamanian- 
registered freighter Rose Mary, the Royal Navy merely forced the ship in question 
into a British port and brought charges against those involved. For instance, the 
Rose Mary had been contracted to onload 1,000 tons of Iranian oil in mid-June, 
1952 for an Italian oil firm, Ente Petrolifero Italia Medio-oriente (EPIM). If the 
British did not oppose the shipment, the Iranians and EPIM officals planned, the 
company would sign a ten-year agreement with NIOC.31 Again, Musaddiq 
miscalculated British resolve. Royal Navy vessels instead drove the Rose Mary 
into Aden and confiscated what it still believed to be AIOC oil.
The successful British boycott was to have dire consequences for Iran’s 
nationalization. Musaddiq had calculated that the large multinational companies, 
particularly the American cartels, would be eager to profit-from Iranian oil, and so 
would be willing to violate the British boycott. He was wrong. EPIM’s shotgun 
attitude was the exception, not the rule. Most oil companies believed that the 
sanctity of business contracts had to be preserved, and so refused to concede 
Tehran’s unilateral cancellation o f the 1933 Agreement. And even had a handful 
o f bold companies ignored the British sanctions, the lack of trained personnel at
31 Ibid., p. 130.
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Abadan would have made full production, and export difficult, and a failed 
boycott irrelevant.
As it was, oil exports from Iran dropped drastically in 1952. The last oil
tanker left Iran in early July, and the Abadan refinery was only running at 12% of
capacity. Musaddiq, due to a combination o f poor advice and naivete, thought
that the West could not do without Iranian oil, and so expected to both retain
qualified employees and remain at or near full production. However, British,
American, and other Western oil companies merely increased production to cover
for decreased Iranian exports. The Americans had initially been nervous about
the prospect o f losing AIOC oil, and had estimated in a secret January, 1951
report that Europe’s “extra annual dollar charge” to attain oil elsewhere could
reach $700 million.33 The same report, entitled National Intelligence Estimate 14
(NIE-14), stated the following:
[The] loss of Iranian oil production and o f the refinery at Abadan 
would temporarily have an adverse effect upon Western European 
economic activity, and would impose severe financial losses 
particularly upon the British, who control all the oil production of 
the country. Although the effect o f the loss o f Iran on the volume 
of petroleum which could be made available to Western Europe 
might be overcome in a relatively short time by developing 
reserves and building refineries elsewhere, the financial effects 
would be overcome slowly, if at all.34
Contrary to these bleak warnings, however, Western companies closed ranks after 
nationalization, and successfully compensated for the 660,000 barrels of oil Iran
32 Ibid., p. 85.
33 State Department, Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1951. vol. 5, (Washington, DC, 
1982), p. 269.
34 Ibid.
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had produced each day.33 While it is true that the British economy was shaken by 
the loss o f AIOC revenues, Conservative Prime Minister Anthony Eden observed 
that the loss was blunted because “the oil industry closed the gap in production,” 
and so lessened Great Britain’s plight.36
Britain’s opponent faired worse. The Musaddiq government struggled 
courageously to mute the country’s economic suffering due to the loss of critical 
oil revenues, though as the months passed economic woes and, with them, 
criticism, increased. The central government traditionally had received 40% of its 
revenue from oil revenues, so Musaddiq and his advisors increased exports in 
non-oil commodities to make up the difference. At the same time, they toughened 
regulations on imports in order to achieve a favorable balance-of-trade. To their 
credit, the Musaddiq government performed superbly under the harsh 
circumstances, and even brought non-oil exports into the positive in their final 
two years in office. (See below, Table 5 .1).37 Unfortunately, the severe cutback 
in oil revenues, the comprehensive failure o f nationalization, the lack of an 
alternate oil agreement, and growing internal dissatisfaction combined to cement 
Musaddiq’s fall in mid-1953. Regardless, Musaddiq is to be commended for 
these valiant, if futile, efforts.
35 Heiss, p. 85.
36 Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs o f Anthony Eden (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1960), p. 219.
37 The Musaddiq government increased exports of such items as textiles, sheep, tobacco, etc.
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T able 5.1 -  The non-oil balance o f  trade, 1948-1953. (million rials)38
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Year Exports 
(excluding oil)
Imports Balance (E
1948 1867 5480 -3613
1949 1785 9320 -7535
1950 3563 7109 -3546
1951 4391 7405 -3014
1952 5832 5206 626
1953 8426 5756 2670
In early 1952 another mission visited Tehran which, though unsuccessful, 
was to foreshadow the agreement made with the Shah-Zahedi government in 1954 
after the removal o f Musaddiq from power. In late 1951, Musaddiq had discussed 
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) the 
possibility of an IBRD take-over of Iranian oil operations.39 In this formula, 
EBRD would run the country’s oil installations until a permanent agreement could 
be reached between Iran and Great Britain. In die interim, profits would be 
divided three ways, with one-third going to Iran, one-third going to a fund for 
future compensation of AIOC, and one-third going to a subcontractor-agent 
responsible for the marketing of Iranian oil.40
Despite lofty American hopes, however, the EBRD propositions ran 
aground due to a combination of British recalcitrance and Iranian idealism. The 
British were still contesting the legality of nationalization, and deliberately stalled
38 Katouzian, p. 184. Katouzian’s table has been excerpted in its entirety. His Persian-language
source comes from Iran’s Ministry of the Economy.
39 This IBRD was the exception, not the rule. Given the tenuous situation in Iran, most lending
institutions considered Iran a high-risk investment, and refused to cooperate.
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the LBRD-Musaddiq negotiations because they believed Musaddiq’s days were 
numbered. If they could weather the storm, the British hoped, domestic 
opposition to the prime minister would cause his ouster, and with a little help 
from London a more malleable government would replace him. If the pieces fell 
as Whitehall planned, British commercial interests would remain in Iran, albeit on 
a lesser scale. The Iranians had more complex reasons for vetoing the IBRD 
proffer. First, Musaddiq’s oil advisor, Kazim Hasibi, objected to IBRD’s 
stewardship because he felt it provoked questions regarding Iran’s claims to its oil 
resources.41 Second, the proposal permitted the return o f British technicians to 
Iran, something Musaddiq would not tolerate. Finally, the proposition was 
ambiguous about the price for which Iranian oil would be sold. Musaddiq 
persistently demanded $1.75 per barrel throughout the crisis, though the 
wholesale market allowed a maximum of approximately $1.1.0.42 Iran eventually 
rejected IBRD’s offer, yet this same offer provided a paradigm for future Anglo- 
Iranian negotiations. The Americans later modified this example, replacing 
IBRD’s subcontractor with an international oil consortium consisting of the 
Iranian government and British, Dutch, French, and American companies.
In early 1953, Iran’s position became increasingly untenable. Again, the 
Musaddiq Administration fought mightily to keep the government financed by 
limiting imports and increasing non-oil exports. Yet at its heart, 20th century Iran 
was oil-driven, and without the accompanying income, the country foundered.
40 Goode, p. 72. In addition, this subcontractor was to be responsible for daily operations and 
transportation.
41 Ibid.
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Given the deterioration in Iran, the premier redoubled his efforts to attain both
financial aid and American political pressure upon the British. In January,
Musaddiq contacted President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower while Eisenhower was
still at Columbia University. Musaddiq hoped that a change o f administration in
Washington, coupled with an early appeal to the incoming president, would lead
to an increase in much-needed American economic aid. The Iranian premier also
sought to dispel any myths about the crisis that had reached the president-elect’s
ears, and seasoned his letter with appeals to Eisenhower’s patriotism:
It is my hope that the new administration which you will head will 
obtain at the outset a true understanding of the significance of the 
vital struggle in which the Iranian people have been engaging and 
assist in removing the obstacles which are preventing them from 
realizing their aspirations for the attainment of... life as a 
politically and economically independent nation. For almost two 
years the Iranian people have suffered acute distress and much 
miseiy merely because a company inspired by covetousness and a 
desire for profit supported by the British government has been 
endeavoring to prevent them from obtaining their natural and 
elementary rights.43
Musaddiq then pointed to British defiance of recent decisions in Japanese and 
Italian courts that “declared Iranian oil to be free and unencumbered.”44 Finally, 
in late May, 1953, Musaddiq requested emergency economic aid and hinted 
strongly that if  the “situation” continued on its course he would join the Soviet 
camp:
There can be serious consequences, from an international 
viewpoint as well, if  this situation is permitted to continue. If
42 George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy (New York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1983), p. 397.
43 Musaddiq, as cited in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday & Co:, Inc., 1963), pp. 160-161.
“ Ibid.
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prompt and effective aid is not given this country now, any steps 
that might be taken tomorrow to compensate for the negligence of 
today might well be too late.45 [Italics added]
Eisenhower was not stirred. On the contrary, he laid blame for the
deadlock entirely on Musaddiq’s shoulders, this despite the State Department’s
conviction that British intransigence was equally to blame. In Mandate for
Change, Eisenhower remarked that Musaddiq’s “troubles [were] rooted in his
refusal to work out an agreement with the British.”46 In his reply, dated June 29,
1953, Eisenhower countered that
it would not be fair to the American taxpayers for the United States 
government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to 
Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the 
sale of its oil and oil products if a reasonable agreement were 
reached with regard to compensation whereby the large-scale 
marketing of Iranian oil would be resumed... In case Iran should 
so desire, the United States government hopes to be able to 
continue to extend technical assistance and military aid on a basis 
comparable to that given during the past year.47
Any remaining hope stored in Musaddiq’s heart that die United States would 
serve as a counterweight to British power evaporated. While the Americans had 
for some time doubted Musaddiq’s leadership abilities and criticized his 
recalcitrance, they had not adopted Britain’s desire to oppose him. However, the 
change in U.S. administrations, coupled with Musaddiq’s perceived flirtation with
45 Ibid., p. 161.
46 Ibid.,p. 162.
47 Ibid.
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leftism, led to a common Anglo-American strategy, if from different motives.48 
The stalemate would soon be broken.
Deadlock remained throughout early 1953. The intricacies of Anglo- 
Iranian offers and counteroffers will not be detailed here. Rather, we will proceed 
to a short narrative of the developments surrounding the fall of Musaddiq’s 
government in late summer 1953.
August, 19S3
It was during these fateful months that the National Front coalition 
manifested renewed signs of internal disunity. Again, it must be reiterated that 
the National Front was not unified political party with a set platform and mutually 
cooperative leadership. In reality, it was an extremely loose coalition of 
incongruous political groupings and individual freelancers temporarily affiliated 
through the nationalization drive. For instance, minister o f education and NF 
leader Karim Sanjabi observed that “[t]he greatest flaw of the National Front was 
the lack of a coherent ideology and organizational structure.”49 As the economic 
conditions in Iran worsened with little prospect of adequate resolution, and as 
Musaddiq attempted the implementation of other portions of his own political 
agenda, the NF coalition fell apart. Many groups and individuals who had once 
carried Musaddiq’s banner sought his downfall during the summer of 1953.
48 Eisenhower claimed that Musaddiq was courting a $20 million Soviet aid program avert 
bankruptcy. See Mandate for Change, p. 163. In fairness, it must be said that a reassessment of 
America’s oil crisis policy was initiated by Truman at the end of his term, in October, 1952. 
Eisenhower’s administration would complete this policy adjustment.
49 M. Reza Ghods, Iran in the I f f 1 Century: A Political History (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1989), p. 179.
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During the oil crisis, Musaddiq’s primary support came from an odd 
amalgamation consisting of leftist, moderate, and extreme rightist elements. On 
the left, Musaddiq’s NF found support mainly from Tudeh, the Soviet-sponsored 
Communist organization. In late 1950 and early 1951, Tudeh had actually allied 
itself against Musaddiq, particularly for his vehement opposition to the Soviet oil 
concession after the Second World War. Yet they soon shifted their support to 
Musaddiq as the nationalization drive gathered steam, partly out o f political 
opportunism and partly due to flexibility derived from utilitarian Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine, which will be examined below. It is possible that, as the Americans 
claimed, these same leftist elements in Iran could have usurped Musaddiq. The 
outcome of an attempted leftist coup would have been in doubt, however, as the 
Tudeh members were outnumbered by pro-Shah forces in the army.
The second bloc that bolstered Musaddiq’s government was gathered 
around the person of Sayyed Abulqasim Kashani, die renowned, independent, and 
extremely popular cleric. Initially, Kashani’s traditional middle class and 
merchant followers rallied to the cause of anti-imperialism- due especially to this 
group’s disdain for European-style modernization and corruptive Western 
influences. But as Musaddiq’s political platform was unveiled, a platform that 
included an increase in the peasants’ harvest share and support for women’s 
rights, Kashani turned against his former colleague.50 In February, 1953, Kashani 
cited these moves as un-Islamic and pro-Soviet and withdrew from the National 
Front coalition. In losing the support of Kashani’s bloc, Musaddiq’s power base 
was significantly weakened. On the fringe of this traditional-rightist power-bloc
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were small cells o f violent fundamental Muslims, the Devotees o f Islam and the 
Society of Muslim Warriors. Though sometimes able to influence drastically the 
direction of Iranian politics, as possibly in the case of Razmara’s assassination, 
their small membership made large-scale political impact difficult. On the other 
hand, threats levied by these fringe elements were unnerving for Musaddiq’s 
government during the first year of the oil crisis. No doubt, Musaddiq was 
pushed toward intransigence on the nationalization issue out o f fear of retribution 
should he make one concession too many during negotiations with the British.
The third grouping of Musaddiq supporters is more difficult to label. This 
centrist faction, if that is an adequate moniker, included Zahmatkishan-i Mellat-i 
Iran (Toiling Masses of Iran), led by ex-Tudeh leader Khalil Maleki and Dr. 
Muzaffar Baqa’i. The word ‘centrist’ applies to a limited extent because the 
Toiling Masses were neither of the extreme left, nor were they a liberal 
democratic in ideology. Katouzian observes that Maleki’s portion of the party 
were originally Tudeh members, but broke off on a course independent from 
Soviet doctrinal dogma. In doing so, this group developed a leftism that was 
applicable to Iran’s cultural, social, and economic nuances. Later, however, the 
ambitious Baqa’i opposed the Musaddiq government, and the Toiling Masses of 
Iran split into two factions, with Maleki assembling a new party called Third 
Force.51
Thus, as summer progressed, Musaddiq found a large army arrayed 
against him. The Shah’s circle, o f course, had been opposed to Musaddiq since
50 Ibid., pp. 186-187.
51 Katouzian, p. 170.
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the latter’s militant opposition to the Shah’s father, Reza Khan. The Shah 
pretended later that he was not intimidated by Musaddiq, calling him a “theatrical 
performer” and commenting on the prime minister’s “sudden changes of mood.” 
In reality, the Shah was terrified of Musaddiq’ s impassioned, boisterous coalition, 
and was unwilling to depose the seasoned politician out of fear of public backlash 
and Tudeh violence. He had already attempted to oust the premier in July, 1952, 
when Musaddiq had attempted to take control o f the army, which was 
traditionally the Shah’s bastion. The monarch succeeded in appointing Qavam to 
the premiership, but after heated pro-Musaddiq demonstrations and political furor 
the Shah was forced to restore him to his former position.53
By August, 1953, however, circumstances had changed. Widespread 
discontent with Iran’s economic conditions and the ongoing deadlock over oil 
production prompted increased criticism of Musaddiq’s hard-bargaining ways. 
Further, there existed rather intense personal rivalries among leaders of the 
National Front and associated support groups. These rivalries helped produce 
mass defections from Musaddiq’s bloc. Among the defectors was Sayyed 
Kashani, who not only disagreed with some of Musaddiq’s modernization 
policies, but who was also jealous of the prime minister’s political position. In 
addition, external powers began actively agitating for Musaddiq’s dismissal that 
summer. The actions of the British and American intelligence services during the 
summer of 1953 have been thoroughly detailed in other works, so only a synopsis 
of Musaddiq’s final days will be provided.
52 Pahlavi, p. 83.
3J M. RezaGhods, p. 186.
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Great Britain had made no secret o f its desire to hasten Musaddiq’s fail, 
but was reluctant to pursue covert operations to topple Musaddiq without 
American complicity. For the first 18 months of the crisis, the U.S. government, 
while increasingly estranged from him, still resisted London’s lobbying for direct 
intervention. However, as the situation in Tehran deteriorated, and fears of leftist 
insurrection abounded, Washington agreed to help the British orchestrate 
Musaddiq’s removal with the help o f the Shah. The American Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain’s MI6 dubbed the project “Operation 
Ajax.” The CIA’s Kim Roosevelt arrived in Iran in mid-July and immediately 
initiated contact with the Shah and his loyal aide General Fazlullah Zahedi. The 
operation involved the recruitment of anti-Musaddiq elements in the army, police, 
religious, and political establishments, as well as the hiring of criminal types to 
instigate widespread riots and demonstrations against the government. The 
British and American agents involved found a bevy o f eager Iranian cohorts, and 
the plan was set in motion.
At 1 a.m. on August 16, four tanks from the Shah’s summer residence 
encircled the premier’s house, and Colonel Nematollah Nasiri, Commander of the 
Imperial Guards, delivered a letter to Musaddiq informing him o f his dismissal 
and subsequent replacement by retired General Fazlullah Zahedi. Musaddiq 
responded by having Nasiri arrested by a group of his loyalists, and when the 
Shah learned of this development, he fled to Rome. For the next three days 
Tehran was plunged into chaos as American and British-sponsored street-toughs 
strolled the streets, some demonstrating in favor o f the Shah and others posing as
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riotous Tudeh aggravators. In the interim, CIA agent Kim Roosevelt instructed 
provincial Iranian commanders to come to Tehran to support the Shah and 
overthrow the Musaddiq government. By the evening of August 19, several key 
radio stations had been occupied by pro-Shah army forces, Musaddiq was 
deposed, and the coup was over!54 A crisis that had been simmering for over two 
years came to an abrupt and bloody end in a matter of days.
In the wake of the coup, the new Shah-Zahedi government launched a 
vicious counterattack against its opposition, including Musaddiq’s National Front 
coalition. Indeed, Musaddiq, due to his continued popularity in many circles, was 
one of the few officials in the government not summarily executed. On 
September 5, Eisenhower presented an $45 million emergency aid program to the 
reinstated, pro-American Shah.55 (This aid package had been preceded by a 
$900,000 ‘gift’ from the CIA immediately after the successful coup). One month 
later Great Britain reestablished diplomatic relations with Iran, and a new oil 
agreement with Iran was signed in summer, 1954. The new agreement was 
patterned after earlier international consortium models, and incorporated a 50-50 
division o f profits between Iran Mid the oil companies. The British did, o f course, 
retain some footing in the country, though not at the same level as before. This 
compact permitted AIOC, now British Petroleum, a 40% share of oil operations; a 
U.S. oil group another 40%; Royal Dutch Shell 14%; and Compagnie Fransaise 
des Petroles 6%.
The oil crisis had ended, but its legacy would linger for decades.
54 Ibid., pp. 190-191.
55 Eisenhower, p. 165. Total U.S. aid for that year would eventually total $85 million.
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PART II: INTERPRETATION
6. Iranian Intransigence
At first glance, the Oil Nationalization Crisis o f 1949-1953 seems to have 
simple, well-marked explanations. The Iranians were driven toward 
nationalization of AIOC as a means of attaining control over a profitable national 
resource. The British feared the loss o f income vital to their war-devastated 
economic infrastructure. The Soviets, though unwilling to launch a direct 
invasion of the country, nevertheless pursued the goal o f internal leftist 
subversion. The Americans intervened to block possible Communist usurpation 
of the central government, and to gain access to Iran’s petroleum reserves. 
However, as Mary Ann Heiss observed in the early stages of her own study on 
Iran’s nationalization push, “the oil dispute and its ultimate resolution proved to 
be more complex subjects” than first anticipated.1
Iran of the 1940s and 1950s was a rare and complex landscape where a 
potentially confusing myriad o f disparate forces met In Iran, all conceivable 
political, social, religious, economic, and cultural forces were present. These 
forces, when mixed, violently convulsed the country’s socio-culturai fabric, 
political institutions, and economic fortunes.
Iran of the 1940s and 1950s was the point of impact in a collision of 
historical forces. Here, there were meetings between imperialism tod anti­
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colonialism, Western modernization and Perso-Islamic tradition, liberal- 
democratic reform and despotic monarchy, Westernism and Islamic conservatism, 
republicanism and leftism, autocracy and peasantry, and market economy and 
controlled economy.
Thus, the causes, courses, and consequences of the Oil Nationalization 
Crisis were shaped by the heat produced from the meeting of these historical 
forces. The study of this period of U.S.-Iranian relations is fulfilling specifically 
because one rarely finds so many disparate elements combining in one area at one 
time. The goal o f this portion of the study is to examine the internal historical 
forces that: 1) led to oil nationalization; 2) bolstered the intransigent position 
adopted by Musaddiq’s camp during the critical years 1951-53, and; 3) led to the 
erosion of Musaddiq’s support and the overthrow o f his government in August, 
1953.
The Role o f Memory
In diplomatic relations, past experiences shape the perceptions (or 
misperceptions), policies, initiatives, and responses of statesmen and nations 
alike. On an individual level, a politician’s or diplomat’s cultural and/or religious 
upbringing, environment, social class, familial upbringing, economic fortunes, 
past experiences, and personal idiosyncrasies directly affect his or her conduct of 
foreign affairs. These elements combine to form that individual’s character, and 
that character may positively or negatively affect his or her performance during
1 Heiss, p. ix.
92
diplomatic negotiations. Shireen T. Hunter drew a similar conclusion regarding 
the nation-state:
Nations, like individuals, are largely a product o f their past. 
Memories and experiences color their assessment of present 
reality, shape their vision of the future, and form their national 
ethos. Some experiences leave such a deep imprint on a nation’s 
psyche that they affect its behavior for generations... Iran’s history 
is replete with such traumatic experiences...2
For Iran, centuries o f foreign intrigue and attempts at politico-cultural domination 
had forged a very distinct “national ethos.” Iran had a glorious 5,000-year history 
before the influx of Islam in the seventh century A.D. After the renowned 
empires of Cyrus the Great, Darius and Xerxes, Iran suffered through several 
invasions from a variety o f external enemies: Greeks, Romans, Turks, Mongols, 
and Ottomans. Beginning in the late 18th century, the once-mighty Persian 
Empire caught the attention of British and Russian expansionism. During the 19th 
century, the British desired to draw the country into its sphere of influence in 
order to protect its colonization of India, vis-a-vis Russia, and gain new trade 
opportunities in Iran. Tsarist Russia wanted Iran to serve as a buffer state 
between its southern flank and the encroaching English, and to use the country as 
a warm-weather trade and shipping route. Iran was caught in the middle of this 
vicious colonial tug-of-war. In a series of wars between Russia mid Iran between 
1804-28, the Iranians lost the Trans-Caucasus region to the Russians through the 
Treaties o f Gulistan (1813) and Turkimanchi (1821). In 1857, Iran signed the
2 Hunter, pp. 7-8.
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Treaty of Paris, ceding jurisdiction over Afghanistan to the British Crown.3 In
1907, Russia and Great Britain made a formal agreement dividing Iran into three
main regions. Russia and Great Britain would maintain spheres of influence in
the north and south, respectively, while Iran would be permitted to keep the
country’s center under its jurisdiction.
All in all, this downward spiral from prominence to subservience left
permanent scars on the heart and psyche of Iranians, as Mohammad Reza Shah
expressed in Answer to History :
From the Treaty of Paris in 1857 until 1921 [the year Pahlavi’s 
father, Reza Khan, came to power], our unfortunate country had no 
government which dared to move one soldier, grant one 
concession, or pass one law concerning Iranians without the 
agreement, tacit or otherwise, o f either the British ambassador or 
the Russian ambassador, or of both. Our policies- if  such they can 
be called- were developed in the two embassies... Their diplomatic 
communications were orders, which we carried out, and in the 
event of our showing any sign of recalcitrance, they became 
threats.4
First, Iran’s ill treatment at the hands of the West created intense feelings of 
resentment and anger toward the European colonial powers. Given Great 
Britain’s activities in Iran in the 19th and 20th centuries, it was inevitable that they 
would bear the brunt of this anger, and nowhere are these sentiments voiced more 
passionately than in Persian literature of the two centuries. In Mohammad Hosain 
Roknzadeh-Adamiyyat’s novel, The Braves o f Tangestan (1931), the citizens of 
British-occupied Iran are involved in a rebellion against their occupiers during the 
First World War. One of the heroes, Ra’is Ali, describes his European enemies:
3 Donald N. Wilber, Iran: Past and Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp.
78-81.
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In truth, the Europeans are an oppressive and 
despotic people. Except for having made 
advancements in industry and in making instruments 
of slaughter, they are not superior to us. It is 
astonishing that they consider us savages, while their 
own character and behavior are far worse than that of 
African savages. Is not all this uncalled-for 
bloodshed, all this meaningless slaughter, all this 
injustice, aggression, and cruel-heartedness evidence 
of their savagery and bloodthirstiness? What are all 
these tanks, machine guns, armored ships, and poison 
gases for, except to kill human beings, for quenching 
their [Europeans’] greed and lust, and for other 
materialistic uses?3
Iranian fury was also visited upon the Russians for their infringements
upon Persian sovereignty. Further, this ire was not the result o f some imagined
violation of the country’s self-determination, for Russia had historically
maintained designs for its southern neighbor, as the “moderate” V.N. Lamsdorff,
foreign affairs minister under Nicholas n, candidly testified:6
The principal aim pursued by us... through various ways and 
means during long years of our relations with Persia can be defined 
in the following manner: to preserve the integrity and inviolability 
of the possessions o f the Shah; without seeking for ourselves 
territorial acquisitions, without permitting the hegemony o f a third 
power [i.e. Great Britain], gradually to subject Persia to our 
dominant influence, without violating, however, the external 
symbols o f her independence of her internal regime, hi other 
words, our task is to make Persia politically an obedient and 
useful, i.e. a sufficiently powerful instrument in our hands.7
4 Reza Shah Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 45.
5 Excerpted from M.R. Ghanoonparvar, In A Persian Mirror: Images o f the West and Westerners 
in Iranian Fiction (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1993), p. 64. See also Mohammad 
Hoseyn Roknzadeh-Adamiyyat, Daliran-e Tangestcmi, 7th ed. (Tehran: Entesharat-e Eqbal, 1975), 
p. 108. Note the Iranian prejudice toward Africans.
Excerpted from Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The 
Dynamics o f Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 58. Rubinstein, in turn, excerpted 
Lansdorff s quote from Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Russia and the Middle East,” Ivo Lederer, ed., 
Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1962), p. 497.
7 Ibid.
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To the reserved LamsdorfF, though Iran was to be allowed a thin facade of 
sovereignty, their ultimate design was “to make Persia politically and obedient 
and useful...instrument in [Russia’s] hands.” Iran’s relations with other nations 
were destined to be adversely affected by its encounters with domineering foreign 
powers such as Great Britain and Russia.
Over time, Iranians became extremely suspicious of the motives, 
machinations, and actions of foreign diplomats, advisors, business people, and 
private citizens. This xenophobia, prompted by many centuries of attempts by 
foreign powers to dominate the country’s culture and political systems, was an 
aberration to Westerners, who were usually on the other side of the colonial wall. 
The apprehension and suspicion with which Iranian government officials 
approached their foreign counterparts during the twentieth century was not 
entirely comprehended by Western statesmen. Indeed, as die National Front’s 
nationalization train gathered speed in late 1950 and early 1951, Western analysts 
and journalists tended to label his group “nationalist,” although it would be more 
accurate to dub it an anti-colonial or anti-imperial, popular movement.
To American officials in particular, such Iranian suspicion was irrational. 
Having not been historically entangled in Anglo-Russo-Iranian infighting, 
Washington simply could not relate to Iran’s paranoia. Yet we must remember 
that Iran and the United States have had very different historical backgrounds 
form their respective worldviews. History is memory, and it is our memories that 
make long-lasting imprints on our hearts and minds, and subsequently mold our
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views. Since its inception, the United States has been subjected to only one 
foreign invasion, this being the British infringement on U.S. territory during the 
War o f 1812. In contrast, during its long history Iran has been subjected to more 
wars and invasions than can be counted, Had America’s borders been violated 
more often, and its politico-cultural hegemony threatened, it is likely that 
American and Iranian worldviews would be more similar than divergent.
The “Persian Psyche”
What, then, has Iran’s bipolar history produced? Hunter has noted that the
country’s glorious past, followed by a humbling period of descent, created
“contradictory tendencies” in Iran’s foreign policy:
The interaction of this dimension o f Iran’s historical legacy with its 
more recent experience of decline has created contradictory 
tendencies in its external behavior. At one and the same time, Iran 
wants to be neutral and disengaged from great power competition 
and to be an influential regional and international actor, an impulse 
which inevitably embroils it in such rivalries.8
Jahangir Amuzegar stated that the country’s proud and tortuous past has produced
rather distinct traits in the Persian character, though he issued the necessary
cautions against generalizations. To Amuzegar,
[insecurity has always been an inseparable part o f life in Iran- at 
least after the fall of die old Persian Empire in the seventh century 
A.D. Seven subsequent centuries of invasions by the Arabs, Turks, 
Mongols, and others marked a tumultuous period of unsettled 
sovereignty, ceaseless warfare, havoc, destruction, and 
bloodshed... Those long centuries of endless political feuds and
8 Hunter, p. 10.
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economic uncertainty left the Iranians with a sense of helplessness 
and fear.9
Amuzegar continued, stating that “a stereotypical Persian psyche may be said to
possess two dichotomous streaks, one positive and the other negative:”10
[Positive:]...national pride and patriotism, creativity, intellectual 
curiosity, friendliness, hospitality, tolerance, generosity, warmth, 
and compassion.. .11
[Negative:]... insecurity... individualism... selfcenteredness... pessi­
mism. .. egotism, ..distrust.. .12
Amuzegar obviously did not intend this description to be an infallible racial and 
cultural stereotype. He was, however, making an attempt to explain the Iranian 
“assessment of present reality,” “vision of the future,” and “national ethos” which 
Heiss addressed. Still, this interpretive framework is useful in an analysis of 
Iranian attitudes toward external actors. It is this “Persian psyche;” fearful, 
untrusting, suspicious; that frequently characterized the National Front’s 
perceptions of British mid American diplomacy. While the Iranians had cause to 
distrust Western officials, often this distrust passed from mere emotion to rigid 
stereotype and acute paranoia. This apprehension toward Iran’s external contacts 
caused deep animosity toward the British during the crisis. Musaddiq’s forces 
were flint-headed: they were determined to drive the British commercial interests 
from Iran forever in order that the Crown’s influence would end. Unfortunately, 
this . intransigence also prevented Musaddiq’s government from making 
compromises, even of a temporal nature, which were in its best interest.
9 Jahangir Amuzegar, The Dynamics o f the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis’ Triumph and 
Tragedy (Albany, NY State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 102-3. See Amuzegar’s 
chapter seven, “The Persian National Psyche.”
10 Ibid., p. 100.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., pp. 100-103.
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The Foreign Office, o f course, did not fully understand the true motives 
behind Musaddiq’s recalcitrance; Eden, in particular, disparaged Musaddiq in 
Full Circle and viewed his counterpart as “the first real bit o f meat to come the 
way of the cartoonists since the war.”13 Eden continued his tirade against the 
aged Iranian premier:
Musaddiq’s megalomania was described as verging on 
mental instability. He had never been amenable to reason, and 
lately it had been necessary to humour him as with a fractious 
child...
In a later interview [fall, 1951]... Musaddiq remarked to 
the United States Ambassador that the Iranians were not donkeys 
and could no longer be deceived by professions o f friendliness.14
Any analysis o f Western statements of this type regarding either 
Musaddiq’s temperament or the stereotypical Persian character must be rendered 
with great caution. Historian James F. Goode astutely observes that British and 
American ignorance and prejudice, such as that exhibited above by Eden, 
influenced die conduct o f Western foreign policy in Iran. However, Goode fails 
to accompany this assertion with heeded qualifications. True, some Anglo- 
American officials did not possess comprehensive knowledge o f Iran’s cultural, 
political, economic, and social idiosyncrasies.13 Yet Mary Ann Heiss pointed out 
that factors influential to diplomacy’s outcome can often be cancelled out or 
minimized by other factors. In the case of American-Iranian diplomacy during 
the oil nationalization crisis, other economic, political, historical forces
13 Eden, p. 219.
14 Ibid., p. 230. See also quotes from British officials in Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 15, 
24, 26-27. For American Secretary of State Acheson’s perceptions, see Present at the Creation, 
pp. 503-504.
Goode, Diplomacy of Neglect, p. viii, 7,66. See also In the Shadow of Musaddiq, p. 12.
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overshadowed racial and cultural factors. While some U.S. officials could have 
used extra schooling and an entry-level course in cultural sensitivity, it was 
Musaddiq’s determination to resist British domination at whatever cost that was 
deemed most provocative in the eyes of Western diplomats. At nearly every 
stage, the prime minister was unwilling to compromise.
Further, we must understand that Musaddiq’s perceived stubbornness and 
“megalomania” were forged both by personal quirks and intense domestic 
pressures. Though an unpopular stance in the eyes o f cultural revisionists, it must 
be stated that Musaddiq, though brilliant, did suffer from medical and mental 
disorders which hindered his performance. Physical and mental well-being, in 
addition to religious and cultural values, can be vital determinants in a 
statesman’s conduct of foreign relations. In the case of Musaddiq, his well- 
known nervous disorder and advanced age negatively affected his judgement, just 
as British foreign officers’ biases hindered their decisions. In his cultural 
analysis, Goode seems to indicate that British and American ethnocentrism 
affected the crisis’ outcome in equal measure. This is incorrect. Because British 
negotiators were Musaddiq’s main counterparts, their prejudice and ignorance 
were more significant than that o f the Americans, who actively joined in the 
dispute only after nationalization became law. Also, cultural prejudice was not 
the preeminent sculptor of the crisis’ outcome, but rather economic, political, 
historical, and ideological forces.
In addition, Musaddiq’s own fiery rhetoric and truculent supporters 
constrained his freedom of movement during negotiations with AIOC and the
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British government. Acheson noted that Musaddiq seemed to be under intense
pressure throughout the oil nationalization crisis, some of his own doing and some
the result of unbending public and political coercion:
Another of Mosadeq’s marked characteristics was his distrust of 
his own countrymen; he would never talk with any of them 
present... Mosadeq’s self-defeating quality was that he never 
paused to see that the passions he excited to support him restricted 
his freedom of choice and left only extreme solutions possible.16
U.S. Policy Planning Director Paul Nitze also noted the same intense internal
duress suffered by Musaddiq:
... [H]e appeared to be under such heavy political pressures back 
home that it was nearly impossible for him to make the necessary 
concessions that would have led to an equitable settlement. Had he 
done so, no doubt he would have risked alienating one group or 
another on whose support he depended. Hence, his strategy was to 
temporize in the belief that toe longer he held out, toe more 
frightened we would become of a Communist takeover and toe 
more likely it would be that we would put pressure on toe British 
to come forth with most of toe concessions.1
In the end, Musaddiq’s very passion for his cause, coupled with overwhelming 
domestic duress, shackled his government to intransigence. Even after many 
Iranian leaders began calling for a compromise with AIOC, his government 
refused to concede ground, opting instead for an all-or-nothing approach toward 
London. This all-or-nothing strategy was also designed to scare toe Americans 
into support for his government, support bom of toe fear o f leftist insurrection. 
This tactic later cost Musaddiq dearly.
16 Acheson, p. 504.
17 Nitze, p. 132.
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Iran’s Legitimate Grievances
Although this seemed an irrational stance to British and American 
officials, one must understand that the recalcitrance characteristic o f Iranian 
foreign policy had rational, historical experiences that, to some extent, justified its 
xenophobic nature. First, the British had abused their status as a colonial power 
for the duration of Anglo-Iranian relations- particularly with regard to a fair 
division of oil revenues. In Table 6.1 (below), the Iranian central government 
received less income, 11.9% of total net, in a seventeen-year period than the 
British government received in tea revenue. Thus, in spite o f Iran’s 20% 
ownership share, the country received only 14.6% o f the company’s net profits, 
compared with 16% under 1903’s D’Arcy agreement.18 Musaddiq’s devotion to 
the expulsion of the AIOC is understandable in light o f the political mid economic 
exploitation suffered by Iran. Unfortunately, this devotion blinded him to the 
problems associated with nationalisation.
Table 6.1 -  AIOC income and expenditure: total, 1933-194919
*
Description £ million % o f total % o f net
profit
Net income 895 100.0 -
Taxes paid to the British government 175 19.5 ■-
Net profit 720 81.5 100.0
Capital investment, retained profits, etc. 500 55.8 69.4
Dividends, etc. (paid to British/non-Iranian 115 12.8 16.0
shareholders)
Revenues paid to the Iranian government 105 11.9 14.6
18 Katouzian, p. 183.
19 Katouzian, p. 183. Katouzian has excerpted his data from Musaddiq’s “Message to the People of 
Iran,” Ittila’at, August 30,1951.
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Second, British exploitation of Iran during the Second World War reached
a new level of rapaciousness. The effects o f Iran’s wartime occupation by Allied
forces are often under-emphasized in surveys of Westem-Iranian relations. In
Homa Katouzian’s impeccable study of Iran’s political economy, he commented
on the effects of the country’s wartime occupation by Allied forces. It was an
occupation that became the last straw for many Iranians. Katouzian also
elaborated on the method by which the Allies controlled access to Iran’s
resources, resources frequently used to supply their own troops:
The economic impact o f the occupation was devastating.
The Allies needed food, tobacco, raw materials, and so forth, both 
for the use of their troops in Iran and for general use. Therefore, 
they effectively forced the Iranian government to put the country’s 
resources at their disposal. The operation was carried by means of 
monetary ‘policy’...
... the Iranian currency was devalued by more than 100 per 
cent, from 68 to 140 rials to the pound sterling. Depending on the 
circumstances, devaluation may have beneficial or damaging 
effects for a given political economy. When the Iranian currency 
was devalued, foreign demand for exports- i.e. the demand of 
occupation forces for Iranian goods and services- was virtually 
unlimited, while the possibility o f expanding the supply of those 
goods and services was extremely limited. These two facts put 
together imply that the devaluation by 100 per cent o f the Iranian 
currency reduced Iran’s earnings from the sale of her goods (or 
exports) to the Allies by almost half o f what they would have been 
had the currency not been devalued. On the other hand, as Iranian 
imports were highly specific in nature and could not be 
significantly reduced now that foreign exchange (and, hence, 
foreign goods) were dearer, the value of Iranian imports could not 
have been much less than what they would have been without the 
devaluation. These observations together mean that the 
devaluation was detrimental to Iran’s export earnings as well as to 
her balance of trade, and had a devastating inflationary effect 
which further impoverished the already poor Iranian people.20
20 Katouzian, The Political Economy o f Modem Iran, p. 142. Mistreatment such as this directly 
shaped Iranian perceptions of the West.
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The miserable state of Iran’s economy, and the hardships brought to bear upon the 
people, served as the final spark for an angry public after the war. Allied 
devaluation of the rial and monopolization of Iran’s goods and services drove 
inflation out-of-control, decreased the buying power of Iranians, and cut the 
country’s export revenues substantially. When Musaddiq raised his cries for 
nationalization, his words found welcoming ears.
Given the aforementioned characteristics and circumstances of the Iranian 
people in the postwar period, it became virtually inevitable that the Musaddiq 
government would adopt an intransigent position versus Great Britain. Decades 
of Russian and British domination taxed and angered many Iranians. These were 
the emotions which Musaddiq tapped into during the nationalization drive, and 
these were the same emotions which restricted his independence after 
nationalization was ratified.
Internal Dissent
Further, internecine strife endemic to Iranian politics made his downfall 
inevitable, with or without Anglo-American complicity. Simply put, Musaddiq 
had many domestic enemies with whom to contend. These enemies were 
sufficient in strength and organization so as to doom both his government and 
nationalization even without a British-American coup. The Western aggressors 
merely organized, financed and manipulated extant political opposition to replace 
Musaddiq.
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Cyrus Vakili-Zad performed an excellent short study o f the interactions 
between traditional and modernist thought schools within Iran, and this study 
provides the analyst with a useful framework for the measurement of Iran’s 
political spectrum. In his analysis, Vakili-Zad divided 19th and 20th century 
Iranian views on modernization into three main groups: “Inward-looking 
Intellectuals,” “Outward-looking Intellectuals,” and “Social Engineers.” The 
Inward-looking group, Vakili-Zad observed, mainly discards Westem-style 
modernization, technology, and ideology. This group perceives Islamic culture 
and law as completely sufficient for meeting the needs of the Iranian 
sociopolitical landscape, and rejects most Western technology and ideology as 
being both unnecessary and detrimental. The second group, “Outward-looking 
intellectuals,” desire “the whole package.” This group can also be dubbed 
Westernizing intellectuals, for they prefer a complete importation of Western 
technology and ideology, mid retain a strong affinity for Iran’s /?re-Islamic past 
The third group, “Social Engineers,” are a mixture of the preceding groups. The 
“Social Engineers,” while eager for applicable technologies and Western 
ideologies, believe that many aspects o f Euro-American culture are subversive. 
Thus, a reasoned rejection of undesirable elements of Western modernization is 
wedded to an embrace of Perso-Islamic culture to produce a hybrid ideology that 
includes the best of both worlds.21
Vakili-Zad’s division of Iran’s perceptions on modernization matches well 
with the groupings o f political ideologies present during the Musaddiq
21 Cyrus Vakili-Zad, “Collision of Consciousness: Modernization and Development in Iran,” 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, Jvdy 19% (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd), p. 140-141.
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Administration. The first group, “Inward-looking Intellectuals,” correlates with 
the religious-traditional crowd allied with Sayyed Abulqasim Kashani.22 This 
group, which included many religious clerics and low to middle class workers, 
initially supported Musaddiq’s nationalization campaign. However, as the 
country’s economy sank due to the loss o f oil revenue, and as Musaddiq’s full 
political agenda became known, Kashani and his followers turned against the 
premier, This withdrawal came about due, in part, to Musaddiq’s attempts to 
redistribute land, a move that would hurt the traditional landowners and autocrats 
who financed the religious clergy. Further, Musaddiq held views on the treatment 
of women. He favored the education and enfranchisement of females, a policy 
deemed un-Islamic by Iran’s more religious male citizenry. These irreligious 
policies were destined to earn Musaddiq opposition from his more traditional 
backers within the National Front, and thus erode his support base.
The second group, “Outward-looking” or Westernizing intellectuals, 
matches with the Shah’s inner circle, though this categorization must be qualified. 
As his moniker, the Shah-in-Shah (king-of-kings), suggested, the Shah viewed 
himself as chief among the great pre-Islamic shahs o f the past. In choosing this 
name, Mohammad Reza Shah egotistically labeled himself as chief among the 
great Persian kings of the past. In this manner, the Shah embraced his pre-Islamic 
Persian heritage. Yet the Shah also believed that only a thorough importation of 
Western technology would provide Iran with the economic, financial, industrial, 
military, medical, and educational resources to assert the country’s freedom of
22 Katouzian points out that most clerics remained silent until well into Musaddiq’s tortured 
premiership. See Katouzian, p. 171.
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movement. As both Amuzegar and Hunter reminded us, Iran’s long and glorious
was followed by two centuries o f derision and decline. This downward spiral
created both extreme insecurity and an innate desire to reassert its sovereignty.
Similarly, the Shah craved a restoration of Iran to its previous place among the
great empires of the world, yet lacked the resources to do so. In his heart, he
likely preferred nationalization i f  it could be successfully carried out without
further Western technical assistance, and without drawing the ire o f needed Euro-
American allies. These were impossibilities. He realized that Iran simply did not
possess the training and institutions to run the oil company independently, and so
opposed Musaddiq. He also opposed Musaddiq because o f the premier’s repeated
attempts to limit the monarchy’s power. Musaddiq, on the other hand, tried
repeatedly during his two-year tenure to wrest control o f the army away from the
Shah. Without control o f the army, Musaddiq surmised, the war would be lost.
in the end, it was the loyalty of most army unite to the Shah that cemented
Musaddiq’s fall from power.
The Shah’s ability to maintain control over the armed forces also
illustrated the isolation of Musaddiq’s government. As Katouzian observed, the
prime minister was unable to assert effective control over the entire government,
as other, deeply-entrenched, pro-Shah elements held their ground during the
National Front onslaught:
...[Musaddiq] was not in control either of the whole apparatus of 
the state, or of the entire expanse o f Iranian lands: he was merely 
the leader o f a popular (i.e. melli) political movement [the National 
Front], and the head of an independent government administration; 
that is, even at the best of times, he was in charge of only one 
organ o f the state. The rest of the state apparatus was still in the
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hands of despotic [pro-Shah] agents and institutions, who, in 
pursuit o f their own interests, collaborated with the interested 
foreign powers [Britain and America] against the Popular 
Movement. The situation was an authentic example of dual 
sovereignty; and it involved a struggle between the democratic 
forces led by Musaddiq, and the conservative and despotic (and 
foreign) powers led by the Shah, who eventually emerged • 
victors.23
The Shah’s forces proved to be the most dangerous of Musaddiq’s internal 
enemies, for they possessed established government organs and resources 
necessary to execute a successful coup. Once the British and American 
intelligence services determined that the premier should be deposied, the Shah’s 
forces and Kashani’s traditionalists offered their services with eagerness.
Another political party that was “Outward-looking” in ideology was the 
Tudeh Party. The Tudeh Party embraced Marxist-Lenini st doctrine in its entirety. 
It consisted mainly o f factory and textile workers, students, and young educated 
professionals. It was initially extremely hostile toward Musaddiq and his 
courtship of American support versus the British government, but later tempered 
its criticism after the U.S. government adopted a pro-British stance. During the 
pivotal days of August, 1953, the well-organized Tudeh Party withdrew its 
support from Musaddiq. This was to be a feteful decision, for the Tudeh Party 
was the only strong, viable ally left in Musaddiq’s camp: their apathetic response 
was deeply regretted by the group after the Shah’s reassertion o f dominance.
The third major intellectual group, “Social Engineers,” spanned from the 
extreme left to the center-right. Only two of merit will be mentioned here. On 
the center-left, the Toiling Masses of fcui was a socialist party led by ex-Tudeh
23 Katouzian, p. 164.
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member Khalil Maleki and Dr. Muzaffar Baqa’i Kirmani. Although the party 
leaned slightly to the left, it cannot be placed in the same category as Tudeh, for it 
sought a distinctly Iranian form of socialism. However, Baqa’i Kirmani 
eventually turned on Musaddiq, while Maleki continued his support for the 
premier, and the party split into two groups. Maleki’s faction became known as 
Third Force, and supported Musaddiq to the bitter end.
Synopsis
The revisionist school would have us believe that the overriding factor in
Musaddiq’s fall and the failure of nationalization was Anglo-American opposition
to the prime minister. In such an interpretation, cultural prejudice, ignorance, and
unwarranted fears of Communist usurpation among Western statesmen resulted in
hostility toward the well-meaning Musaddiq.
However, as this chapter indicates, this cultural interpretation, which is
frequently an integral part o f revisionist thinking, is faulty. True, many British
*
and American officials held biased views of Iranian culture in general, and of 
Musaddiq in particular. A discussion of these prejudices will be discussed in the 
following chapter. Yet the personal biases o f Western statesmen varied both in 
degree and in their impact upon the nationalization drive’s final outcome. In 
reality, British prejudices against Iranians were much more pronounced than those 
held by their American counterparts, and because British intransigence or 
cooperation determined the outcome of Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations, it was 
British obstructionism that helped derail nationalization.
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It has also been proven that the Iranians maintained legitimate grievances 
against the AIOC, which had been used by the Crown as leverage against Tehran. 
So long as Great Britain had control o f the company, Iran’s political and 
economic independence were jeopardized and its destiny in the hands o f another. 
Musaddiq’s coalition, the National Front, correctly assessed that only the 
complete expulsion of British influence from Iran would guarantee the country’s 
future self-determination. This realization propelled the pro-nationalization bloc 
toward an unyielding, all-or-nothing posture. This determination, coupled with 
Musaddiq’s own uncompromising rhetoric, shackled his government to 
truculence, Unfortunately, these factors also restricted Musaddiq’s ability to 
negotiate, for he knew that domestic political pressure to nationalize would not 
permit concessions to the British. Musaddiq’s devotion to the nationalization 
principle blinded him to pragmatism, even after many supporters began calling for 
compromise during the summer of 1953. Further, the loose coalition that had 
carried the nationalization banner disintegrated during 1953 due to four key 
reasons. First, there was the lack of a common, unifying ideology. Second, there 
was increased opposition prompted by economic and political deterioration 
Third, personal rivalries and mutual suspicion among the leadership of the 
National Front weakened the coalition. Fourth, allegiances with foreign actors 
introduced additional external pressure upon Musaddiq.24
24 For instance, the Soviet Union’s sponsorship of Tudeh served to influence Tudeh’s relationship 
with Musaddiq. Early in the nationalization drive, Tudeh bitterly opposed Musaddiq as an 
imperialist stooge. After nationalization, the Soviet Union and Tudeh applauded the premier for 
defeating British colonialism. During the two-year crisis, Tudeh supported Musaddiq for 
- pragmatic reasons, perhaps hoping to usurp his government at an opportune time. Yet during the 
critical days of August, 1953, the Tudeh hesitated, depriving Musaddiq of one of his few power 
bases with which to resist the coup.
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Again, it must be reiterated that even without British and American covert 
intervention, it is likely that Musaddiq’s government would have fallen, and with 
it, hopes for a successful nationalization of Iran’s oil reserves, The anti-Musaddiq 
bloc in Iran was strong, and increasing in strength with each passing day. The 
majority of the army was loyal to Mohammad Reza Shah, and it is unlikely that 
that organ would have sided with Musaddiq in an open confrontation with the 
Shah. Further, by the summer o f 1953 Musaddiq had lost substantial support 
among the merchant and traditional middle class. This flight from the National 
Front was also directly linked to the defection o f several prominent clerics to the 
pro-Shah side. Given this erosion o f Musaddiq’s support base, his fall was not a 
matter of if, but when.
lil
7. Anglo-American Intransigence
Although Iranian domestic pressures were instrumental to 
nationalization’s failure, and, hence, the fall of Musaddiq’s government, 
opposition from the United States and Great Britain also proved a critical factor. 
American officials in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, unlike their 
English counterparts, were initially reluctant to subvert actively Musaddiq’s 
leadership. However, as the situation in Iran worsened, fears of leftist subversion 
mounted, and American policy came in line with the British anti-Musaddiq 
stance. Before examining the motives for British and American intransigence, a 
discussion of Western prejudices and perceptions will be provided.
Anglo-American Prejudice
Western prejudice and ignorance has historically been an underlying force 
directing the actions, reactions, and dispositions of diplomats in the Near East. As 
previously affirmed, a statesman’s traits and experiences mold his or her 
perceptions of reality, and, therefore, conduct-of foreign relations. Religious and 
cultural background, personal experience, racial bias, mental (instability, 
ideology, and physical and mental health converge in the individual to help form 
the actions and reactions of the state when that individual is serving as an agent of 
the state.1
1 The obverse is also true. The individual’s character is shaped by the state (or society) in which 
he or she lives.
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Nonetheless, in the case of the Iranian oil nationalization crisis, cultural
and racial prejudice was outweighed by other influences. This said, it is still
important to provide a cultural interpretation of Westem-Iranian relations during
the oil nationalization crisis. James F. Goode has made this sort o f cultural
interpretation a foundation of his scholarship. Goode pointed out that, except for
a dissenting minority, most Westerners who spent time in Iran maintained fieiy
prejudices against the country and its people. In the opening chapter of In the
Shadow o f Musaddiq, he profiled common Anglo-American biases:
Prejudice prevailed. Americans seemed unpersuaded by [minority] 
arguments that ran counter to notions built up over years of 
[Muslim-Christian] religious controversy. Increasing disparities in 
wealth and power between East and West reinforced the belief that 
the Christian, democratic, and progressive West was superior in all 
respects to the Islamic, autocratic, and stagnant East...2
Iranian politics confused Westerners. Unable to fathom the 
shifting alliances among the [Majlis] deputies, and within the 
[Shah’s] court, they easily concluded that Iranians were 
‘irrational... undisciplined, unprincipled and erratic.’ Or, as 
British Ambassador Sir Reader Bullard (1941-6) opined, Iranians 
were psychologically immature.
In Western chancelleries Musaddiq came to represent all 
that diplomats disliked most about Iranian politics. They 
considered him old-fashioned, narrow-minded, xenophobic, and 
even ‘a hysterical and demented demagogue.’ He earned 
opprobrium for opposition to foreign oil concessions in the 
fourteenth Majlis, and reports to Washington had little that was 
good to say about him. Generally they just ignored him.3
A discrepancy in material-technological wealth and the degradation of Islam 
generally fostered feelings of contempt toward Near Eastern Islamic culture. In 
Iran’s case, this disdain for Islamic culture combined with other factors specific to
2 Goode, In the Shadow o f Musaddiq, p. 4.
113
>
Perso-Islamic culture, such as a perceived senseless suspicion toward the West. 
Yet to the Iranians, this xenophobic reaction was merely a justifiable defensive 
posture, assumed to protect Perso-Islamic society from self-evident Westem- 
Christian depredations. To many Anglo-American officials, Musaddiq was an 
emotionally unstable, “demented demagogue.” He was not an honorable defender 
of Iranian self-determination. Further, the bewildering nature of Iranian domestic 
politics both irritated and mystified Western diplomats, who were blind to their 
own ‘contributions’ to Iran’s chaotic internal situation.
The British and American foreign secretaries during the latter part o f the 
crisis, Eden and Acheson respectively, displayed some cultural prejudices of their 
own. The two diplomats also held rather demeaning opinions of Prime Minister 
Musaddiq, as shown by the following description by the American Secretary of 
State:4
From the first moment I saw him... Mosadeq became for me the 
character Lob in James Barrie’s play Dear Brutus. He was small 
and frail with not a shred of hair on his billiard-ball head; a thin 
face protruded into a long beak of a nose flanked by two bright, 
shoe-button eyes. His whole manner and appearance was birdlike, 
marked by quick, nervous movements as he seemed to jump about 
on a perch. His pixie quality showed in instantaneous 
transformations...
...he was essentially a rich, reactionary, feudal-minded 
Persian inspired by a fanatical hatred of the British and a desire to 
expel them and all their works from the country regardless o f the 
cost. He was a great actor and a great gambler...5
3 Ibid., p. 12. Goode’s information on the British perception comes from Ervand Abrahamian, Iran 
Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982), p. 211, 216. For Goode’s citation on American 
prejudices, see The Diplomacy o f Neglect, p. 114,138.
4 See also Eden, chapter 9, pp. 210-247. Eden remarked that “[t]he British people... had difficulty 
in taking Musaddiq seriously,” p. 219.
3 Acheson, pp. 503-504. One should not think, however, that every American official hefd low 
opinions of Musaddiq. Paul Nitze, Director of Policy Planning under Eisenhower, maintained a 
positive perception of the Iranian premier. In fact, Nitze believed Musaddiq to be “far preferable 
to the shah and his retinue.” “I expected to meet a weeping lunatic,” Nitze reminisced, “[but] [hje
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To Acheson, the Iranian premier seemed an edgy “actor,” an unworthy man for 
the lofty position he held.
Yet to many Iranians, Musaddiq was a hero. Iranians have long valued 
passion, creativity, steadfastness, and wit as enviable characteristics. Musaddiq 
often exhibited these characteristics in the course of diplomatic and commercial 
negotiations- characteristics that were, to him, a display of Persian 
gamesmanship. He also carried in his heart his mother’s mantra, that a man’s 
suffering for his people is commensurate to his greatness. In this manner, 
Musaddiq viewed himself as expendable: a would-be martyr standing firm against 
imperialism. Unfortunately, Musaddiq also suffered from sudden mood swings 
and acute anxiety, which further amplified the premier’s own personal and 
cultural traits. Western cultural bias against Musaddiq’s Persian character 
combined with his own idiosyncrasies and weaknesses to paint a distorted portrait 
of the premier. These traits were then aggravated by Musaddiq’s implacability 
and withering domestic pressures. The result was an erratic and unyielding 
Musaddiq who negotiated with equally recalcitrant Western officials, such as 
Eden, Acheson, Churchill, and Eisenhower.
Nonetheless, these aforementioned prejudices were not the strong 
sculptors o f the crisis that a misapplied cultural interpretation would have us 
believe. It was British, not American prejudice that more directly shaped the 
outcome of the crisis. Remember that the crisis began as an Anglo-hzmm
turned out to be nothing of the kind. On the contrary, I found him to be a totally rational and sane 
individual, in control of himself at all times...Mossadegh was also well informed as to the 
intricacies of the oil business...[a] tough negotiator.” (Nitze, pp. 130-132). McGhee also was
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conflict, and that the United States became involved later due to the stalemate 
between the two parties, and to fears that the crisis provided an opportunity for a 
Communist coup. Given these political dynamics, it was British bigotry that more 
directly formed the course and aftermath of the crisis. This bigotry combined 
with other, non-cultural factors to form the British position. During the 
immediate postwar period, and even during the crisis, British officials frequently 
dismissed nationalization as the result of characteristic Persian hot-headedness. 
Believing that Iranian emotionalism was a storm, their strategy was to weather 
this storm until rationality returned to the country. If the Crown dealt with 
Musaddiq firmly, as a parent disciplines a child, then the Iranian government 
would back down and a normal relationship restored.
The Americans, though also given to stereotypes, were driven more by a 
desire to keep Tehran out of Communist hands. Goode tends to generalize 
Western prejudice, and thus fails to evaluate separately the differing impacts of 
British and American bigotry. Further, he fails to draw clear lines from prejudice 
to policy in the oil nationalization crisis. He proves beyond doubt that such 
ethnocentrism was extant, yet does not show how bias directly shaped British and 
American policies. Nor are there adequate analyses of other powerful economic, 
political, ideological, and geostrategic influences. These other influences had 
greater affect on diplomacy between the main three participants. A strong 
cultural interpretation cannot be given to emotionalism or vindictiveness, but
amicable toward Musaddiq, but stated that “his attitude probably doomed from the start our efforts 
to facilitate an agreement with the British.” (McGhee, pp. 390-391).
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must calmly measure ethnocentrism’s effects in relation to other, non-cultural 
factors.
Britain’s Setting Sun
A more crucial influence upon British policy was the Crown’s tenuous
position after the Second World War, which served to stiffen English opposition
to Musaddiq’s nationalization program. Two devastating 20th century wars had
severely sapped the strength of the powerful British Empire. In the years
following the war. Great Britain lost several colonial possessions, including her
jewel, India, and public opinion was set against a further deterioration of the
Crown’s position among the world’s great powers. The loss o f these colonies,
coupled with the war’s exorbitant cost in resources and finances, pushed the
British government toward an intransigent stance both before and after
Musaddiq’s nationalization. After the Conservative Party’s victory in the
October, 1951 elections, Prime Minister Winston Churchill described the
country’s economic condition during this period, a condition that would be further
compromised by the permanent loss of Iranian oil and revenue:
The latest estimates show that in 1952, on present trends and 
policies and without making any allowance for further speculative 
losses, the United Kingdom would have a deficit on its general 
balance of overseas payments of between £500 million and £600 
million... These figures mean, in short, that we are buying much 
more than we can afford to pay for from current earnings, and this 
can only in time lead to national bankruptcy. The position has 
been made worse by the loss of confidence in sterling and by the 
additional strain o f the loss ofPersian oil supplies...6
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This quote also illustrates the differing perceptions held by London and 
Washington regarding Iran’s situation. For outgoing Labour Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee, the crisis “illustrated the kind of problem that arises when 
insurgent nationalism comes into conflict with old-established commercial 
interests.”7 The British were acutely aware of the financial stakes involved in a 
potentially irrevocable loss o f Iranian oil, tax revenue, and profits. In contrast, the 
Americans finally opted to support a joint Anglo-American operation to depose 
Musaddiq due to their fears that continued internal chaos could lead to a Tudeh 
coup. The British had favored such a covert operation for two years prior to the 
August, 1953 coup, but for quite different reasons, Whitehall was less fearful of 
Communist usurpation, and believed that the Musaddiq government could be 
supplanted by another, wo«-Communist regime more conducive to a favorable oil 
agreement. Great Britain’s main foreign policy goal, as Attlee hinted, was to 
retain valued Iranian commercial assets, and thus protect British strategic, 
commercial, and military interests. Whitehall’s aim was to persuade the 
American government not to mediate the oil dispute, but rather to cooperate in its 
plans both to oppose nationalization and topple Musaddiq.
After the Conservative Party’s usurpation o f power in October, 1951, 
incoming Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden also expressed concerns that the 
Iranian situation, if not dealt with firmly by London, could hasten the spread of 
similar nationalization attempts throughout the Near East. In spite of the Crown’s 
reduced resources and manpower in the wake of the war, Eden still hoped that
6 Parliamentary Debates, 1951-1952, November 6, 1951, 493 H.C. deb. 5s, pp. 76-77 
[Italics added].
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some possessions or commercial interests could be retained, so long as
expenditures did not outpace potential gains. If the British government was
unable to maintain effective control o f its Iranian holdings, Eden surmised, other
Near Eastern peoples may be encouraged to pursue similar actions, having been
prompted by the bold Iranian move:
Now, as a result of events in Iran, Egypt became ebullient. The 
troubles fomented on the Shatt al Arab, festered on the Nile. There 
were riotings and shootings and attacks upon our troops. In 
October, the Labour government, as one of its last acts, increased 
the garrison of Egypt by two brigades.
This was the lowering prospect I contemplated on the day I 
took over at the Foreign Office. We were out of Iran; we had lost 
Abadan; our authority throughout the Middle East had been 
violently shaken; the outbreaks in Egypt foreshadowed further 
upheavals,..8
The incoming Conservative government was also recalcitrant for more basic, 
political reasons. During the 1951 election campaign, Churchill criticized the 
Labour Party for its soft policy toward Iran’s nationalization. If elected, the 
Conservatives promised to assume a tougher line toward Musaddiq. British 
interests and prestige were at stake, they claimed, and these had to be protected. 
Once in office, the Conservatives felt obligated to make good on their campaign 
rhetoric, and opposed nationalization (and Musaddiq) at every opportunity.
Thus, the British and American governments held quite different views on 
the Iranian oil nationalization crisis. British policy was shaped by commercial, 
domestic political, and economic considerations, whereas the American position 
was shaped more by geostrategic interests. During the first months of the crisis,
7 Attlee, p. 246.
* Eden, p. 217.
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the two governments had disparate assessments o f the Iranian domestic situation, 
of the risks of continued economic deterioration, and of the correct course of 
action to be followed. Eventually, the two allies forged a unified approach to the 
crisis, and actively sought the deposition of the courageous, but misunderstood, 
Iranian premier. It should also be pointed out that, like their American 
counterparts, there was a shift in tactics after the change of administrations. The 
Labour Party, under Attlee’s leadership, had been willing to resist Musaddiq 
through diplomatic, economic, and political means only. In contrast, the 
Conservatives under Churchill showed themselves more eager to settle the crisis, 
and were willing to use more assertive methods to achieve their goal.
Friction.
As Truman’s July, 1951, letter to Musaddiq stated, the U.S. government
initially preferred to serve as unofficial mediator in the dispute, and sent W.
Averell Harriman to Tehran for that purpose. The Americans perceived British
obstinacy as a key reason for the stalemate that set in after nationalization, a
sentiment echoed by Acheson:
Mosadeq was aided by the unusual and persistent stupidity of the 
company and the British government in their management of the 
affair. Hope for stability and progress in Iran lay in the young 
Shah, although American liberals clung to the illusion that some 
other moderate leadership existed between the Tudeh Party 
Communists and the feudal reactionaries and mullahs.9
Acheson’s first point, that the Crown had managed the Iranian situation poorly, 
was a common critique in the State Department. The State Department had
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already formally endorsed the 50-50 profit-sharing principle adopted by American 
oil companies, believing it to be both fair and essential to muting simmering anti- 
Western feelings in the developing countries. In contrast, the British considered 
the 50-50 principle a concession too far. When possible, Whitehall hoped to 
retain its authoritative, and exploitative, position in the Near East, and so resisted 
such an arrangement with Iran until mid-1951. By this time, however, the 
National Front and its supporters rejected such an agreement, and opted to 
unilaterally nationalize the AIOC in its entirety.
In November, 1951, Eden and Acheson conducted a series of meetings in 
Paris to discuss Anglo-American differences and reach agreement on correct 
Iranian policy.10 During the meetings, Eden outlined four major principles that he 
believed essential to a settlement of the nationalization crisis:
1. There must be fair compensation for loss cause by 
nationalization...
2. ...security for payment of effective 
compensation...[Compensation could only be paid in the form 
of oil].
3. Iran should not by reason of her unilateral action secure, 
overall, more favourable terms than concessionary 
Governments which have respected their contracts.
4. [British nationals cannot be excluded from Iran].11
In essence, Acheson was able to persuade his British counterpart to accept 
nationalization in principle. However, the British refused to accept de facto 
nationalization because they still viewed the unilateral abrogation of the 1933
9 Acheson, p. 501.
10 The two statesmen were in Paris for a meeting of the U.N. Assembly. In a period of ten days, 
Eden and Acheson held five meetings.
11 Eden, pp. 219-220.
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Agreement as an illegal act.12 The Crown was also reluctant to make concessions 
because doing so would reward a government that had violated a commercial 
contract.
Eden and Acheson also disagreed about the politico-economic situation in 
Iran. Acheson expressed American concerns of leftist subversion in Iran, and 
believed that if  a mutually acceptable oil agreement was not signed, the Musaddiq 
government could slip into the Communist camp. As Acheson iterated above, 
many State Department officials did not believe “moderate leadership” existed in 
Iran between the Tudeh party and the far right. If the politico-economic situation 
continued to deteriorate, Acheson pined, Musaddiq would either turn to the Soviet 
Union for assistance, or succumb to a Tudeh coup. Foreign Secretary Eden 
disagreed:
Our reading of the situation was different. I did not accept the 
argument that the only alternative to Musaddiq was Communist 
rule. I thought that if  Musaddiq fell, his place might well be taken 
by a more reasonable Government with which it should be possible 
to conclude a satisfactory agreement.13
The two diplomats also differed on the proper role o f the American 
government in the crisis. Eden, of course, tried to persuade the Americans to 
oppose Musaddiq by rejecting the premier’s requests for economic aid to stabilize 
the Iranian central government. At this time Acheson preferred to remain neutral, 
however, and wondered if giving financial aid to Musaddiq might buy needed 
negotiating time and stymie the leftist threat
12 See Acheson, p. 505.
13 Ibid., p. 222.
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Although Eden and Acheson were unable to reach a consensus about “the 
future of Iran,” they did “come closer” on another key issue.14 They agreed that 
any significant economic aid to Iran should be attained from an international, 
independent lending agency, not the U.S. government. The following February 
Truman thus rejected yet another aid request from Musaddiq, and stated that any 
financial help from the United States government had to be preceded by a new oil 
agreement with Great Britain. In a State Department bulletin issued on March 20, 
1952, the U.S. government justified its decision:
The United States has received several requests, both 
written and oral, from the Iranian Government for loans for direct 
financial assistance to ease the acute situation in which the Iranian 
Government finds itself as a result o f the loss o f its oil revenues.
The United States position in response to these requests has been 
that while the United States desires to be in a position to render 
Iran any proper and necessary assistance, it could not justify aid of 
the type requested at a time when Iran has the opportunity of 
receiving adequate revenues from its oil industry without prejudice 
to its national aspirations. It has been pointed out that the United 
States is bearing a heavy financial burden in its efforts to help 
bring about a stable and lasting peace and that it is most difficult to 
undertake additional commitments to a country which has die 
immediate means of helping itself.
The United States has not, as indicated in press reports 
originating in Iran, established as a condition for granting financial 
aid to Iran that the Iranian Government should accept any 
particular proposals. The United States has consistently 
maintained that a settlement is possible in which the legitimate 
interests of both Iran and the United Kingdom will be protected 
and which will make the resumption of the oil industry operation 
feasible and practicable form the economic viewpoint. We believe 
that the offer of the International Bank to assist in this matter has 
provided a good opportunity to reach this objective, even though 
on an interim basis. We continue to hope that a formula will be 
found which will be acceptable to both parties.i;>
14 Ibid., p. 224.
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Great Britain advised the Americans to reject Musaddiq’s requests for aid in the 
hope that a destabilized Musaddiq government would give way to a “more 
reasonable” administration in Tehran. However, when the United States actually 
rejected repeated requests for large aid packages, it did so due to the massive 
expenditures incurred by the Marshall Plan and other postwar projects, and due to 
the availability o f another substantial income source for the Iranian government. 
The State Department also welcomed the temporary intervention of the 
International Bank to run either the oil industry on an interim basis, or provide 
financial assistance to the Iranian central government.
During the Eden-Acheson meetings in Paris, the matter of American 
commercial intervention was also discussed. At first, Acheson was hesitant to 
bring U.S. oil companies into any consortium that would temporarily run oil 
operations, for he did not want the British government to feel threatened by 
American ulterior motives. In expressing such sentiments, Acheson was, perhaps, 
exhibiting false humility. It was no secret that American oil companies had made 
several attempts in the 1920s and 1930s to gain oil concessions from the Iranian 
government.16 In fact, George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, had met with a group of American oil
15 Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 
1952 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 274.
16 Morgan Shuster stated in The Strangling o f Persia that the U.S. did harbor commercial hopes 
for Iranian oil. Unfortunately, British predominance in Iran’s oil industry stymied private efforts 
to gain an American concession. Further, during the immediate postwar period the United States 
and Great Britain exchanged support on key political issues: American support for Britain’s Iran 
policy in return for British support in Korea and Europe. Thus, Washington was reluctant to 
sacrifice needed British assistance in Southeast Asia and Europe by opposing London’s Iran 
policy.
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executives on May 14, 1951 to discuss the Anglo-Iranian r if t. 17 At the height of 
the nationalization debate in the Iranian Majlis, McGhee told the American 
oilmen that the AIOC should accept nationalization as a foregone conclusion.18 
He then asked the oil officials for advice regarding the proper public position to 
be assumed by the United States government. The executives replied by stating 
that any public displeasure voiced by the State Department would only alienate 
London. The State Department was not eager to risk estrangement with a needed 
ally for Washington’s European and Asian policies. Thus, the oil companies 
initially urged an- American commercial and governmental policy of 
“aloofness.”19
From Truman to Eisenhower
Another reason for American hesitancy on the commercial issue was of a 
legal nature. By spring, 1952, the State Department reached the conclusion that 
only an international oil consortium would be able to run both Iran’s industry, 
and allay Musaddiq’s fears of British domination. As previously stated, a key 
obstacle to successful negotiations had been the issue of the exclusion of British 
nationals from Iran. The National Front and its cadre were dead-set against the
17 Officials from the large oil companies, such as Caltex, ARAMCO, and Gulf, were present.
18 McGhee eventually ran afoul of the British due to the Assistant Secretary’s connections with the 
American oil industry. Because of his background as an oilman, London claimed that he was a 
biased player, and ill-suited to make fair judgements during the crisis. McGhee defended himself, 
saying that AIOC policy amounted to “obstructionism,” and asserting that Iran (like it or not) had 
the right to nationalize i f  compensation was provided. (See McGhee, p. 322, 338). As the crisis 
lapsed into fall, 1951, the State Department, sensing the rising tensions, replaced Ambassador-to- 
Tehran Henry F. Grady with Loy Henderson. (Both Grady and McGhee had been more 
sympathetic to the Iranian side). Anthony Eden was ecstatic about Henderson’s appointment, and 
remarked that the American Ambassador’s help was crucial to the 1954 settlement of the oil 
dispute. (See Eden, p. 226).
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return of British technicians and employees after it became obvious that they were 
unwilling to work for the nascent NIOC. After their expulsion in fall, 1951, the 
British demanded that any new agreement permit the return of their nationals to 
the Iranian oilfields. London wanted to keep its foot in the door of Musaddiq’s 
house. Musaddiq, of course, refused the demand.
When it became obvious that neither side would compromise on this key 
point, the State Department’s Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson arranged a meeting 
with American oil industry representatives, Attorney General James McGranery, 
General Omar Bradley, and the Justice Department’s Leonard Emmerglick. 
Acheson and Nitze believed that an international consortium, one that could 
replace the much-maligned AIOC, was the only viable option for a mutually 
acceptable oil compact. There were, however, very important legal obstacles to 
the plan. According to the plan, the consortium would be comprised of both 
European and American companies. Unfortunately, the Justice Department’s 
Antitrust Division was embroiled in several legal proceedings against U.S. oil 
companies for alleged monopolization practices. Before bringing the proposal to 
President Truman’s desk, Acheson wanted to see if  the plan would pass the 
Justice Department’s legal stipulations.
At the meeting, held October 8, 1952, Emmerglick was less than 
enthusiastic. He believed that the law must be impartial, and adamantly argued 
against American participation in an international consortium in Iran because he 
believed it to be a violation of his department’s antitrust standards. General
19 “Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs,” 
FRUS, 1951, vol. V, p. 312.
Bradley vehemently objected, stating that the matter was one of national security 
and that the antitrust laws should be suspended in the case of Iran. Truman 
eventually sided with Bradley and Nitze on the matter, instructed the Justice 
Department to overlook American participation in the consortium, and told the 
State Department to proceed with the proposition.20
After these legal issues were settled, the State Department and British 
Foreign Office thought there was renewed hope for a settlement. London agreed 
to permit new discussions on the plan outlined by the Truman Administration, and 
Musaddiq approved the proposal in January, 1953, after adding a request for a 
$50 million loan from the U.S. government.21 Musaddiq then made another 
abrupt reversal, and rejected the proposition! Nitze claimed that the Iranian 
premier likely rejected the plan “in the mistaken belief that he could cut a better 
deal with the incoming Eisenhower administration.”22
Once again, Musaddiq had made a serious miscalculation, for the 
incoming Eisenhower Administration was not in a generous mood. There were 
five key justifications for Eisenhower’s immovable stance toward Musaddiq.
First, though Iran was considered of vital strategic importance in the Near 
East, particularly as a line-of-defense against southward Soviet aggression, the
20 Nitze, p. 134.
21 The loan was to come via the Defense Production Administration. Truman, like his successor, 
did not place a priority on Iranian financial aid. His Mutual Security Program (announced to 
Congress on May 24,1951) proposed the following expenditures (See Truman, Public Papers, p. 
304):
Economic aid Military aid
Europe $1,650 million $5,240 million
Asia 375 555
Middle East and North Africa 125 415
Latin America 22 40
Administration  78  :
Total $2.25 billion $6.25 billion
127
Eisenhower Administration did not place the oil crisis at the top of its priority list. 
Both Truman and his successor believed the Korean conflict and other global 
situations to be of greater import than events in the oilfields o f southern Iran.
Second, the Marshall Plan and other postwar economic and military aid 
programs were taxing government resources, in late May, 1953, Prime Minister 
Musaddiq sent a request for emergency financial assistance to Eisenhower, and 
claimed that if the aid was not received, there would be “serious consequences.”23 
The “serious consequences” he hinted at were, of course, the threats o f both 
internal leftist subversion and an external alliance, borne of necessity, with the 
Soviet Union. Yet Eisenhower and his new Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, were not swayed by Musaddiq’s sword-rattling.24 As state before, 
President Eisenhower sent a reply, dated June 29, 1953, in which he contended 
that a substantial economic aid package to Iran would be an unjustifiable use of 
taxpayer funds.25 He continued Truman’s policy of rejecting large-scale financial 
assistance to Musaddiq until a new oil agreement with Great Britain was reached. 
To Eisenhower, Musaddiq had access to much-needed revenue for his 
government, but the premier’s repeated rejections o f British and American 
proposals were the main source of Iran’s“ troubles.”26 The expensive rebuilding 
programs underway in Western Europe, postwar aid programs in Turkey and
22 Nitze, p. 135.
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 161.
24 A few U.S. officials, including George McGhee and Henry Grady, had been more eager to 
provide economic assistance. In fall, 1950, for example, U.S. Ambassador-to-Iran Grady urgently 
requested a $100 million for Iran. The State Department turned the request down because both the 
Department and American lending institutions believed Iran to be a high-risk in the absence of an 
oil agreement. See Acheson, pp. 501-503.
25 Ibid., p. 162.
26 Ibid.
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Greece, and Eisenhower’s determination to reach a settlement in Korea, combined 
to render the idea of increased expenditures in Iran unpalatable. Further, that 
Eisenhower’s response came one month after Musaddiq’s request is indicative of 
the low priority given to the oil nationalization crisis.
Third, even i f  the American government could have afforded the large 
economic aid packages requested by Musaddiq, it is improbable that Eisenhower 
would have given his approval. Marshall Plan money did help turn the tide in 
Greece’s war with leftist insurrectionists. Yet substantial resource expenditures in 
China did not have the same result, and in 1949, China was “lost” to the 
Communists. If the U.S. government opted to grant Musaddiq financial aid, with 
or without a new Anglo-Iranian oil agreement in hand, it would not guarantee 
victory over growing leftist activity in Iran. It must also be iterated that, as 
Katouzian asserted, Musaddiq was in control of only one bloc o f the central 
government. Pro-Shah and traditionalist forces, many o f them known for their 
corruption, still controlled other departments within the government, and 
Eisenhower could not justify dumping aid into a government legendary for its 
criminal elements.27
Fourth, by the time Eisenhower took office in January, 1953, international 
oil companies had successfully closed the production gap left by the loss of 
Iranian oil exports. From 1947 to 1954, Iranian oil production dropped from 
424,000 barrels per day to only 59,000. In contrast, Saudi Arabian production 
increased during the same period, from 246,000 barrels to 953,000 barrels per 
day. Kuwait likewise expanded oil production from 45,000 to 952,000 barrels per
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day.28 This successful ‘bridging of the gap’ contrasted sharply with a 1951
prediction that the forfeiture of Iranian oil would cause devastating effects.29
Musaddiq’s prediction that the world, especially the Western world, could not do
without Persian oil, was wrong. Eisenhower and Churchill, while eager to resume
full production in Iran, could afford to play the waiting game because British,
American, European, and international oil producers had closed ranks.
Fifth, the Tudeh Party’s increased benevolence toward Musaddiq’s
government, coupled with Musaddiq’s own veiled threats o f a leftist courtship,
convinced Eisenhower and Dulles that opposition to the premier was increasingly
necessary. Eisenhower stated that Musaddiq was “moving closer and closer to the
Communists,” and it was this concern that pushed the American government to
embrace the long-standing British plan to actively machinate Musaddiq’s
overthrow.30 During the summer of 1953, Eisenhower grew wary of Musaddiq’s
tolerance of Tudeh support, and worried that a repeat o f Czechoslovakia’s loss to
leftism was in the offing:
For the shah, the time had come to check that course... 
Mossadegh, the shah thought, believed that he could form an 
alliance with the Tudeh party and then outwit it; but in doing so, 
the Shah recognized, Dr. Mossadegh would become to Iran what 
the ill-feted Dr. Benes had been in Czechoslovakia- a leader whom 
the Communists, having gained power, would eventually destroy.31
For Eisenhower and Dulles, the fear of leftist subversion was the final, fateful 
factor in their decision to join MI6 in an operation to bring Musaddiq down and
27 See also Pahlavi, p. 82.
28 Ibid., p. 160.
29 “Interest of the United States in the Development of the Petroleum Resources Of the Near and 
Middle East,” January 8 ,1951,NIE-14, FRUS, 1951, vol. V, p. 269.
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supplant him with the more amicable Mohammad Reza Shah.32 The Truman and 
Eisenhower governments were virtually identical in their motives and perceptions 
during the oil nationalization crisis. Both administrations were reluctant to grant 
substantive financial aid given Musaddiq’s intransigence, the bevy of other 
pressing foreign policy matters, the availability o f oil revenue to Iran, and the 
risks o f lending to an unstable government. Yet Eisenhower and Dulles were 
faced with the growing possibility of a leftist coup in Iran, and the slippage of 
Tehran into the Communist camp. Eisenhower was willing to avert this 
catastrophe //the expenditure of resources was limited.
A Diplomacy o f Priority, Revisited
This determination to limit both expenditure and involvement in Iran 
strongly supports the assertion that American policy constituted a diplomacy o f 
priority, and not a diplomacy o f neglect. U.S. officials, both in the State 
Department and in the Truman and Eisenhower governments, did not ignore the 
postwar Iranian oil dispute. Rather, they carefully examined the Iranian situation, 
placed it in its global context, and determined that the crisis did not warrant top 
priority. Although they believed that Iran should remain in the Western camp, 
they nonetheless could not justify any drastic increase in resource allocation to the
30 Eisenhower, Mandate fo r Change, pp. 162-163.
31 Ibid., p. 163.
32 After Dulles’ appointment, Paul Nitze urged Dulles to carry on discussions with Musaddiq. 
Dulles initially believed that the U.S. government had been ‘too harsh’ toward Musaddiq. Dulles 
also believed that Egypt’s Gemal Abdel Naser should be the “wheelhorse of [America’s] Middle 
East policy.” (See Nitze, p. 135). However, as 1953 progressed, Dulles and brother Allen of the 
CIA had changes o f heart. Hoping to avoid a leftist coup in Iran, they opted to help topple 
Musaddiq.
131
country given the other problems facing the United States. There were four 
significant factors that reduced the relative importance of the Iranian crisis.
First, the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, which handled most diplomatic 
contacts with Iran, was only one of four offices working under the leadership of 
the Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs of the State Department.33 In addition 
to these four offices, there were twenty geographic divisions. In addition to the 
Political Affairs group, there were three other departments on the same tier: 
Administration, Public Affairs, and Economic Affairs. Each of these groups had 
more subdivisions: twenty, nine, Mid, thirteen, respectively. Not only was the 
Near Eastern Affairs Division competing with other geographic areas for monies 
and attention, such as the European and Far Eastern Affairs Divisions, but there 
was also competition within its own branches! Given that the postwar period 
witnessed the formation o f Israel, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, leftist agitation in 
Greece, instability in Turkey, and growing anti-colonialism in Egypt, it should be 
no surprise to revisionists that the U.S. government placed Iran lower on their 
diplomatic priority list. These were, furthermore, Near and Middle Eastern crises. 
Other global situations encountered in the postwar period were: the fall of China 
in 1949; the 1948 Berlin crisis; the occupation of Japan; the invasion of South 
Korea in June, 1950; and the births of the U.N. and NATO. The decision to 
relegate Iran to lesser priority was, therefore, a conscious decision- not a 
development bome entirely out o f ineptitude and neglect
33 Graham H. Stuart, The Department o f State: A History o f Its Organization, Procedure, and 
Personnel (New York: MacMillan, 1949), pp. 454-455.
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Second, Eisenhower, as Robert A. Divine observed, was a Europe-
oriented executive:
He shared the Eastern establishment’s foreign policy view that 
American security rested on a stable and friendly Europe, and he 
had little patience for those Republicans who were oriented toward 
Asia.34
Granted, Eisenhower was serious about his campaign vow to travel to Korea and 
reach a peace agreement with China and North Korea. However, his 
administration remained firmly Europe-centered throughout his tenure, for Europe 
was Caucasian America’s forefather. The American ruling majority had no 
cultural, religious, ethnic, or historical affinity with Iran. Given the fact that 
Europe was perceived to still under direct or indirect Communist threats, it was 
inevitable that American officials placed greater emphasis upon European 
economic, political, and military stability.
Third, Eisenhower’s leadership style did not foster an environment of 
diplomatic neglect, but rather attentiveness. True, Eisenhower delegated much 
authority to his subordinates, and expected consensus on issues to be reached by 
his subordinates before they reached his desk. However, Secretary of State 
Dulles, Sherman Adams, and other members o f the staff were also eager for input 
from Eisenhower, particularly given his wealth of foreign policy experience and
34 Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.
10. Truman also believed Europe central to America’s security needs: “The heart of our common 
defense effort is the North Atlantic community. The defense o f Europe is the basis for the defense 
o f the whole free world- ourselves included. Next to the United States, Europe is the largest 
workshop in the world. It is also a homeland of the great religious beliefs shared by many of our 
citizens- beliefs which are now threatened by the tide of atheistic communism.” (Italics added]. 
See Harry S. Truman, Public Papers o f the Presidents, 1951 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1965), p. 9.
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international contacts. He was not, as Fred I. Greenstein asserted, a roi faineant, 
but an “activist” who carefully balanced his ultimate sovereignty with a 
delegation of duties to trusted advisers.35 In the case o f Iran, just as in other 
foreign policy crises, Eisenhower was never aloof but rather involved.
Fourth, both the Truman and Eisenhower governments had determined 
that a direct Soviet invasion of Iran, though not impossible, was implausible. The 
National Security Council had studied the situation and drew the following 
conclusions:
Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective in the Soviet 
program of expansion...36 Although the U.S.S.R. will continue to 
apply strong political and psychological pressures against Iran...
(T]t is considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would be willing 
to resort to direct armed intervention...37
This assessment proved crucial to American strategy in Iran, for without the threat 
of direct Soviet intervention, the dispute’s severity was lessened significantly, and 
more focus placed upon other hotspots. To the Americans, it appeared that Stalin 
was unwilling to risk his goals in Eastern Europe and East Asia in order to make 
gains in Iran. This was a correct assessment. If the Soviets were content to 
subvert Tehran via a third force, the Tudeh Party, then the Americans were 
willing to employ the same tactic through the Shah. Soviet policy in Iran 
followed similar reasoning, as the following chapter will testify.
35 Fred I. Greenstein, “Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence,” Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 1, Winter 1979-1980, pp. 575-599.
36 Undated S/P -  NSC files, NSC 107 Series (Top Secret), FRUS. 1951-1954, vol. X,
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), p. 11.
Ibid., p. 15.
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All in all, American policy toward Musaddiq and his nationalization of 
British oil assets was, in essence, rather pragmatic. Neither Truman nor 
Eisenhower embraced Musaddiq and oil nationalization. Yet the Truman 
Administration was willing to wait for Musaddiq’s demise, while the Eisenhower 
Administration opted to intervene directly in order to hasten the premier’s fall and 
attain stability in Iran. Though American attitudes toward Musaddiq did not 
change, tactics and objectives did change. This change o f administrations and, 
hence, policy goals, was also reflected in the transition from Henry Grady to Loy 
Henderson as ambassador to Iran. Grady was more sympathetic to the Iranian 
came than his successor. In fact, Henderson was praised by the British 
government for his empathy for the British position, and his usefulness during and 
after the 1953 coup.
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8. Cold War Dynamics
In James F. Goode’s Diplomacy o f Neglect, he surmises that one of the 
sculptors o f oil nationalization’s outcome, the Cold War, need not have been the 
powerful factor that it was during the crisis. He states that the United States was 
“consumed” by the Cold War, and thus followed a “misguided policy bom of 
ignorance and anticommunist ideology.”1 It is easy to render such assessments at 
the end of the Cold War. Yet at the time, the policies formulated by British, 
American, and Soviet diplomats seemed reasonable.
The Bane o f Historical Revisionism
The fault of this strain of historical revisionism is that it takes a backward
look in history, and downplays the strong historical forces at work at the time a
crisis is in motion. Gaddis observed this tendency in his aforementioned article
on the Cold War. In the case of Iran, it is easy for criticism to be leveled against
American policy in Iran during the nationalization period because the 1979
Revolution granted us a sobriety only history can provide:
As the observer looks back over events in Iran in the years after 
1945 he has a feeling that with more wisdom, or at least with more 
knowledge of Iranian conditions and especially o f Iranian 
tendencies, the United States government could have helped 
prevent the descent into chaos in 1978.2
1 Goode, Diplomacy o f Neglect, p. viii.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
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Of course, an emotive, revisionist argument is easier to render than a
reasoned assessment because the bitter fruits of past miscalculations have been
harvested. Katouzian, in a discussion o f the Constitutional Revolution, observes
that this inclination can be very damaging to a well-structured historiography:
[A]t its best, this is a flight of fancy in reading history backwards- 
that is, interpreting past reality in the light of later experience; and, 
at its worst, shows a complete disregard for the effects o f social 
forces and human consciousness in historical situations.3
A revisionist approach, though able to uncover some previously overlooked 
causes, can also lead to erroneous conclusions. Different interpretive approaches 
under the revisionist umbrella can illuminate past historical events by revealing 
previously veiled determinants of those events’ outcomes. However, 
revisionism’s fallacy is that it sometimes relies too heavily on contemporary 
perceptions of past events, rather than rendering an accurate perception of those 
events through the eyes of history’s participants. In the case o f the Iranian oil 
nationalization crisis, the effects o f Cold War ideological, political, economic, and 
military rivalry upon the outcome are too often downplayed by a revisionist 
approach. Let us, then, examine the perceptions and policies o f the Soviet and 
American governments through their eyes.
Soviet Polity in Iran
First, it must be understood that Soviet-Iranian relations in the 19th and 
20th centuries have been characterized not by variation, but by continuity. The
3 Katouzian, p. 59.
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Bolshevik Revolution provided only a brief lull in Russia’s southward push, as
Firuz Kazemzadeh noted:4
The Soviet Union has had as its ultimate goal a Persia under a ( 
government controlled from Moscow; but in pursuit of this goal it 
has not been prepared for major political sacrifices, let alone war.
Iran, on its part, has been trying to use every available means to 
stay outside the sphere of Russian domination...
Soviet pressure on Iran has been unremitting, though its 
intensity has varied with circumstances. In resisting such pressure 
Iran has had to exercise extreme care lest she commit herself to 
Russia’s antagonists to such an extent that she would lose her 
freedom of maneuver.3 [Italics added]
What is fascinating about this consistent Tsarist Russian/Soviet policy is its 
pragmatism. Russia has historically desired warm-water transport routes, namely 
through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean and through the Trans-Caucasus 
region to the Persian Gulf. However, Russian and Soviet foreign policies have 
been, as a whole, more consumed with safeguarding and/or advancing the western 
border due to the number and strength of countless invasions from that direction. 
Western Russia’s flat topography has historically invited invasion, making the 
quest for an Iranian sphere o f influence secondary to the country’s western 
concerns. After the close of the Second World War, the Soviet policy was shaped 
by fresh memories of Axis infringement o f its Western border, and of the 20 to 30 
million Russians killed during the conflict. Foreign Commissar V.M. Molotov 
stressed Soviet apprehensions of German resurgence at a conference of foreign
4 See Rubinstein, pp. 57-62.
3 Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Soviet-Iranian Relations: A Quarter-Century Of Freeze and Thaw,” The 
Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. 
Vucinich, eds.(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 55.
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ministers at Paris in July, 1946. At this conference, plans for the demilitarization
of Nazi Germany were being discussed:
The Soviet Government reaffirms that the disarmament and long­
term demilitarization of Germany are absolutely essential. The 
Soviet Government holds that Germany should be kept disarmed 
and demilitarized not for twenty-five years, as suggested in the 
draft, but for at least forty years.
Thus, in the postwar period, Stalin’s attention was riveted on regions other than 
Iran. Soviet foreign policy focused on attaining a sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe to serve as a buffer between liberal-democratic, capitalist aggressors and 
die Soviet state. Likewise, after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Soviet 
diplomats busied themselves in that theater. Iran was, therefore, not the first item 
on Moscow’s global expansion agenda. While its oil resources, warm-water 
access, and geo-strategic values were coveted, the Soviet Union was decidedly 
pragmatic in its pursuit of policy. If expenditures or risks outweighed any possible 
gains, Soviet officials were content to maintain neutral relations with Tehran. If a 
situation presented itself that could be turned to Soviet Russia’s advantage, as in 
the chaotic two-year nationalization period, then Moscow would seek to 
manipulate that situation and so advance Soviet goals.
A second intriguing aspect o f Soviet foreign policy in Iran concerns the 
relationship between Communist ideology and its application. George 
Lenczowski recognized that revisions of dogmatic Marxism by Lenin and Stalin 
provided the Soviet Union with greater flexibility in its relations with capitalist 
and colonized nations. In its initial form, Lenczowski stated, Marxist history
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adhered to six “quite neatly-delineated periods:” primitive, slave-holding, feudal,
capitalist, socialist, and Communist.7 Thus, in this doctrinal approach, transition
from one period to another will inevitably lead to class struggle, revolution, and
warfare as each dominated class seeks to usurp its antecedent-dominator. In this
rigid formula, Marx left no room for peaceable relations between capitalist and
leftist entities. In essence, war was inevitable.
However, Lenin significantly modified this strict doctrine, so much so that
it could be labeled a “virtual repudiation” of Communist orthodoxy.8 Lenin
contended that as competition for material resources between capitalist nations
increased, socialist revolutions would occur due to the resultant chaos. Lenin also
argued that if a leftist revolution were successful, the new state would quickly
draw the fury of the capitalist nations. Given such dire circumstances, Lenin
surmised, it could be necessary to establish temporary alliances or agreements
with capitalist elements both to ensure survival and, simultaneously, to agitate for
leftist rebellion. Peaceful coexistence now joined the certainty of war as foreign
policy paradigms. As a result, an ideological justification was discovered to
support independence of movement:
This conceptual dualism, combining the inevitability of war and 
the possibility of coexistence, has permitted subsequent Soviet 
leaders to interpret Lenin virtually at their will, choosing that part 
of his theory which at the moment best suited them.9
6 V.M. Molotov, Problems o f Foreign Policy (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1949), p. 55.
7 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971), p. 5.
8 Ibid., p. 6.
9 Ibid., p. 8.
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When applied to Soviet-Iranian relations during the Musaddiq period, clarity is
given to an otherwise clouded picture. The Soviet Union was neither
extraordinarily helpful, nor particularly hurtful, to Musaddiq. True, they
continued to lend assistance to leftist elements in Iran- deemed an antagonistic
action by the Americans. However, despite fears by a few American officials of a
repeat of Azerbaijan, the Soviets did not intend to intervene directly in Iranian
internal affairs, so long as there was no significant Western military presence in
Iran. (The CIA and NSC eventually reached this same conclusion). Rather, the
Soviets preferred to coexist with Musaddiq, likely in the hope that his National
Front coalition could be employed as a vehicle to bring the Tudeh to power.
Moscow did not actively support Musaddiq due to his past complicity in defeating
the postwar Soviet oil concession. The Soviets seemed willing to employ covert,
subversive methods, but did not want to jeopardize recent gains in Eastern Europe
and the Far East for a lesser prize in Iran. Kazemzadeh noted this tendency in an
analysis o f Stalin’s decision to withdraw Red Army troops from Iran in 1946:
Stalin was not prepared for the sake of achieving all his aims in 
Persia to jeopardize his European goals. His hold on East 
Germany, Poland, and the rest of Eastern Europe had not yet been 
consolidated. Czechoslovakia was still governed by a coalition of 
“bourgeois” politicians. Eduard Benes was still president and Jan 
Masaryk was alive. Rumania had not yet been rid o f the king and 
the non-communist politicians, and in Bulgaria the struggle for 
control had not yet ended with the arrest and execution o f Nikola 
Petkov. Stalin mast have weighed opportunities and risks and 
decided that, having already achieved so much in Iran, he should 
not needlessly endanger his position...10 (Italics added]
10 Kazemzadeh, p. 62.
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Moscow was unwilling to continue an armed occupation of the country if doing 
so risked gains elsewhere. It seemed that the Soviet Union was only willing to 
expand its southern sphere of influence through indirect means, such as its 
support o f the Tudeh Party. The Soviets, like their American adversaries, would 
only consider direct armed intervention in the event of a U.S. or British 
invasion.11
When the Soviets did place diplomatic pressure on Musaddiq, they did so 
only in an effort to force a withdrawal of American military aid. Washington 
refused to grant substantial economic aid, but agreed to resume military assistance 
to Iran in April, 1952. In a threatening diplomatic note, Moscow protested 
Musaddiq’s acceptance of the American offer:
The Soviet Government deems it necessary to call the 
attention of the Iranian Government to the fact that, in agreeing to 
accept American so-called aid Mid, in this connection, assuming 
definite commitments of a military nature toward the United States 
of America, the Iranian Government is in feet setting out on the 
path of helping the United States Government to carry out its 
aggressive plans directed against the Soviet Union.12
Musaddiq and the Tudeh Party
Despite the improbability of direct Soviet intervention in Iran, the 
Americans were nonetheless deeply concerned by the oil dispute and the potential 
defection o f the Iranian government to the Soviet camp. Before describing the
11 State Department, Undated S/P -  NSC Files, “NSC-107,” FRUS, 1951-1954, vol. X 
(Washington, DC. Government Printing Office) p. 11-13.
12 Kazemzadeh, p. 67. Kazemzadeh excerpted this quote from Royal Institute of International 
Relations, Documents on International Affairs: 1952 (London, 1955), pp. 334-335.
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American response to perceived Soviet-Tudeh subversion in Iran, it is necessary
to provide a brief outline of Musddiq’s relationship to the left.
In the study of history, one must often be cautious in the use of primary
source material, that material provided by the participants in a historical event or
period, because each actor maintains distinct biases. These biases, often the result
of the actor’s own misperceptions and personal political agenda, can skew our
scholarship. Therefore, it is often necessary to exhibit restraint and good
judgement in our use of their first-person accounts.
The question of the Tudeh Party’s true position during the months
preceding Musaddiq’s fall provides us with such an instance. The Shah, of
course, vigorously accused Musaddiq of complicity with the leftists (both before
and after the August coup), no doubt with the design of courting American
support for his monarchy. Musaddiq, in his Memoirs, cited the Shah’s
accusations o f corruption during the referendum to keep Musaddiq in power:
And for the referendum, Musaddiq, the great champion of free 
elections, arranged that those in favour of dissolution and those 
against it should vote in separate plainly-marked booths! 
Everyone understood that if a man had the courage to vote against 
dissolution he would probably be beaten up by Musaddiq’s toughs 
or by those of the Tudeh- actually the two groups by this time were 
almost indistinguishable. The results were all that Musaddiq- or 
Hitler before him-could have desired.. .13
Musaddiq retorted that the “disciplined organisation” of the Tudeh Party projected 
a strength not commensurate with its small membership. He downplayed the 
Tudeh’s interference during the referendum, saying that
13 Musaddiq, p 291. See also the Shah’s Mission for My Country, p. 96; and Musaddiq, p. 277.
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the Tudeh party had some following in certain northern parts of the 
country as well as the capital, which, due to its disciplined 
organisation, looked impressive; but even if it did have some 
support elsewhere it was negligible. It is unworthy of the shah-in- 
shah to ignore 20 million people of this country, mid, in order to 
disregard everything that well-meaning and patriotic people do, 
believe or pretend them to be the propaganda effect o f a small 
group known as Tudeh [mass]...14
Musaddiq also minimized the support he had received from the Tudeh Party in the
months leading up to the 1953 coup. He also claimed that his alleged association
with the Tudeh Party was a “mere pretext” used by the Shah to stage the coup.13
Musaddiq’s Memoirs will be quoted here at length:
The left-wing [i.e. Tudeh party] propaganda [for the declaration of 
a ‘democratic republic’] after the 15-16 August coup was used as a 
mere pretext for the overthrow of my government, and the looting 
of my house and my papers and documents. I say this, because the 
decision to topple the government had been already taken before 
the 28 February conspiracy, and until 1.00 a.m. on 16 August, 
when the royal notice for my dismissal was delivered to me, no 
individual, left-wing or otherwise, had said a word about the 
declaration of a democratic or any other republic.. .16
Reality lay somewhere between the two views. In truth, Musaddiq had received 
key support from the Tudeh, support he was not willing to reject given his 
tenuous position in the months preceding the coup. Remember that it was the 
Shah, not Musaddiq, who maintained the overall loyalty of the army. The army
14 Ibid., pp. 291-292. In truth, Musaddiq did use questionable tactics during the August 3 
referendum. Knowing that he lacked support in the rural districts, Musaddiq set a short deadline 
for the vote in order to prevent rural voters from making it to the polls. Doing so permitted urban 
voters, (more of whom supported the premier), to vote for Musaddiq. He also arranged for the use 
of marked booths. All in all, the prime minister’s unscrupulous methods were used as a 
justification by the Shah for his coup.
15 Ibid., p. 285 for evidence of Musaddiq’s ‘distance’ from the Tudeh Party: “Between 16-19 
August, I received a report that the Tudeh party had stuck certain leaflets on the walls, and I 
ordered all of them to be removed and destroyed. This was done, and no other disorder was 
observed which they could use as a pretext for the coup.”
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was an instrument Musaddiq tried repeatedly to convert to his cause. Because 
Musaddiq received support from the extreme left, and because he exhibited a 
reluctance to curb their activities, some U.S. State Department officials 
mislabeled him a leftist. However, most officials were aware that Musaddiq was 
neither pro-British, nor pro-Soviet in his politics. He was, in their estimation, 
susceptible to a Communist-sponsored coup.
American Policy in Iran
For the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, the memories o f Chiang
Kai-shek and Bene§ made them wary of a repeat performance in Iran. This was
not a new fear, but one that had grown significantly since Stalin’s stubborn refusal
to withdraw his troops from Azerbaijan after the war. It was a fear that increased
as the oil dispute lapsed into its second year, for American policy-makers viewed
politico-economic chaos as fertile ground for leftism. “World communism,”
George Kennan argued, “[was] like [a] malignant parasite which [fed] only on
diseased tissue.”17 To the State Department, Iran was becoming increasingly
susceptible to Soviet machinations. Heiss summarized American consternation in
Empire and Nationhood:
If the Soviets could dominate Iran... the Soviets could also control 
the oil-rich areas o f Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The United States and 
its allies would be cut off from a resource deemed essential to 
victory in a modem war. For this reason alone the Soviets had to
16 Ibid., p. 319.
17 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), p. 559. In 
commenting on Soviet intentions during the immediate postwar period, Kennan stated the 
following: “Where individual governments stand in the path of Soviet purposes pressure will be 
brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet 
foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran)...” (Kennan, p. 556.
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be denied even a modicum o f influence in Iran, lest they use it to
t o
attack Western interests there and throughout the Middle East.
It seems that the revisionist school has had difficulty reconciling this type of 
statement, one that highlights Iran’s strategic significance, with U.S. rejections of 
Musaddiq’s aid requests mid lack o f significant resource expenditures in Iran in 
the immediate postwar period. However, if  one keeps in mind that the State 
Department anticipated no immediate, direct Soviet intervention, American 
actions are understandable. Again, the U.S. government believed that an invasion 
of Iran from the north was unlikely given the Soviet (and American) focus on 
European and Asian affairs. Because the U.S. government still anticipated 
continued leftist internal subversion, the Eisenhower Administration decided to 
oppose Soviet policy through their own third party, the anti-Musaddiq and/or pro- 
Shah forces inside Iran.
Thus, Soviet and American conduct in Iran exhibited, not differences, but 
striking similarities in policy, tactics, and perceptions between the two estranged 
superpowers. The Tudeh Party, though initially hostile to Musaddiq, later threw 
its support to the premier because o f his anti-British, and hence, anti-imperialist, 
sentiments. However, the Soviet Union was unwilling to jeopardize more 
important gains elsewhere for the sake o f a small jewel: a leftist, pro-Moscow 
government in Tehran. This pragmatism, though borne of postwar historical 
context, had as its underlying ideological justification Leninist and Stalinist 
modifications of a formerly rigid Marxist interpretation of historical process.
18 Heiss, p. 9.
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American foreign policy toward Iran in 1953 displayed a similar 
pragmatism. For the United States, direct military intervention was only a viable 
option in the event o f Soviet armed aggression. Since, according to intelligence 
reports, this was improbable, the Eisenhower government decided to join the 
British in an operation to topple Musaddiq, for Musaddiq’s deteriorating position 
heightened fears o f a leftist coup. Further, American pragmatism had its own 
practical factors and doctrinal justifications. In the summer of 1953, Eisenhower 
was reassessing American policy toward the Soviet Union. Previous to the 
Korean War, the United States had relied rather heavily on the deterring effects of 
nuclear superiority to ward off Soviet expansionism. Unfortunately, the Korean 
conflict exposed the fallacies o f relying on this strategy, for both Truman and 
Eisenhower (unlike MacArthur) did not view a limited nuclear strike on Korea or 
China as wise. Doing so, they correctly surmised, would not defeat the 
Communists, but would only expand the war and warrant nuclear retribution.
Eisenhower, after using rollback rhetoric to help win the 1952 election, 
decided that a reevaluation of containment policy was necessary. The result, 
dubbed the “New Look,” involved a combination of nuclear and conventional 
forces, and diminished reliance solely on nuclear retaliation as a deterrent for 
Communist aggression. Thus, the new American strategy would be to rely upon 
other, economic, propaganda, and political methods to oppose the Communist 
Bloc. This provided the State Department and Eisenhower Administration with 
more options to resist Soviet aggression, options that included the use of third
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parties, such as political groups, governments, and rebel movements, to stymie 
leftist expansion.
John Lewis Gaddis pointed out that containment doctrine, originally 
developed by George Kennan, underwent many transformations, and was subject 
to various interpretations as to its proper execution. He observed that two strands 
o f thought evolved out of Kennan’s initial postwar commentary, Universalist and 
Particularist
The Universalist approach to containment tended toward abstraction. 
Universalism called for national security to be attained through a reshaping of the 
globe in America’s image: an ideological and systematic harmonization of 
America’s external world with republicanism. Yet as Gaddis asserted, this 
interpretation contained significant dangers. First, it assumed that peace and 
security could be maintained by the assimilation of disparate nations into a 
common liberal-democratic framework. If a large bloc o f states held similar 
ideological views, maintained similar governmental structures, and were unified 
by contempt for a common enemy, the Soviet Union, then harmony would be 
reached and external security established. Of course, this interpretation assumed 
too much, for even when a group of nation-states have had common religious, 
political, and ideological elements, these have not guaranteed stability and peace. 
(Europe of the 18th and 19th centuries is a case-in-point). Second, Gaddis 
reminded us that this policy required immense expenditures in money, equipment, 
raw materials, military aid, and political support. Despite its significant resource 
wealth, such expenditures were bound to tax the U.S. economy and political
148
infrastructure without a guarantee of success. Further, one had to wonder if some 
countries, given the expenditures required to draw them into the American orbit, 
were worth saving. At the time of the Iranian dispute, U.S. policy-makers had, 
consciously or unconsciously, employed Universalist reasoning in their decision 
to intervene directly in Korea. Technically, Korea was outside the American 
defense perimeter. Yet a theoretical interpretation of containment doctrine 
demanded direct U.S. intervention because a loss in Korea threatened American 
security elsewhere in Southeast Asia; By intervening on South Korea’s behalf, 
therefore, the United States hoped to salvage a liberal-democratic victory and stop 
the domino effect. In essence, America sought to reshape the Korean peninsula in 
its own image, and thus protect its interests.
The Particularist implementation of containment doctrine was more 
pragmatic, and did not seek to reshape the world because of the inevitability of 
divergent ideologies, policies, and goals amongst nations. Instead, this 
interpretation emphasized more traditional balance-of-power methodology. 
Whereas Universalism tended to be moralistic, Particularism emphasized self- 
preservation and the advancement o f national interest as preeminent 
considerations in charting foreign policy. Morals were, therefore, virtually 
irrelevant. Victory over Communism and sustentation o f the American republic 
were priorities; methodology and ideology were secondary to these penultimate 
goals. Particularism also set limits on interference in the internal affairs o f other 
nation-states, for intervention in any and every crisis could tax the resources and 
manpower of the government. Thus, this interpretation allowed for a more
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selective, utilitarian approach to the containment of Soviet expansion. The U.S. 
government could ally with any nation, so long as that nation was friendly to 
American/Western interests and hostile toward leftism. The structure and 
ideology of allied governments was less important than their usefulness in 
opposing Communism and advancing American foreign policy goals.
U.S. policy during the Iranian oil nationalization crisis was fatefully 
shaped by this Particularist interpretation. Bome of postwar experience, not mere 
theory, this approach permitted the United States the same freedom of movement 
as that guaranteed by the Soviet embrace o f Leninist and Stalinist alterations to 
Marxism. To both superpowers, a Tehran regime hostile toward the other party 
was the ultimate purpose of Iranian policy. Other considerations, including 
ideological and ethical concerns, were secondary in the minds of Soviet and 
American diplomats. While one must appreciate, to some extent, the revisionist 
criticisms o f American policy during this period, one cannot wholeheartedly 
accept them. Remember that in the eyes o f American diplomats, the leftist threat 
in Iran was real and immediate. Remember also that the Soviet Union did have 
designs for a friendly government in Tehran, Though both superpowers were 
unwilling to intervene directly, they were willing to fight the nascent Cold War 
through third parties. While this is distasteful, and shackled the Iranian dream of 
self-determination, it was the perhaps unavoidable result of Cold War dynamics.
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9. A Most Machiavellian Affair
What is History?
In the preceding study, it has been my goal to strike as closely as possible 
at the foundational truths o f American-Iranian diplomacy during the Iranian oil 
nationalization crisis of 1949-1953. Yet such an attempt was inevitably harried 
by dangers at every turn, for history, as Bernard Bailyn pointed out, is 
simultaneously a “craft” and a science.1 Each historian brings his or her own 
techniques, perceptions, biases, and passions to historiography. This can be 
beneficial, for in many cases previously overlooked causes o f historical events are 
uncovered and past inaccuracies revised.
However, in our zeal to rewrite history and illuminate past grievances we 
can project our own contemporary, emotive judgements on the subjects o f our 
studies. Revisionist surveys of American-Iranian foreign relations often possess 
this error. One integral portion o f this revisionist school is the cultural 
interpretation o f history.
While long a characteristic o f Westem-Iranian relations, prejudice and 
ignorance did not play the role during this crisis apportioned them by the 
revisionist school. Unfortunately, contemporary historical revisionism often 
misapplies the cultural approach, giving it inordinate emphasis in many histories. 
Cultural revisionism seeks to name the bigoted parties in intercultural conflicts,
1 Bernard Bailyn, On the Teaching and Writing o f History, Edward Connery Lathem, ed. 
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), pp. 49-50.
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and then attributes blame for these conflicts solely to prejudice. Cultural 
revisionists must understand that this paradigm does not apply in equal measure to 
every historical event. While an obvious factor in international and intercultural 
relations, there can sometimes be other factors that more powerfully shape an 
event’s outcome. A reasoned, patient, and fair approach to historiography is 
required- an approach that, while passionate, is not mastered by emotionalism, 
moralistic vengeance, or an unwillingness to admit fundamental truths. Bailyn, 
while admitting that history is “an art form,” also argued that “good history” 
should hit close to its target, which is truth:2
The word “history” has, I think, two meanings. One is 
simply what happened; that is, the events, developments, 
circumstances, and thoughts o f the past, as they actually occurred.
The other is history as knowledge o f what happened, the record or 
expression of what occurred.
One needs to understand the relationship between the 
reality of what happened- the totality of past events and 
developments, past circumstances Mid thoughts- and what, in 
historical writings and compilations, people represent them to have 
been. That relationship, it seems to me, is crucial to all historical 
study and knowledge. The accuracy and adequacy of 
representations o f what is written about them, remain the measure, 
in the end, of good history- this despite all the fashionable doubts 
that are raised about the attainment of absolute or perfect 
objectivity and accuracy (which no one pretends to, anyway).3
The frequent bane of historical revisionism is its frequent /wOTepresentahon of 
past historical events. In the case of the Iranian oil crisis, it has often been 
asserted that the preeminent influences in both Musaddiq’s fall and die failure of 
nationalization were, in essence, Anglo-American prejudice and cultural 
ignorance.
2 Ibid., p. 49.
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In reality, these intercultural factors, while prevalent amongst many o f the 
players involved, were not the potent sculptors of the crisis’ outcome that 
revisionists would have us believe. Rather, Iranian intransigence, Anglo- 
American recalcitrance, and Cold War dynamics were more powerful factors in 
Musaddiq’s fell and nationalization’s defeat than long-standing cultural 
antagonisms and stereotypes. Each actor involved, though influenced by their 
respective (mis)perceptions and animosities, was motivated by more basic 
considerations.
Of all the significant factors, the Soviet-American rivalry was by far the 
greatest sculptor of the crisis’ outcome. In essence, it was not prejudice or 
ignorance that prompted American opposition to Musaddiq. Rather, Iranian 
internal instability and subsequent fears of a Communist coup were the two 
preeminent shapers of U.S. policy.
What, then, have we learned?
At its core, the outcome of the crisis was shaped most by the selfishness 
and pragmatism of the participants, and by the reactions of states to the actions of 
other internal and external actors. Goode would have us believe that pure-hearted 
altruism should have been the cornerstone of American foreign policy in Iran. 
While a noble sentiment, this thesis does not match with the realities of postwar 
Soviet-American competition, nor does it match with the underlying character Of 
American conduct during the period. In spite o f its Cold War republican 
blustering, U.S. policy was coldly pragmatic. The United States was willing to
3 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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support ‘freedom-loving’ peoples, but only i f  American interests were either
advanced or protected.
In essence, U.S. diplomacy with regard to Iran did not veer far from
Niccolo Machiavelli’s time-tested observations in The Prince. Machiavelli, like
his later American counterparts, hoped that morality, fairness, and integrity could
all be elements of a prince’s conduct o f international relations. Unfortunately,
such altruism was likely to be reciprocated by malevolence on the part of other
actors, making a more selfish approach necessary for survival:
P]t has seemed wiser to me to follow the real truth of the matter 
than what we imagine it to be... for how we live is so different 
from how we ought to live that he who studies what ought to be 
done rather than what is done will learn the way to his downfall 
rather than to his preservation. A man striving in every way to be 
good will meet his ruin among the great number who are not good.
Hence it is necessary for a prince, if  he wishes to remain in power, 
to learn how not to be good and to use his knowledge or refrain 
from using it as he may need.4
In quoting thus, I am by no means condoning such conduct, but rather 
condemning it. What is unfortunate about the conduct o f relations between 
nations is its consistently selfish character. Individual human nature tends toward 
self-preservation, and this tendency is inherently projected on relations between 
groups.
America’s diplomacy o f priority during the oil nationalization crisis was 
an example of such selfishness, and while not condoning U.S. conduct, I must 
point out that the State Department’s behavior symbolized a prevalent weakness 
in human nature. Until we, as individuals, alter our tendencies toward self-
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preservation and amoral ity, our conduct as nations will not appreciably change. 
In truth, we;, often base" our decisions on our own, personal, diplomacies o f  
priority.
4 Niecoid Machiaveili, Wm Prime, TG. Bergin, <xL {New ¥«fc  Appieton-Ceimuy-Crofts, 1947),
p. 44.
Appendices
Appen d ix  A -  Text of Nine Point Law [Bill], April 30, 19511
By the grace of Almighty God
We
Pahlavi Shahinshah of Persia
Hereby command, by virtue of article 27 of the Supplementary Constitutional 
Law that:
Article 1. With a view to arranging the enforcement of the Law of 24 and 
29 Isfand 1329 (15th and 20th March, 1951) concerning the nationalisation of the 
oil industry throughout Persia, a mixed Board composed o f five Senators and five 
Deputies elected by each of the two Houses and o f the Minister of Finance or his 
Deputy shall be formed.
Article 2. The Government is bound to dispossess at once the former 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company under the supervision of the mixed Board. If the 
Company refuses to hand over at once on the grounds o f existing claims on the 
Government, the Government can, by mutual agreement, deposit in the Bank 
Milli Iran or in any other bank up to 25 per cent o f current revenue from the oil 
after deduction of exploitation expenses in order to meet the probable claims of 
the Company.
Article 3. The Government is bound to examine the rightful claims of the 
Government as well as the rightful claims of the Company under the supervision 
of the mixed Board and to submit its suggestions to the two Houses of Parliament 
in order that the same may be implemented after approval by the two Houses.
Article 4. Whereas, with effect from 29th Isfand 1329 (20th March, 1951), 
when nationalisation of the oil industry was sanctioned also by the Senate, the 
entire revenue was derived from oil and its products is indisputably due to the 
Persian nation, die Government is bound to audit the Company’s accounts under 
the supervision of the mixed Board which must also closely supervise exploitation 
as from the date of the implementation of this law until the appointment of an 
executive body.
Article 5. The mixed Board must draw up, as soon as possible, the statute 
of the National Oil Company in which provision is to be made for the setting up 
of an executive body and a supervisory body of experts, and must submit the 
same to the two Houses for approval.
Article 6. For the gradual replacement o f foreign experts by Persian 
experts the mixed Board is bound to draw up regulations for sending, after 
competitive examinations a number of students each year to foreign countries to 
undertake study in the various branches o f required knowledge and gain 
experience in oil industries, the said regulations to be carried out by the Ministry
1 Parliamentary Debates, 1950-1951, June 11,1951, H.C.488, deb. 5s, pp. 1665-1666.
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of Education, after the approval o f the Council of Ministers. The expenses 
connected with the study of such students shall be met out o f oil revenues.
Article 7. All purchasers of products derived from the wells taken back 
from the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company can, in future, buy annually the same 
quantity of oil they used to buy annually from the Company from the beginning of 
the Christian year 1948 up to 29th Isfand 1329 (20th March 1951) at reasonable 
international price. For any surplus quantity they shall have priority in the event 
of equal terms of purchase being offered.
Article 8. All proposals formulated by the mixed Board for the approval 
of the Majlis and submission to the Majlis must be sent to the Oil Committee.
Article 9. The mixed Board must finish its work within three months as 
from the date of approval of this law and must submit the report o f its activities to 
the Majlis in accordance with article 8. In the event of requiring an extension it 
must apply giving valid reasons for such extension. Whilst, however, the 
extension is before the two Houses for approval, the mixed Board can continue its 
functions.
Appendix B -  American Secretaries o f  State, 1933-1959
Cordell Hull 1933-1944
Edward R. Stettinius 1944-1945
James F. Byrnes 1945-1947
Dean G. Acheson (Interim) 1947
George C. Marshall 1947-1949
Robert A. Lovett (Interim) 1949
Dean G. Acheson 1949-1953
John Foster Dulles 1953-1959
Appen dix  C -  American Ambassadors to Iran, 1933-1954
William H. Homibrook 1933-1936
Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. 1939-1943
Leland B. Morris 1944-1945
Wallace Murray 1945-1946
George V. Allen 1946-1948
John C. Wiley 1948-1950
Henry F. Grady 1950-1951
Loy W. Henderson 1951-1954
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